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This study is an Arts and Humanities Research Council funded collaborative project 
between Salford University and the Working Class Movement Library (WCML).  The 
project seeks to investigate and analyse, both diachronically and synchronically, the 
political cultures within major British trade unions affiliated to the Labour Party, the 
way in which these relate to the ideologies of working-class political movements 
generally, and how they are situated within wider contemporaneous debates.   
Typically research into trade unions has focused on the industrial side of their work, 
their official doctrine, and their formal and explicit policies, as expressed through 
conference speeches, resolutions and voting behaviour.  In contrast this study 
focuses on the morphology of the ideology and ethos of the different unions and 
their membership, looking beneath the official policies and overt statements to 
ascertain their common-sense understandings and unconscious and unquestioned 
received wisdom, which may have been invisible to the participants, but is exposed 
with the passage of time.  The relationship between the ideological understandings 
expressed through the journals, the dominant strands of socialist thought, and 
Labour Party policy, will also be investigated.  
The key sources for the project are in-house journals (1931-1951), written by and 
for trade unionists affiliated to the Labour Party, which are held at the WCML.  The 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) and the National Union of General and 
Municipal Workers (NUGMW) have been selected for scrutiny: the NUGMW, a 
general union in which ‘labourism’ dominated, and the AEU, a traditional craft union 
renowned for its centrist leadership and powerful communist influenced, shop 
steward movement.  The journal of the Aircraft Shop Stewards’ National Council 
(ASSNC), the New Propellor, is also included, not as a co-equivalent to the official 
union journals, but as a representative benchmark of the ideological understandings 
of many engineering activists, who agitated and promoted left-wing socialist and 




Research Questions  
 
The analysis of the journals will ascertain whether the passage of time has exposed 
attitudes and assumptions that reveal underlying mentalities, ideologies, and 
political cultures, that would have gone unnoticed at the time of their publication.  In 
this pursuit, the texts will be interrogated for evidence of whether the journals written 
by and for trade unionists reveal elements of socialist political cultures within the 
British trade union movement, the extent of any commonality of political culture 
within and between the journals, and the extent to which these are contested, both 
by other socialists, and by non-socialists.   
The journals did not exist in isolation, and thus it is important to identify whether the 
journals’ content reflected the broader political culture of Britain, and what changes 
in political cultures were evidenced as the context in which they were situated 
developed, from the 1931 turn to the left, through the ‘red 1930s’ and the pro-USSR 
war-time period, and finally the period of the first majority Labour Government and 
the evolving Cold War.  Thus, this study will seek to identify the morphology of 
socialist ideology in the period as expressed within the journals, and the nature of 
any challenges to it.  Importantly, ideas, interpretations, implications, and beliefs, 
regarding the presence of ‘actually existing socialism’ (the USSR) will be 






The objective of this study is to analyse the politics of British trade unions and shop 
steward movements in the context of the period in question (1931-1951) when 
socialism was the dominant discourse of the Labour Party.  This will be 
accomplished through an examination of the key in-house journals of leading trade 
unions affiliated to the Labour Party, held in the WCML’s archives.  The study will 
focus on, and analyse, the ideological character and function of the content, 
including the apparently ‘non-political’ content (such as letters pages, cartoons, 
events, education, and training), seeking evidence of political cultures, especially 
‘lived culture’ and unconscious received understandings, and how these relate to 







Trade Unions were established to defend, promote and extend the interests of their 
members.  They provided the institutional form for workers to unite to counter the 
power asymmetries between themselves and their employers within the capitalist 
legislative and judicial environment, where their interests were subordinate to those 
of the employers.  Collaboration enabled workers to garner ‘strength through unity’, 
to protect and enhance their interests and to undertake occupational and even class 
motivated action to fight for realisable goals.  Unions can be viewed as 
institutionalised manifestations of societal ideology, their organisational 
bureaucracy, structure, collective bargaining, rules and procedures, being derived 
from the dominant ideology of the society in which they were embedded.1  They 
were principally protectionist organisations, subject to the structural constraints of 
the legislative framework and judicial interpretations of capitalist society.   
Trade unions evolved embodying the ideology and interests of their founders; they 
were adaptive and reflexive, mediated by their structural environment and their 
history as it interacted with prevailing circumstances.  Like all institutions, trade 
unions embodied ‘particular amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn 
influence[d] development of ideas and material capabilities’,2 whose past shaped 
their structures, values, ethos, and policies.  Individual unions were institutions in 
themselves, but they also formed part of the greater labour movement in Britain and 
other countries such as Sweden and Germany.  Such movements can be 
understood as ‘a collection of loosely related institutions and individuals working 
towards a vaguely defined common goal’, whereby its various elements are 
expected to make sacrifices for other sections of the movement.3  
The unions shared the raison-d’etre of advancing their member’s interests, and a 
common ethos, and shared values.  Trade unionism as an ideology in its own right 
                                                          
1  John E. Kelly, Trade Unions and Socialist Politics (London, 1998), pp. 63-68, 77.  
2  Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations theory 
millennium’, Journal of International Studies, 10:2 (1981), pp.126-155. 
3 Donald Schon, ‘Beyond the State’, (London, 1971), in H.M. Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos in the 
Labour Party (London, 1979), p.18. 
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provides a distinct prism and interpretative framework for analysing issues which 
directly affected employment and workplace issues (slumps, unemployment, or 
booms); it guided the unions responses and actions in the industrial sphere, and 
facilitated the establishment of a collective identity.  Nonetheless the ideological 
stances of the union officials, their members, and the journal contributors, were not 
necessarily homogenous on an intra-union or inter-union level, or between the trade 
unions and the shop steward organisations.  The dominant ideology of the 
organisations inevitably diverged from that of a proportion of its members, who were 
recruited on occupational criteria rather than political allegiance.  Each union 
represented workers with different occupational identities (within a narrow or very 
broad range), from white-collar workers, skilled craftsmen, to the semi-skilled, or 
unskilled.  Such differentiation inter alia, affected workers’ material wealth and 
social standings, their perceptions, and outlooks.  Occupational identities were 
further overlaid by workers’ more fundamental identities: their gender, ethnicity, 
roles outside work, and their own ideologies, and societal norms and values.    
In the period 1931-1951, as in most of their history, trade unions represented under 
half of the total workforce – which fell to around 30% between 1920 and 1931; it 
then increased, but remained below 40% until the Second World War. Trade union 
membership was not exclusive to socialist or even Labour Party supporters; many 
members had no particular interest in politics, and others were Liberal or Tory 
voters.  Indeed, over 50% of working class people voted Conservative in the British 
general elections of 1931 and 1935 and a proportion of these were probably trade 
unionists.  Thus, union membership was a loose affiliation of workers who combined 
in pursuit of their material interests.  Some, especially core activists, sought to 
modify the current system and considered their union membership to be an 
expression of commitment to a broader labour movement that could involve the 
long-term reform and even the replacement of capitalism.   
The Labour Representation Committee (LRC) / Labour Party (LP) was created in 
recognition that the parliamentary path would prove more efficacious than industrial 
militancy in achieving some of the unions’ objectives, especially within the prevailing 
hostile legislative environment.  The Labour Party’s creation as the union’s 
parliamentary voice was overtly political, and embodied a potent and enduring, 
reciprocal duty to protect.  Moreover, its inception as the ‘child’ of the TU movement 
created lasting structural, constitutional, financial, and emotional bonds. The formal 
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separation of the political and the industrial wings was an expedient that ostensibly 
left the trade unions depoliticised and certainly subordinate to parliamentary politics 
(although the point of production’s centrality in the economic struggle ensured that 
conflict at work remained a politically contested area).  Of course, the deliberate 
attempt to depoliticise industrial conflicts was itself political. But it expressed the 
ruling conviction in Britain that legitimate politics took place within the formal political 
system, at the apex of which stood Parliament. 
The ostensibly depoliticised unions often presented themselves as practical, 
empirical, and reactive, a disposition which effectively marginalised a broader 
concern for theoretical issues. Guild socialists, communists, and syndicalists were 
among those who challenged the unions’ ostensibly depoliticised stance by raising 
issues of power within society and industry.  The practice of the unions was in any 
case overtly political.  The nineteenth century union leaders were principally 
Liberals (with some openly Conservative, for instance in the Lancashire mills), and 
many retained a Liberal ideology even after the Labour Party’s establishment.  
Socialism in Britain grew from very small beginnings in the revival of the 1880s and 
entered the unions via the work of individuals such as Tom Mann and Will Thorne 
and through the interventions of various socialist organisations, including the Social 
Democratic Federation (SDF), the Fabian Society, Socialist Labour Party (SLP), 
British Socialist Party (BSP), the Plebs League, the Independent Labour Party (ILP), 
and the Communist Party (CP) and the debates within and between them.  The 
Labour Party’s adoption of a socialist clause in its 1918 constitution testified to the 
growing influence of collectivist thinking within the unions. But even after the Great 
War – a radicalising and destabilising experience for all the belligerents – socialists 
remained a tiny minority within the Labour Party. Studies of the period plausibly 
depict Labour as a party dominated by unions which remained indifferent, if not 
actually hostile, to socialism.4 Yet by 1931 socialism was the regnant ideology in 
both the Party and the unions affiliated to it. 
This change was not inevitable. Some unions created or later became affiliated to 
the Labour Party, but the Party’s purposes were initially rather narrowly conceived. 
The unions themselves remained wedded to free collective bargaining and sought 
to recruit members irrespective of political allegiances.  Trade unionism did not 
                                                          
4 Ross McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party: 1910-1924 (London, 1974). 
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imply socialism.  The optimisation of members’ terms and conditions of work in the 
industrial sphere depended on the unity of as many members of the workforce as 
possible. Steering clear of association with particular political parties and their 
ideologies was one way of pursuing that goal, as the USA’s American Federation of 
Labour (AFL) tried to demonstrate under Samuel Gompers’ leadership.  Indeed, the 
British Trade Union Congress (TUC) preached such an approach to African and 
Caribbean trade unionists in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s.5   The role trade unions 
actually played depended on history and politics and these varied significantly in 
accordance with national trajectories. For instance, in Sweden, under their Social 
Democratic Governments’ labour friendly environment (1932 -1976), their fewer and 
larger unions coalesced in the Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO) federation, which 
unlike the TUC, could make long-term binding decisions on wages with an equally 
centralised and comprehensive employers’ federation.  This environment enabled 
the country to engage in long-term tripartite planning even in the absence of 
extensive state ownership of industry.  In post 1948 Germany, historical 
circumstances allowed a statutory co-determination policy to be introduced, obliging 
large companies to have union representatives on their Boards, resulting in more 
powerful unions that garnered arguably greater benefits than their British 
counterparts.  Elsewhere unions split on political or religious lines, as in France and 
Italy, further illustrating that the development of trade unions in Britain followed one 
amongst many evolutionary possibilities, albeit subject to contextual constraints. 
 
Trade Unions and Politics 
 
British unions are a product of their history and the path dependencies it can 
generate.  The transformation of society wrought by the industrial revolution gave 
rise to trade unionism, as industrialisation thrust large groups of workers together in 
an asymmetric power relationship with the employers.  The employer – employee 
relationship developed in the context of a state where the elite (originally the landed, 
then increasingly the industrial), set the constitution and laws; thus, class was 
political as well as economic (and cultural).  Proscribed by the Combinations Acts 
1799 and 1800 and the Unlawful Societies Act 1799, the early trade unions’ survival 
                                                          
5 Peter Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, (Redwood City, 1988). 
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and growth depended on their convincing government that they did not threaten the 
capitalist status-quo.  Concessions were obtained, such as the Ten Hour Act and 
the 1867 Reform Act (which also protected the bourgeoisie by demonstrating that 
reforms were obtainable through parliament, obviating the need for revolution).  
However, only with the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 were two or 
more people able to further their trade dispute without being liable to criminal 
conspiracy charges.  Subsequent legislative changes enabled or constrained 
organised labour. Nonetheless, legislation remained inequitable.  Unions in Britain 
were forced to realise that political engagement was a necessary condition for 
shaping subsequent legislation and practices, including employer acceptance of the 
unions as workers’ legitimate representatives in negotiations and collective 
bargaining. 6  Changes made in law offered institutional and universal rights and 
protection, and were consequently striven for by the labour movement.  
There is a large and diverse body of published work investigating the relationships 
of trade unions with politics which provide the background and context in which the 
journals analysed in this study were written. 7  These range from general labour 
histories, to histories of trade unions and trade unionism, through craft unions and 
friendly societies, to new unionism, and the subsequent wave of militancy and 
syndicalism.  These studies are all situated in their various historical contexts, such 
as the dire economic conditions and unemployment of the 1920s, (with failed 
strikes, lock-outs, especially the 1922 engineers’ lock-out), the 1926 General Strike 
and 1927 Trade Disputes Act (which significantly weakened the unions, and 
resulted in many union leaders seeking negotiation and accommodation and the 
promotion of Mondist policies, rather than industrial actions),8  as well as the 
subsequent rearmaments boom, WWII, and the post-war period. 
                                                          
6 The Conciliation Act 1896 underlined state support for collective bargaining.  This was further 
enhanced by the new powers to promote the issue given to the Ministry of Labour in 1918. 
7 These issues are covered in the wide-ranging literature on trade unions and working class politics 
and history.  For instance, Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World 
War (London, 1994); Hugh A. Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions Since 1889: Volume II: 1911-
1933 (Oxford, 1985); H. A. Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions Since 1889 (Volume III): 1934-
1951 (Oxford, 1994); H. A. Clegg, Alan Fox, and Andrew Thompson, A History of British Trade 
Unions Since 1889: 1889-1910. Vol.1 (Oxford, 1964); Charles L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars 
1918-1940 (New Edition) (London, 1956); Andrew Taylor, Trade Unions and Politics: A Comparative 
Introduction (London, 1989). 
8 The accommodative policies followed by powerful union leaders heightened the left-right divide in 
the movement. The PLP welcomed this stance, as it minimised public discontent over the 
consequences of industrial action (electorally disadvantageous), and perceptions of the Labour Party 
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Other studies focused on specific unions,9 or specific issues such as the trade union 
- Labour Party relationship or the influence of communists.  There is also a large 
body of literature ‘from below’.  The current study, analyses trade union and shop 
stewards’ journals as cultural artefacts that archive the understanding and 
consciousness that these organisations disseminated to their readership, and thus 
attempts to fill a gap in the literature by examining the changing political cultures 
exposed by the conversations the unions had with their members through their 
journals.  
The history of the labour movement (1889-1951) within the broader economic, 
social and industrial environment, is traced in Hugh Clegg’s three volumes A History 
of British Trade Unions Since 1889, which cover pivotal industrial actions, landmark 
rulings, and other enabling / conciliatory, or constraining / coercive, legislation, and 
their immediate and cumulative effects.10  The structural problems facing the unions 
as institutions are explored, including their bureaucratisation and centralisation 
which their growth necessitated, their collective bargaining function, and their 
relationships with the TUC and Labour Party.  The Government’s expansion and 
extension into the industrial sphere resulted in the labour movement’s inclusion on 
Government committees and subcommittees, which brought trade unions and the 
political rulers into increased proximity, transforming their position from outsiders at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, to their subsequent incorporated status.  The 
unions’ attempted to influence government and the executive bureaucracy through 
engagement with the state at multiple levels, including Royal Commissions, 
Commissions of Enquiry, Select Committees (such as Education and National 
Expenditure), war-time production and labour committees (including Joint 
                                                          
as a ‘class’ movement which the capitalist press promoted, as opposed to the Conservatives who 
they portrayed as representing public opinion and the national interest.   
9 Histories of the specific unions whose journals are analysed in this study include: William 
MacLaine, The Engineers’ Union, Book 1, (1938), WCML trade union/ENG/6/G/45; James B. 
Jefferys, Story of the Engineers: 1800-1945 (Herts, 1945); Hugh A. Clegg, General Union in a 
Changing Society (Oxford, 1964); Lisanne and Giles Radice, Will Thorne: Constructive Militant 
(London, 1974); John Callow, The Union  (London, 2012); John Robert Clynes, Memoirs (London, 
1937); John Lloyd, Light and Liberty: One Hundred Years of the Electrical, Electronic, 
Telecommunications and Plumbing Union (London, 1990); ETU, The Story of the ETU: the Official 
History of the Electrical Trades Union (Kent, 1952); Frank Chapel, ‘Sparks Fly’ (London, 1984). 
10 Such as: The Taff Vale and Osborne Judgements; 1926 General Strike; the Trade Disputes and 
Trade Unions Act 1927 which replaced ‘Contracting-Out’ from paying the political levy with 
‘Contracting-in’, and legislative restrictions on Trade Union’s Political Levy, Political Funds, and 
Political Expenditure (described by William Brownlie (AEU), as ‘One for the creation of industrial 




Production Committees (JPCs)), Ministerial Advisory Committees and Government 
Co-ordinating Committees), as well as specialist investigative committees, 
legislative scrutiny committees, tripartite corporatist bodies, other state bureaus, 
and quangos.11 The unions’ embeddedness in the legislative and politico-economic 
environment is evidenced, and Clegg highlights the union leaders’ conviction that 
legal changes were a necessary condition to make all concessions won, permanent 
and enforceable.12  Clegg’s account adopts an ostensibly apolitical approach, but it 
encompasses a sense of an inevitability of outcome, casting syndicalism and 
Marxism as implicitly undesirable and unfeasible, industry based unionism as 
unrealisable, and the left-wing generally as obstructive and a hindrance to the 
Labour project.  
Clegg and other Oxford School proponents’13 publications concentrate on the 
management of the conflicting interests of workers and managers through 
institutional reforms that would facilitate grievance resolution, tripartite working, and 
legislative interventions to maintain and enhance workplace relations.  Thus, they 
advocated that trade unions should not merely pursue wage bargaining (deemed a 
threat to the country’s economic position through undermining competitiveness and 
creating wage push inflation), but also that unions should work with employers and 
the government (including on wages policy) to increase productivity and economic 
growth, whilst minimising inflation.  In this vein, Allan Flanders’ Trade Unionism,14 
presented an account of prevailing conditions, problems, and policy prescriptions 
around ‘responsible’ union leaders working constructively with employers to 
facilitate productivity increases and efficiencies, and the role of Government in 
establishing wage policy.15   
                                                          
11 There is also a literature that specifically covers the relationship between the trade unions and the 
Government.  For instance, V. L. Allen, Trades Unions and the Government (London, 1960), 
12 Clegg, Fox, and Thompson, A History of British Trade Unions Volume 1 (Oxford, 1964); Clegg, A 
History of British Trade Unions Volume 2 (Oxford, 1985); Clegg, A History of British Trade Unions 
Volume 3 (Oxford, 1994). 
13  Including theorists such as Allan Flanders, Alan Fox and Otto Kahn Freund. 
14 Allan Flanders, Trade Unionism (London, 1958). 
15 For an account of the ideological underpinnings of Flanders’ work, see, John Kelly ‘Democracy 
and Anti-communism: Allan Flanders and British Industrial Relations in the Early Post-war Period’, in 
Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman, and John Mcillroy, British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics (Hants, 
1999), Also see, Michael Poole, Theories of Trade Unionism (London, 1984); John T. Dunlop, 
Industrial Relations Systems (Henry Holt, 1958); Alan Fox and Allan Flanders, Trade Unionism, 
(Hutchinson, 1958); Arthur Marsh Industrial Relations in Engineering (London, 1965), Hugh Clegg, 
Trade Unionism Under Collective Bargaining (Oxford, 1976); for international comparisons, see for 
example, Richard Scase, Social Democracy in Capitalist Society: Working Class Politics in Britain 
and Sweden  (Maryland, 1977). 
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Studies by theorists like Richard Hyman challenge the Oxford School of industrial 
relations policy-orientated pragmatism, instead employing Marxist analysis, focusing 
on the class conflict considered endemic in capitalism, and manifest in the 
asymmetries reified through its hegemonic ideology, and institutionalised in its 
politico-judicial, economic, and social systems.  Hyman’s Marxism and the 
Sociology of Trade Unionism,16 and his Industrial Relations: A Marxist 
introduction,17 provide theoretical Marxist accounts of trade unions situated within 
their multifaceted environment.  Such Marxist understandings, interpretations, and 
critiques of the prevailing political economy, and the embodied political ambition to 
empower and eventually emancipate labour and fundamentally restructure society, 
are useful in the analysis of the journals written by and for trade union members.  
John Kelly’s Trade Unions and Socialist Politics18 analyses the union’s ability to 
represent working class interests, the viability of industrial democracy, and the 
impact of wage militancy and industrial action in raising class consciousness and 
politicising the workforce.  He rejects the theory that union leaders have become 
merely a conservative force.  Kelly examines the forging of class consciousness 
through trade unionism, and the interactive and inter-penetrative relationship 
between class consciousness, trade unionism, and socialist politics with reference 
to classical socialist texts (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky, and Gramsci).  
These selected texts cover the various theorists’ understandings of trade unions, 
concerning for instance, their position as a product of the capitalist system, the 
incorporation of trade union leaders and officials through bureaucratisation, the 
unions’ conception of their own welfare (and that of their officials), and the power of 
capital and the expediencies of the capitalist system.  Thus, Kelly highlights the 
plurality of explanations and interpretations of trade unions, even when analysed 
from a purely communist perspective. 
The shop steward movement forms an important element in British trade union 
function and dynamics, providing an interface between the officials and the rank and 
file. Indeed, for many workers ‘the shop steward is the union’,19 as their workplace 
                                                          
16 Richard Hyman, Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism (London, 1971). 
17 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (London, 1975). 
18 John Kelly, Trade Unions and Socialist Politics (London, 1988). 
19 James Hinton, ‘Coventry communism: A Study of Factory Politics in the Second World War’, 
History Workshop, 10 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 90-118; J.F.B. Goodman and T.G. Whittingham, Shop 
Stewards 2nd Ed., (London, 1973), p.xiv. 
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presence (as opposed to branch presence), means they are normally the first 
people workers consult for dispute resolution or to pursue grievances. The 
stewards’ precarious position (historically elected and dismissed by a show of 
hands) ensured that they were attuned to the rank and file’s mind-sets, opinions, 
objectives, and concerns.20 
The shop stewards were a particularly powerful element in the AEU due to the 
industry’s structure (multiple small engineering firms).  Edmund and Ruth Frow’s 
1982 study, The Engineers Struggles, focuses on AEU shop stewards’, their history, 
roles, the movements’ protagonists, and internal unions relations, as they evolved 
and encountered various industrial disputes.21 Written by a communist shop 
steward / trade union official, the study provides an insightful backdrop to the AEU 
and NP journals’ perspectives, content, and the common sense understandings that 
underlay its articles (Edmund Frow was active in both the AEU and Aircraft Shop 
Stewards’ National Council (ASSNC) / Engineering and Allied Trades Shop 
Stewards National Council (EATSSNC)). 
Studies into workplace organisation and dynamics form another strand of the 
literature on trade unions.  Richard Croucher’s study Engineers at War 1939 -
1945,22 seeks to capture the ethos of the union membership that diverged from its 
right-wing leadership, exposing the tensions that can arise between rank and file 
opinion and the union officials over pay claims and industrial disputes, raising 
issues of trade union loyalty.  As such, he exposes issues that are minimised or 
excluded from the official Trade Union journals.  His study challenges the dominant 
narrative of wartime national unity, instead revealing wartime industrial politics and 
militancy, including that of apprentices and women. He also examines the different 
stances of the AEU and Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) (principally 
male) union officials’ and shop stewards’ attitudes towards women, and women’s 
(largely non-unionised) militancy in pursuit of equal pay.  
                                                          
20 The Shop Stewards movement in general is explored in, for instance, Goodman and Whittingham, 
Shop Stewards.  Also see for instance, Edmund Frow and Ruth Frow, Engineering Struggles 
(Manchester, 1982); 
21 Frow and Frow, Engineering Struggles; Also see: Arthur Marsh, and Edward E. Coker, ‘Shop 
Steward Organization in the Engineering Industry’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1:3 (1963), 
pp. 170–190. 
22 Richard Croucher, Engineers at War, (Manchester, 1982); Also see R. Croucher, Communist 
Politics and Shop Stewards in Engineering, 1935-46’, PhD Thesis, (University of Warwick, 1977), 
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 Other studies such as Alan McKinlay and Joseph Mellings’ The Shop Floor Politics 
of Production,23  reject institutionalists’ accounts, instead concluding that it is the 
interplay between the shop floor and the other principal actors in the historic 
circumstances of the post-war engineering industry, that shaped outcomes.  Studies 
by Jonathan Zeitlin,24 Richard Price,25 and Richard Hyman,26 also expose the 
unions’ internal tensions, as trade union leaders (who have a stake in the status-
quo) can clash with the rank and file opinion, further exposing the structural conflict 
between capital and labour, and the centrality of the point of production for trade 
union politics, in terms of both bread and butter issues, and also their potential to 
encompass political issues.  
Ken Coates and Anthony Topham’s Shop Stewards and Workers’ Control (1975) 27 
examines the issues through participants’ voices, exposing intra-union tensions, 
where the ethos of the union as the ‘members’ union’ under the member’s 
democratic control and policy direction, came into conflict with the Trade Unions’ 
need for efficient governance, adherence to union-employers’ agreements, and 
avoidance of anarchy and unofficial strikes.   Their analysis is imbued with Marxist 
ideology,28 promoting workers’ control, and condemning Mondism, Corporatism, 
and the Neo-Corporatism advocated by Keynes (implemented under the post-war 
consensus, and generally favoured by the TUC), which they described as ‘an 
apostasy, because wage slaves remained in bondage even while their living 
standards increased … for us socialism was, is and will remain a call for freedom’.29 
Such analysis provides a useful background to the on-going factional actions and 
                                                          
23 Alan McKinlay and Joseph Melling, ‘The Shop Floor Politics of Production: Work, Power and 
Authority in British Engineering’, in Campbell, Fishman, and Mcillroy, British Trade Unions and 
Industrial Politics, p. 76.   
24Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Shop Floor Bargaining and the State: A Contradictory Relationship’, in Steven 
Tolliday and J. Zeitlin (eds), ‘Shop Floor Bargaining and the State’, (Cambridge, 1985); J. Zeitlin, 
‘From Labour History to the History of Industrial Relations’, Economic History Review, 40:2, (1987); 
J. Zeitlin, ‘Rank and Filism and Labour History: A Rejoinder to Price and Cronin’, International 
Review of Social History, XXXIV, (1989), pp. 89-102; 
25 Richard Price, Masters, Unions and Men: Work Control in Building and the Rise of Labour, 1830-
1914 (Cambridge, 1980), p. 17. 
26 Richard Hyman, Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism (London, 1971); R. Hyman, 
Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (London, 1975); R. Hyman, ‘The Politics of Workplace 
Trade Unionism: Recent Tendencies and Some Problems for Theory’, Capital and Class, 8 (1979), 
pp. 54-55. 
27 Ken Coates and Tony Topham, Eds. Shop Stewards and Workers Control Vol 1 (Nottingham, 
1975); K. Coates and T. Topham, Eds. Shop Stewards and Workers Control Vol 2 (Nottingham, 
1975); K. Coates and T. Topham, Eds. Shop Stewards and Workers Control Vol 3 (Nottingham, 
1975). 
28 Coates and Topham founded the Institute for Workers Control. 
29 K. Coates, and T. Topham, ‘Trade Unions and Politics’ (Oxford, 1986). 
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debates that existed beneath the formal accounts presented in the union journals, 
which form the basis of this thesis. 
Although the unions were constitutionally intermeshed with the Labour Party and it 
was the principal party they supported, the Communist Party of Great Britain 
(CPGB) was also influential - to an extent disproportional to its size.  Nina 
Fishman’s exploration of the CP’s influence on, and within the trade union 
movement, in her The British Communist Party and Trade Unions 1933-1945,30 
dispels many myths perpetuated within the historical record, and fills some of the 
omissions.  Her work is pertinent to all studies on trade unionism of the period, but 
is especially useful in this study as communists were over represented in the AEU, 
and controlled the ASSNC.  Specific situational studies, such as Hinton’s Coventry 
communism: A Study of Factory Politics in the Second World War (1980) explores 
the relative success of the Communist Party, with its industrial focus, during the 
specific conditions of WWII, compared to that of the Labour Party which traditionally 
attempted to depoliticise industrial relations. 31    
The dominance of the Labour Party and the trade union movement hierarchies by 
the right, and their relationship with those of other ideological persuasions, is also 
evidenced in the current literature (particularly the trade union /Labour Party /CPGB 
relationships).32 Fears of communist infiltration of the labour movement at all levels 
had abounded since the Bolshevik revolution,33 and remained a live issue 
throughout the period analysed here, especially when contextually determined 
international or domestic issues rendered it pertinent.  Trade unions’ Labour Party 
affiliation was subject to the acceptance of the Labour Party’s ‘Programme, 
Principles, and Policies’, which was incompatible with the CPGB’s ideology and 
allegiance to the Communist International (Comintern).34  Attempts to restrict 
                                                          
30 N. Fishman, The British Communist Party and Trade Unions, 1933-1945 (Hampshire, 1995). 
31 Hinton, ‘Coventry communism: A Study of Factory Politics in the Second World War’, History 
Workshop, 10, (1980), pp. 90-118. 
32 For instance: John McIllroy, ‘British communists and the 1932 Turn to the Trade Unions’, Labor 
History, (December 2015), pp. 1-25; John Callaghan, ‘National and International Dimensions of 
British Communist History’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 24:3 (2008), pp. 
456-472; J. Callaghan, Cold War, Crisis and Conflict. The CPGB, 1951–68.  Volume 5 (London, 
2004); J. Callaghan, ‘The Plan to Capture the British Labour Party and Its Paradoxical Results, 1947-
91’, Journal of Contemporary History, 40:4 (October 2005), pp. 707-725. 
33 Premised on communist writings since ‘Lenin’s Left-Wing communism: An infantile Disorder’, 
(1920) and especially after the, 1935 Popular Front set a pattern for communist attempts to recruit 
shop stewards, and obtain office, or high position. 




ideology within the trade unions and the Labour Party through the exclusion and 
vilification of communists was codified through rule changes.35 This resulted in the 
TUC, many individual unions, and the Labour Party, being conspicuously absent 
from concerted and unified political action, such as the ‘National Unemployed 
Workers Movement’, 36  or the United and People’s Fronts, against fascism.37  The 
CPGB countered that the Labour Party, to be fully representative of the labouring 
classes, must incorporate workers who were communist, especially as historically 
they accepted the ILP and SDF and BSP.    
Such CPGB / Labour Party / trade union / internal union politics, and factional 
conflicts, were notoriously exposed within the Electrical Trades Union (ETU).  
Although the ETU is not one of the principle unions analysed here, the literature on 
its internal dynamics is noteworthy, both in terms of the factional conflicts within the 
union, but also as an illustration of the extent to which authorial perspectives shape 
analysis.  The ETU sponsored study by Schaffer (1949) focused on the unions 
formal history, changes to its internal structure, and its decisions and actions.38  The 
unions’ own account (1952), does likewise.39  Both accounts underplay internal 
disputes highlighted elsewhere, and adopt a somewhat self-satisfied unreflective 
tone, concentrating on the constitution, officials and leadership, and the union’s 
achievements, whilst denigrating those dissenting from official policies.  Contrary 
accounts are presented in John Lloyd’s (1990) analysis,40 which judged 
                                                          
35 In 1929, a prohibition was placed on members of proscribed political parties attending the Labour 
Party Conference as delegates; the Labour Party NEC increased control over Labour candidate 
selection, and required individual party membership; the TUC’s ‘Black Circular’ (1934) barred Trade 
Councils from permitting communist delegates.  All these factors combined to reinforce the Labour 
Party-trade union relationship, whilst excluding the far-left.   Moreover, some unions (for instance the 
TGWU) banned communists and fascists from holding certain offices as incompatible with their 
Labour Party affiliation.  The Labour Party also opposed the pre-WWII Unity campaign promoted by 
the ILP, Socialist League, and the CPGB.  Indeed, the Labour Party disaffiliated and then proscribed 
the Socialist League at its 1936 conference (precluding its members from continued Labour Party 
membership), effectively forcing it to disband.  Similarly, in, 1939 Stafford Cripps, supported by trade 
unionists like Will Lawther and Sam Watson of the miners, urged the NEC to establish a Popular 
Front.  When the NEC rejected the proposal, he circulated his memorandum, and refused party 
instructions to withdraw it; he was expelled along with others including Aneurin Bevan and George 
Strauss.   
36 Richard Croucher, We Refuse to Starve in Silence (London, 1987); Wal Hannington, Ten Lean 
Years, (London, 1940); J. Callaghan Socialism in Britain (Oxford, 1990) pp. 130-131. 
37 For an analysis of the relationship between the trade unions and the CP and Labour Party, see for 
instance, Fishman, The British Communist Party and Trade Unions.  For proscribed organisations, 
see for instance, The Labour Party, The Communist Solar System: The Communist International 
(London, 1933). 
38 Gordon Schaffer, Light and Liberty: 60 years of the ETU (Kent, 1949). 
39 ETU, The Story of the ETU (Kent, 1952). 
40 Lloyd, Light and Liberty.  
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communists, their meetings, planning, candidate selection, and electoral strategies, 
to be insidious and manipulative; whereas the same actions by reformists were 
considered courageous. Such accounts are also useful in highlighting examples of 
leadership and membership’s policy differences,41  the interrelationship between the 
trade unions and the parliamentary party, and their ideological and policy 
similarities, differences and tensions, which are highly pertinent to this study.   
The unions presented themselves as ‘the members’ union’, representing the 
members’ opinion, and acting in the members’ interests.  Their democratic 
foundation was considered fundamental; leaders emerged to represent the will of 
the members.  Nonetheless, the extent to which union leaders embodied their 
members’ will, is difficult to ascertain.42  Martin Harrison’s Trade Unions and the 
Labour Party since 1945, explores such phenomena along with the parallel issues 
of manipulation of the unions’ affiliation numbers and delegate discretion (although 
composite resolutions rendered discretion inescapable) which affected policy 
outcomes due to the potentially hegemonic influence of the biggest unions’ block 
vote.43  
The Labour Party’s trade union roots are evidenced in their constitutional 
incorporation and structural power within the Labour party.  The unions’ input 
extended well beyond finance to cover numerous inter-related spheres, including 
policy formation and decisions, political education, socialist ideology, revolutionary 
separatism, and political factionalism.44  Trade unions, to varying degrees, 
encouraged members to influence political policy discussions and directions by 
lobbying, submitting resolutions, or by standing for office in local, district, or national 
government, or in civil society institutions.45  Lewis Minkin, summed up the trade 
union – Labour Party relationship in his title: The Contentious Alliance: Trade 
                                                          
41 As exemplified by the 1946 membership’s rejection of the EC’s decision to submit a resolution to 
the Labour Party Conference supporting the CPGB’s affiliation, albeit on a ballot restricted to the 
28% who paid the political levy, of whom 45% voted (Ibid.). 
42 John McIllroy, Trade Unions in Britain Today (Manchester, 1995). 
43 The numbers that unions affiliated (as opposed to the numbers paying the political levy) 
determined vote allocation.  Unions could enhance their political influence by overestimating 
numbers; alternatively, if conservation of union funds was prioritised, they could underestimate.  For 
instance, the ETU (1949) increased their affiliation from 30,000 members to 100,000. Moreover, the 
NUM typical affiliation figures for the Labour Party were higher than those which it used in its TUC 
affiliation. Martin Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party Since, 1945 (London, 1960), p. 64.   
44 Lewis Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party (Edinburgh, 1992), 
pp. 8-9.   




Unions and the Labour Party.46 His study explores the evolution of the power 
relationships, roles, protocols and unwritten ‘rules’, which shaped respective 
positions and territorial tensions resolutions.  Minkin foregrounds the importance of 
ethos in the relationship, and how unwritten ‘rules’ (founded on shared values) 
governed participants’ behaviour, including the dynamics of their connections and 
interactions, and their mutual respect for the autonomy and primacy of each in their 
particular (but interpenetrative) spheres of the political and the industrial.   
Minkin counters the view that the union ‘Barons’ effectively controlled Labour Party 
policy direction (although they may have closed-off some options),47 instead he 
posited that ‘Restraint has been the central characteristic of the trade union – 
Labour Party relationship’.48  Indeed, only about 25% of unions submitted 
resolutions to the Labour Party Conference (absorbing just 15% of debate time), 
contrasting with some 75% of Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) (accounting for 
34% of debate time).49  Moreover, the Conference Arrangements Committee, not 
the unions, set the Conference agenda.50  The complex trade union - Labour Party 
relationship, is further analysed in Shaw’s Discipline and Discord in the Labour 
Party, 51 including their reciprocal obligations, rights, responsibilities, and 
undertakings to confine the pursuit of the political (including economic issues and 
social emancipation) to legal and parliamentary means.  This relationship between 
the two wings of the movement, from the unions’ perspective, is exposed in their 
journals. 
H.M. Drucker’s Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party52 adopts a different 
perspective to those theorists who consider the Labour Party’s function to be 
                                                          
46 Minkin, The Contentious Alliance; also see: L. Minkin, The Labour Party Conference: A Study in 
the Politics of Intra-Party Democracy (London, 1978). 
47 Such issues as keeping issues off the agenda, as well as agenda setting and timetabling see: 
Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (2nd ed.) (Hampshire and New York, 2005). 
48 Minkin, The Contentious Alliance, p. 26. 
49 M. Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party, pp.  204-8. 
50 The order and timing of debates mattered as items late on the agenda were liable to be time 
limited, and simultaneous debates could be employed expediently, whilst exclusions were as much 
an exercise in political power as inclusions. Non-decision making was also employed, some topics or 
resolutions being left off the agenda by tacit agreement, others pushed out, or transformed into 
composite resolutions, or by specifying that certain topics could only be discussed after specified 
intervals of time; for instance, constitutional matters such as affiliation.  See for instance, L. Minkin, 
The Contentious Alliance; S. Lukes Power: A Radical View; M. Harrison, Trade Unions and the 
Labour Party Since 1945, p. 241. 
51 Eric Shaw, Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party (Manchester, 1988). 
52 Henry M. Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party (London, 1979); See also David Howell, 
MacDonald's Party: Labour Identities and Crisis,1922-1931 (Oxford, 2002). 
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acquiring parliamentary power for the labour movement, and its formal politics.53 
Drucker analyses the Party’s ideology both in terms of its doctrine (its formal, 
usually codified, values and constitution), and its powerful but informal ethos, 
including loyalty to the leaders, conservative attitudes to funds, formality in 
practices, and the expectation of leaders to make sacrifices.54 The ideological 
understandings of union protagonists, and the views the union journals 
disseminated, encompassed this wider understanding which feeds into their own 
understandings and interpretations 
In short, trade unions in Britain have been political in numerous ways as recorded 
and analysed in the existing literature. They have lobbied to change the law, 
advanced rights, promoted specific policies (such as the nationalisation of industry) 
and set up and funded their own political party. Activists have worked within them to 
make them more political, and divisions within and between unions have been 
exploited to this end. Given that politics itself is an activity of groups seeking to 
influence resource allocations and decisions affecting the wider society, trade 
unions are necessarily political.55 Furthermore, politics is unlikely to be confined to 
leaders – whether official leaders or unofficial rank-and-file leaders.  The question 
arises as to the beliefs of the wider membership and whether this can be evidenced 





Ideology is fundamental to this project.  It is understood here in its broadest sense, 
as a means to interpret and to make sense of the world.  Ideology assigns 
meanings, informs political thought, provides collectively held frameworks of 
reference, offers normative explanations and prescriptions, and shapes decision-
making.  Ideology is ubiquitous, even, and arguably especially, when unnoticed.  
Ideology has its own extensive literature that ranges from general explanations to 
                                                          
53 Such as Robert McKenzie, Ralph Miliband, Samuel H. Beer, Tom Nairn and Perry Anderson. 
54 Drucker, Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party. 
55 Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics (London, 2005). 
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specific interpretations and understandings.56 It is intimately interwoven into politics 
and impacts on decisions regarding the distribution of scarce goods, and securing 
or opposing public policy.  Ideology manifests as claims which underpin and inform 
people’s self-conceptions, their understanding of society and place in the world. 
This encompasses both the overtly political, and the construction of the paradigms 
within which issues are analysed, limiting the questions asked, and shaping how 
they are understood and answered.  Ideology seeks to decontest meanings and 
control political discourse (with knock-on effects on contingent understandings). 
Ideologies bestow specific associations and inferences and points of reference; they 
establish dominant narratives and provide structured social perceptions and 
interpretations of ‘truth’ and ‘fact’.  This study will analyse the trade unions’ journal 
content to ascertain whether they evidence such competing ideologies. 
Ideology enables and binds those with shared concerns and assumptions to engage 
in collective action, guided by norms, beliefs, and considerations of the 
fundamentals of the ‘good life’, perceptions of morality, human nature, desirability of 
social-systems, and even ‘brute facts’.57  Ideology dictates both what is possible, 
and what is desirable within the systems of civil society, becoming woven into the 
culture and fabric of daily life.58  It encompasses shared systems of ideas and 
beliefs (symbolically or within the lived experience) that provide an explanatory and 
interpretive conceptual framework directed towards practical political thinking and 
public activity, that are typically linked with specific social groups or classes. Like 
politics and trade unionism, ideology is a group endeavour that penetrates society 
at multiple levels through various agents and institutions, reflecting group goals and 
prescriptions.  It is subject to expediencies and context specificities and sensitivities, 
as advocates attempt to elicit and maintain public support in order to action policies.  
Both ideology and political cultures influence received understandings and 
interpretations, yet they are distinct. The ideological is where cultural practices and 
political power become interwoven.59  Political cultures are the product of political 
thought, and form a sub-set of ideology, specifically the forms of knowledge, 
                                                          
56 For instance: Terry Eagleton, Ideology (Essex, 1994); T. Eagleton, Ideology: An introduction, 2nd 
ed. (London, 2007); Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach 
(Oxford, 1998). 
57 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p.56. 
58 M. Freeden, Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford, 2003).  pp.21-25. 
59 Eagleton, Ideology, p. 11. 
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received understandings, sets of values, attitudes and beliefs held about politics 
that infuse the lived reality and aspirations which operate in civil society as a form of 
social cement.60   
Political cultures through discourse and interpretations, engage with the social world 
to shape decisions; they become manifest as social facts, injecting order and 
meaning into observed or anticipated sets of political phenomena, and hold together 
sets of related notions.  The meeting of political thought and  ideas expressed as 
matrices of political concepts, combined with the need for public support in order to 
action policies, means ideologies cannot deal solely in terms of abstract political 
philosophy; rather they are embedded in political action and the real world.61  
Concrete orientation requires consideration of the actual circumstances where 
political thought and policy ideas are to be operationalized.62  Ideologies, whilst 
reflecting group goals and prescriptions, necessarily also reflect contextual 
expediencies and sensitivities as their producers and advocates interact with their 
audience and environment in their attempt to elicit and maintain support from a 
critical mass of the public, thus rendering ideological standpoints permeable.   
The plurality of ideologies in complex industrial societies emerges from the 
amalgam of power exercised in the interests of specific groups (embodying the 
capacity to shape meanings and influence thought-practices).  They also reflect 
people’s understandings of the contradictions and discrepancies between the 
realities and outcomes of particular social-systems and aspirations.  These are all 
imbued with tensions between structure and agency as causal mechanisms, but 
most, including Marx, consider both to be pertinent, as in his famous formula; ‘Men 
make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it 
under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already’.63  
Marxist ideological understandings inform the perceptions the CPGB journal 
contributors, the non- CPGB Marxists, and many non-Marxist socialists, and thus 
are important to this study.  The wide literature on Marxism includes his conception 
of ideology as dissimulations and power manipulation; an obfuscation which acts to 
reify and reproduce power relationships through their entrenchment to advantage a 
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62 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London, 1936), pp.154-155.  
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specific class or group, upholding unjust or oppressive systems through the 
institutionalisation of social and political ideas that construct specific knowledge, 
mystifications and misinterpretations of the social reality.   
Others built on Marx’s foundations. For instance, Gramsci perceived ideology to 
extend beyond distortion and obfuscation, as its functions of legitimation 
necessitated its resonance with people’s life experiences in order to provide 
plausible explanations for reality as experienced by the mass of people (failure to 
bear some relationship to the lived reality would result in the ideology’s demise, as 
arguably occurred with Marxism in the USSR).  In this pursuit, he elucidated factors 
pertaining to ideology beyond the base infrastructure determining the 
superstructure.  He explored ideas around hegemony, and engendering consent 
through civil society and institutions, utilising culture as social cement which 
facilitated the ruling class’ maintenance of their position with minimal coercion.  
Ideology is consciously produced, consciously and unconsciously reproduced and 
reified, but it is typically internalized unconsciously.64 Education, civil institutions and 
dominant discourse shape received understandings and persuade subordinate 
classes that the prevailing order is in their interests.  Consent and legitimacy is 
engendered, albeit with occasional strategic concessions to subordinate groups to 
maintain consent, resulting in individuals becoming part of the organic whole, 
impeding counter-hegemonic movements (although history shows hegemonic ideas 
and regimes decay and are replaced).  For Gramsci, ‘organic intellectuals’ emergent 
in the subaltern class, critiquing the prevailing system, carried the potential to 
remedy spurious understandings internalised by the subordinate groups, and could 
create in them a cultural-social unity and self-consciousness through forging links 
between political theory and ideology as ‘lived’.  Thus, the performative 
contradictions between the social reality of subordinated groups and the official 
ideas and conceptions of the dominant class could be dissolved. 65  As such, 
Gramscian thought provides a nuanced understanding of how ideas, social 
practices and institutions intertwine and inter-penetrate within a complex social 
whole.  Such insights are useful in analysing both changing political cultures in the 
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trade union movement, and the influences on the participants received 
understandings. 
Althusser considered that the ‘ideological state apparatuses’, religious institutions, 
the legal, political, cultural, and especially the educational system and the family, 
moulded social practices and instilled conceptual boundaries through socialisation.  
Norms and values are internalised and then reinforced through social interaction 
and institutions, fashioning political thought-behaviour. Thus individuals are 
‘interpellated’ as social ‘subjects’ and become the unconscious and unreflective 
carriers of the dominant class’s ideology, ensuring the maintenance of the ruling 
class and the established order, and protecting the economic system.66 The 
conceptual limitations imposed restrain options as much as material circumstances, 
dictating norms, impacting values, and restricting conceptions of what is possible.67  
Althusser’s focus on the role of institutions and the importance of axiomatic beliefs 
provides an approach whereby the state endorsed assumptions that underlie 
educational curricula and the ethos of various state and civil institutions can be 
problematized to facilitate an understanding of the acceptance of oppression and 
exploitation of subordinate groups.  
However, not all regard ideology as a super-imposed negative phenomenon; some 
perceive it to be a social product, the manifestation of political thought interacting 
with the real world.  Michael Freeden suggests that ‘ideologies are the 
arrangements of political thoughts that illuminate the central ideas, overt 
assumptions and unstated biases that in turn drive political conduct’,68 and that the 
conceptual morphologies within different ideologies are realised in the political 
thought-practices of its adherents. Freeden’s morphological analysis of ideology 
examines the nature of political concepts (the basic units of political thinking such 
as freedom, justice, rights, equality, democracy, and citizenship, which all ideologies 
contain).  These concepts in themselves are ‘essentially contestable’ and subject to 
competing depictions of their components and hold multiple possible 
characterisations. 69     
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Different ideological strands have their own distinct clusters, combinations, patterns, 
and inter-relationships, continuities, discontinuities, and decontested meanings, 
which both shape, and are shaped by, what is politically possible, which itself is 
dependent on what is contextually possible.70 However, decontestations in the 
meanings of concepts can be subject to challenge.  Terence Ball posits that core 
concepts become ‘sore’ concepts when contested and destabilised by external 
events or changes in understanding, thereby either necessitating a 
reconceptualization of the original concept to incorporate the new meanings, or its 
rejection.71  
Each ideology offers its own ideational complexes, prescriptions and solutions.  In 
Freeden’s terms, they have their own hierarchies, priorities and ideational 
proximities and permeability.  They each contain an ineliminable core formed from 
concept clusters, along with peripheral concepts (intellectually or emotionally 
marginal to the core), and contextually malleable contingent perimeter concepts, 
which form the interface between concrete political action and political thought, and 
thus lend pertinence, functioning as cultural conduits, often in the form of policy 
ideas.72 Core concepts depend on adjacent concepts for their interpretation. 
Specific patterns of core, adjacent and perimeter concepts, endow ideologies with 
their distinctiveness.  However, their specific constructions are malleable, 
diachronically and synchronically, in terms of their relative positioning and rankings 
and reweighting, showing structural permeability and context sensitivity. It is the 
competition for legitimacy in conceptual configurations that underlies efforts and 
repeated conflicts to garner control over public policy or the political system, 
including attempts to alter perceptions and offer politically credible alternatives.73   
Differences and mutations within and between the configurations of concepts exist 
within, as well as between, broad ideological categories.  For instance, socialist 
ideology (the dominant ideology evidenced in the union journals) has different 
strands, but they all share core values and common characteristics, what 
Wittgenstein called ‘family resemblances’, which like a thread have multiple 
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overlapping strands, with no strands running the thread’s full length.74  Thus, all 
strands of socialism share equality and social welfare as core concepts, regardless 
of their relationship with other concepts, whilst the differing configuration and 
relationship between these concepts define the type of socialism under scrutiny.75 
Morphological analysis enables the tracing of the trajectories of various concepts 
over time, as they migrate, distancing themselves from previously adjacent 
concepts, whilst moving closer to others, or travelling nearer or further from the 
core, subject to contexts, idea-environments, and logical and cultural constraints.  
Indeed, Freeden draws the analogy between this morphological analysis of ideology 
and maps, where the network of roads emerging from a specific point are equivalent 
to the logical constraints on an ideology (those required by concretisation), whilst 
the cultural constraints (within the framework of logical agency, considered 
necessary but not following logically from the ineliminable core) act as guides to 
different routes, dependent on preferences but also effectively barring some routes.   
Different ideologies present competing maps, where the multi-dimensional 
relationships between the towns vary, and where the towns are not in any fixed 
location, prominence, or even existence.76 Thus ideologies are subject not only to 
historical inheritance and decontestations, but also the specific positioning and 
interrelationships between the concepts at any time and place. Freeden’s 
morphological approach enables the tracing of both conscious and unconscious 
expressions of ideology, political cultures, common-sense understandings, and 
ethos, and thus is particularly useful in the analysis of the trade union journals for 
changes in political cultures.  
 
Disseminating Ideology: The Role of the Press 
 
The dissemination of ideology is fundamental to its survival and growth, and 
involves various institutions, such as political parties, trade unions and other 
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pressure and interest groups, intellectuals, and the media. The media act as both 
disseminators and gatekeepers of information (and misinformation), offering 
subjective interpretations as facts, framing events, mediating issues through specific 
ideas and interests, setting agendas (omissions and inclusions), promoting some 
aspects and ignoring others, and conferring voice selectively.77 They also employ 
value laden statements, deploy devices like ‘letters’ to the paper which emanate 
from the paper’s  journalists at owners’/ editors’ direction, but signed  ‘housewife’ or 
‘mother’ to lend authenticity.78 The mainstream capitalist newspapers were 
notoriously hostile to socialist interpretations and analysis, and the labour 
movement found difficulty in projecting itself and its specific policies through 
established organs like the BBC or the commercial press.  Thus, the Labour Party, 
and other organisations of the left, considered one remedy to the situation would be 
through their own independent press outlets.  The TUC and Labour Party’s decision 
to take shares in the Daily Herald (1922) was political, and evidenced the perceived 
imperative to have a mainstream print outlet where they controlled the political 
messages and language and could disseminate Labour’s voice, policy directions, 
aspirations, and oppositions.79   However, the history of the socialist press was one 
of chronic financial difficulties. 
The Labour Party’s difficulties in effectively disseminating their message to mass 
audiences are addressed in Laura Beers’ study Your Britain: The Media and the 
Making of the Labour Party.80  She  examines the LP’s preoccupation with 
propagating their message in an overwhelmingly capitalist dominated press 
environment, where Labour’s opponents set parameters, framed debates, specified 
priorities, and selected which aspects to highlight or underplay.  This was especially 
significant as Labour repositioned itself from its early sectional stance representing 
working class interests, to a Party which sought widespread public support from all 
sections of society, and where traditional posters and pamphlets were deemed 
‘increasingly insufficient to combat the subtler and more ubiquitous propaganda 
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natural right-wing biases. 
80 Laura Beers, Your Britain: Media and the Making of the Labour Party (London, 2010). 
26 
 
being served in the Chronical, the Mail, and other anti-Labour papers’.81  Moreover, 
the diminished political coverage in the mass circulation dailies resulted in 
increased editorial agenda setting powers.82  Beers posited that the Labour Party 
should have managed the Tory press better, and the disadvantage inherent in 
Labour’s position could have been mitigated by greater input into the capitalist 
press; this would have facilitated increased public exposure to socialist framing and 
policy prescriptions, and thus ensure greater penetration of such understandings 
and interpretations into public discourse and debate.  This is considered significant, 
as the popular press was the public’s principle source of political news. If Beers is 
correct, the dissemination of a socialist voice would have impacted the non-socialist 
as well as socialist journal readers. The circulation of just the three principal journals 
examined here, was some 200,000 (purchased, not free), far exceeding that of the 
Left Book Club, meaning trade union journals in total would have exposed many 
hundreds of thousands of people to a socialist framing of events and issues. 
 
Approach and Theory 
 
The journal articles will be interrogated for the significance of the views expressed 
(both explicit and implicit), and the changing morphology of the ideology entailed, in 
terms of both ethos and doctrine.  The dominant influences informing the views 
expressed will be sought, and how the ideological understandings evidenced in the 
journals are situated in the broader ideas environment. The unquestioned, symbolic, 
and unchallenged casual assumptions will be the focus, with the aim of exposing 
identifiable strands of political thought in terms of broad continuities, modifications 
within those continuities, inconsistencies, and positions that appear illogical. Such 
unconscious representations of ideas and ‘facts’ in the trade union journals, are 
central to this thesis.   
Historic texts, such as the journals analysed here, typically focus on 
contemporaneous issues, which are mediated through cultural understandings, 
language and meanings.   Theorists differ on how such texts should be addressed.  
History, culture, and social relationships shape meanings, and meanings shape the 
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socio-political world.  The plurality of meanings that can potentially be ascribed to 
concepts, and the conflict over their decontestations, are central to ideology. Thus, 
a conceptual history approach (Begriffsgeschichte) that fuses contemporary and 
historic use of concepts, and their changing meanings and nuances, was advocated 
by Koselleck.  He stressed the importance of both the synchronic and the 
diachronic, focusing on the evolution of ideas, concepts, adjacencies, and 
combinations; why some endure and flourish, whilst others fade, and how their 
meanings can be cumulative and open to further changes, and how they relate to 
real world situations.83    
The insights and potency of language and the importance of decontestations, the 
indeterminacy of language, and multiplicity and multi-level interpretations, are 
fundamental within ideology, as are the notions of intentionality and of surplus 
meaning.  For instance, Skinner focused on the use of language in political thought 
and the importance of contextual interpretation of political texts in order to identify 
the author’s intentions, and the authorial understanding of the audience for whom 
texts were constructed.  Consequently, it would be supposed that articles written for 
trade union members would be of intrinsic interest to readers, and enable them to 
link the various ‘facts’ contained to ascertain ideologically consistent conclusions.  
Skinner argued that there should be a presumption of truthfulness by the author, but 
saw empirical ‘truth’ and ‘fact’ as insignificant in explaining beliefs, maintaining that 
to attempt to conflate rational belief and historical truths is unhelpful, as false beliefs 
are often rationally held.84 Thus, ideology and the political thought it encapsulates, 
can be understood by attempting to comprehend the authorial intentionality, both in 
terms of motivation, and the intended purpose of texts within the social and cultural 
setting, ‘seeing things their way’.85  Skinner’s historicist approach is employed in this 
study.   
Political cultures incorporate class, not merely as a socio-economic group or in 
relations to the means of production, but again in its broad social sense, in 
accordance with E.P. Thompson’s understanding that class is a fluid historical 
phenomenon, resulting from the fusion of experiences and consciousness 
embodied in people and contexts and manifest in the group’s shared feelings and 
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interests.86   Class consciousness is a powerful force in trade unionism, and an 
influential factor in the unions’ interactions. Class consciousness is considered an 
emergent property of class, consequent upon temporally and spatially specific 
cultural interpretations of experiences and circumstances, including received 
understandings of class relationships which involve the ‘othering’ of different 
classes.87  Such ‘othering’  is employed by the journals; the authors draw-out and 
nurture class consciousness to highlight and contextualise the workers’ position 
within capitalist society, highlighting the structural and lived inequalities of wealth, 
power, and opportunity (as exemplified by ‘want in the midst of plenty’ during the 
depression) and sacrifice in the war.   
The idea that social communications are founded in the social experience, which 
extends beyond modes of production, social orders or cultures, was postulated by 
Raymond Williams.88 He utilised the concept of a ‘structure of feeling’, that emerges 
from the lived experience in terms of the nebulous emergent consciousness that  
embodied the values and ethos that result from group members’ affective and 
cognitive practices (including class), the comprehension of which is only fully 
accessible to them. The complexities and incongruities of society in which this 
occurs, for Williams, preclude absolute hegemony.  This approach will inform the 
evaluation of complexities and incongruities evidenced in the journals, and how they 
expose the ideological understandings of the contributors. 
The political cultures and the ideologies underlying them are not always overt or 
self-evident in texts.  The material is often multi-layered and contains both nuances, 
and broader significances. The subjectivities and the changing nature of language, 
meanings, and understandings are addressed by the hermeneutic emphasis on 
multiplicity in the interpretation of speech acts, texts, and their meanings, including 
latent meanings that require a sensitivity to the environment in which they were 
composed.  
Language is the conduit of thought, thus shaping social worlds, disseminating ideas 
and information, and acting as a facilitator and a constraint.  Language is imbued 
with performativity and power which can give legitimacy.  The tactical use of 
language, re-description and altered meanings, employing overlapping vocabulary, 
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or, similar techniques, can be used to steer or control discourse, or to undermine 
people and practices. John Searle considered language to be performative, founded 
in intrinsic intentionality, implying that ideas, once disseminated, can reinforce or 
change interpretations, norms and cultures and can mould ‘common-sense’ 
understandings. 89   ‘Language does not just describe a pre-existing institutional 
reality but is partly constitutive of that reality’.90  Like Skinner, Searle posited that 




The primary sources for this thesis are the journals produced by the unions for their 
members. Thus, insofar as this thesis is concerned, the concept of trade unionism 
here must be taken to be that which is understood and disseminated in the journals 
as constructed by their contributors (principally union officials and labour 
journalists), and their editors (typically the General Secretary or appointed editorial 
committees).  The NUGMW and AEU Journals, and the New Propellor ((NP), 
renamed the Metal Worker (MW) in April 1946) are excavated for evidence of 
political culture in the subjective understandings evidenced in the framing of issues, 
interpretations given, and the inter-relationships between journal articles and 
broader debates.  The Clerk (the journal of the National Union of Clerks) and the 
Electrical Trades Journal (the journal of the ETU renamed Electron in April 1950) 
are employed to ascertain the extent to which the findings from the principal 
journals are replicated and can be generalised.  The large selection of trade union 
and labour movement publications, pamphlets, ephemera, and correspondence 
held at the WCML is utilised situate the principal journals in the context of the wider 
labour movements’ understandings, aspirations, and policy prescriptions.  
The focus on political cultures is not intended to dismiss or diminish the extent to 
which the journals deliberated on industrial issues (varying between some 30-50% 
of the official union journals).  However, the industrial and political are overlapping 
paradigms and it is often difficult to disentangle the two.  Indeed, many articles that 
ostensibly focus on the industrial are heavily imbued with political undertones, 
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meanings, suppositions, and agendas. This is exemplified in the communist NP/MW 
in which the vast majority of content is ostensibly industrial, yet embedded (implicitly 
as well as explicitly) within the wider capitalist system and all which that entails, 
which renders the journal highly political.  
A basic assumption in this study is that that there is no monolithic political culture or 
ideological understanding shared by all trade union members or officials, and that 
differences will be dynamic and contested, and evidenced within as well as between 
the unions.   
The selection of the unions whose journals are the focus of this study is necessarily 
a compromise between a broad sample with sufficient equivalence to find 
differences and similarities, and a narrower sample that facilitates detailed 
investigation within the limitations of the time available.  The comparative nature of 
this study into these historic cultural artefacts is designed to facilitate the isolation 
and comparison of specific variables (the themes that arise from the texts), and to 
examine what lies behind the emergent patterns.   
The choice of unions for this study was based on their specific and diverse 
characteristics.  Firstly, the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), the second 
largest union affiliated to the Labour Party, was an historically important old ‘craft’ 
union, which opened itself to a (limited) broader membership within the engineering 
industry.  The AEU was notable for its strong, communist inspired, shop steward 
movement (largely autonomous consequent upon the structurally fragmented nature 
of British engineering), and a moderate left-wing leadership.   Traditional ‘craft’ 
unions, like the AEU, represented the ‘labour aristocracy’, exclusive and skill based, 
usually through time served apprenticeships. They guarded against an oversupply 
of skilled workers undermining wage levels (albeit with sections for semi-skilled 
engineering workers), and were exclusively male until 1943. 
Craft unions were distinct from the ‘General Unions’ like the NUGMW, the second 
union whose journal is scrutinised here.  The General Unions emerged from the 
New Unionism movement of the 1880s and expanded rapidly, especially with the 
industrial growth of 1892-1911.  They saw strength in numbers, were inclusive, and 
open to women.  The NUGMW had a policy of 'One Big Union'.   It was the product 
of an amalgamation of the National Union of General Workers (which incorporated 
the Women Workers Federation), the National Amalgamated Union of Labour, and 
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the Municipal Workers Association (all of which continued, to some extent, to keep 
their identity within the amalgamated union).   The NUGMW was the most right-wing 
of the journals analysed, although its position varied over time, and in response to 
multiple external factors, and changes to personnel in its hierarchy. 
The journal of the Aircraft’s Shop Stewards’ National Council (ASSNC which was 
renamed Engineering and Allied Trades Shop Stewards National Council 
(EATSSNC) to reflect its extension beyond the aircraft industry), the New Propellor 
(renamed the Metal Worker), is also scrutinised, not as a co-equivalent to the official 
union journals, but as a representative benchmark of the ideological understandings 
of many rank and file movements and engineering activists, who agitated and 
promoted left-wing socialist and communist interpretations.   
 
Union Journals 
The journals were constructed for a specific audience, their membership, which, 
whilst typically sharing related occupations, was heterogeneous, covering a variety 
of ideological understandings, allegiances, and degrees of activism.   The journals’ 
content was subject to numerous factors including the wider discourse, audience 
awareness, and attempts to engage non-active members.  The journals contained 
implicit and overt political material, and embodied specific ideational frameworks for 
interpreting the present and understanding the past, and assumptions within the 
political narrative (including the denunciation of alternative narratives) which were 
constitutive of the received understandings of their readership.  
The journals formed a conduit to extend the union’s voice beyond union meetings 
and rallies, to the wider membership, eliciting a sense of community and solidarity 
amongst their members, not merely through the shared elements of their working-
life, but through efforts to nurture class consciousness, interpellating the readership 
into being one of ‘us’, and ‘othering’ the ownership / management class, who, it was 
declared, lived off the product of their labour.  They employed outside authoritative 
voices to give weight to their message, and promoted independent organisations 
with whom they shared goals, for instance, promoting their inter-war pacifist agenda 
by reproducing ‘Union of Democratic Control’ material, 91  and Albert Einstein’s 1930 
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lecture on Militant Pacifism (before fascism rose in Europe, and the Spanish Civil 
War).92   
The journals enabled unions to exercise some control of language and narrative, 
exerting influence through disseminating ideas and interpretations, often at the 
subconscious level of unquestioned assumptions and common-sense 
understandings, thereby delimiting conceptions of what was considered possible.  
This thesis undertakes to reveal ‘surplus meaning’ and notable absences within the 
material, through analysing the journals in terms of the implicit and explicit political 
cultures, social biases, and value loaded statements - thereby exposing fixed and 
changing elements of socialist political culture and ideology, and how this was 
situated within wider contemporaneous debates.  Both majority and minority 
interpretations expressed in the journals will be scrutinised, including policy 
prescriptions, and critiques of Government policies.  Similarly, the malleability of 
dominant socialist thought itself will be considered, with different aspects being 
stressed at different times, and how this links with Labour Party policy and the 
external environment.     
The journals disseminated a range of socialist understandings and interpretations 
and framing of events and issues, effectively making them largely unacknowledged 
propagandists and socialisers for the Labour Party. The wide-spread nature of trade 
union membership, as opposed to individual Labour Party membership, meant they 
and their journals could circulate socialist and ‘labourist’ values and ideas more 
widely than the Labour Party itself.  Moreover, they embraced effective working 
class education directly in the journals, and indirectly through their reading 
recommendations.  Nonetheless, contributors and editors were cognisant of their 
politically heterogeneous readership, and the necessity to tailor content to engage, 
or at least not alienate the non-socialist.  The unions were fully aware of the 
importance of propaganda and the utilisation of diverse media for attracting and 
retaining members, and even proposed using films ‘to secure interest of the new 
generation many of whom are ignorant of Trade Unionism’.93 As Europe came 
under fascist oppression the AEU, recognising the propaganda power of the British 
printed press and British and foreign radio, called for anyone with linguistic skills to 
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write, translate, or speak on radio, to disseminate international fraternity and 
sympathy with European workers.94  The International Transport Workers 
Federation went further, producing a journal dedicated to the issue, ‘Fascism’.95 
The journals’ content was highly reactive to the dynamic event and issue 
environment in the political, economic, industrial, technical, and international 
spheres.  In the context of the interplay of history, politics, and interest groups, 
within a society shaped by the dominant capitalist classes’ hegemonic influence, the 
journal contributors mediated issues through their ideologies and cultural 
understandings, expediencies and sensitivities.  Those journal contributors who 
rejected hegemonic constructions, strove to challenge and reshape such received 
understandings. Nonetheless, the official union journals promoted 
parliamentarianism.  This was disseminated both explicitly, and implicitly through, 
for instance, Members of Parliament (MPs) contributing articles, and regular 
‘Parliamentary notes’ and accounts of Labour Party’s MPs’ contributions to 
parliamentary debates.   
The different union’s journals each had their individual character and style, with 
many differences and commonalities.  However, they shared a belief in socialist 
core principles, considering the group as the primary social unit, foregrounding 
relationships / interrelationships with their environment (especially their work 
environment), and the objectives of equality and social welfare.  They also shared 
ideas around organisation and democratic representation of their members’ 
sectional or class interests, valuing unity and solidarity, and power through 
collective action. The journals each contained selective accounts and histories, 
specific to their particular unions, and the labour movement generally. Such 
histories were imbued with meaning, held a symbolic function, creating and 
perpetuating the movement’s folk memory, engendering fraternity and solidarity in 
the face of what was presented as enduring exploitation.  They shaped perceptions 
of the unions and their members place in society, acting as cultural glue and class 
consciousness prompts, which combined with their ideology to shape perceptions, 
influencing behaviours, decisions and policies, from purely defensive, to the 
optimism that 1945 generated.  The narrative they engendered at times stood in 
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stark contrast to empirical evidence. For instance, despite the trade union weakness 
during the 1920s and 1930s, the union journals projected the impression that they 
were the powerful, sole voice of labour.  No inkling was given that the unions 
represented only a minority of workers.  Instead they stressed the trade union 
movements’ successes, for instance, in influencing legislation (and individual 
unions’ success in garnering improved pay and conditions, compensation claims, 
and appeals).  When they failed to secure their objectives, structural asymmetries 
and powerful interests were blamed.  The journals also highlighted the unions’ 
financial benefits, clarified policy and discussed bread and butter issues.  Union 
sponsored social events were detailed, outings, ‘smoking concerts’, dinners, long 
membership and service to the union awards, dances, sports events, children’s 
outings, the Mary Macarthur Holiday Home, and weekend, day, and summer 
schools.  Bonds with the wider labour movement were also encouraged through 
various activities, from raising money for Spain, to socials, outings, political rallies 
and meetings, and educational opportunities.   
The NUGMW Journal 
The circulation of the NUGMW Journal was some 50,000.96  Journal contributors 
were typically union officials, and occasionally representatives of national or 
international labour bodies or the LP (rather than labour journalists).  Articles 
submitted by members were sifted by their district office and then again by the 
journal editors (an editorial committee). 97  The NUGMW overtly promoted 
parliamentarianism and the Labour Party line,98  and sought to reinforce the desired 
electoral path to achieve political influence and status through incorporation into 
government.  They regularly published articles featuring members who worked on 
education boards, became Councillors, Aldermen, or Mayors, and MPs.  Their 
achievements were then linked to their union membership, and where appropriate 
their advancement in the union hierarchy (other official union journals did likewise, 
but to a lesser extent).  Such articles reinforced the idea that high position and voice 
was best attained through approved channels. The labourist voice within the journal 
was constant, but loyalty to the Labour Party leadership (as opposed to the union 
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leadership) was not strongly emphasised until the 1945 Labour Party electoral 
victory.   When Chas Dukes succeeded Will Thorne as General Secretary (1936), 
journal content shifted to the left, but subsequently drifted markedly rightwards.  The 
ensuing tenure of Tom Williamson (1946-1962) saw the journal firmly on the right, 
promoting a reformist agenda, faithfully reproducing the Labour Party line.  The 
labourist ethos of loyalty to the leader, solidarity, and future Labour Party electoral 
prospects, usurped all other considerations. Nonetheless, there were continuities; 
the promotion of the co-operative movement (although this diminished after J.R. 
Clynes retired as President) and anti-communism was a long-term background 
issue, coming to the fore as circumstances made it pertinent.  
The NUGMW Journal attempted to engage their readership at their own level, 
explaining terms, clarifying issues, and using accessible language.  They 
periodically employed humorous columns to engage readers, and occasionally 
during the 1930s sought members’ opinions on how to improve the union (offering a 
prize for published ideas on recruitment and retention in 1930-1931, and on 
women’s organisation in 1934).  They also established a themed Readers Forum 
(November 1933 -February 1935), initially focussing on worker control of industry, 
and occasionally members’ ideas were sought through questionnaires sent to 
branches.99 The readers’ contributions to these forums was typically to the left of 
the usual journal content. Cartoons were employed until February 1937, after which, 
photographs were increasingly included (historic buildings, country scenes, and 
young boys enjoying leisure activities).  Thus, as war fears mounted, overt and 
controversial political satire (and anti-non-TU member (‘non’) propaganda) was 
replaced with images of enduring England, and ‘innocents’ who represented the 
country’s future.   
The non-unionist (the ‘nons)’ were heavily condemned in the NUGMW Journal 
through cartoons as well as written articles (diminishing post 1937 after Clynes 
retired). ‘Nons’ were portrayed as selfish, short sighted, morally defective; their own 
worst enemy, detrimental to union members by weakening their negotiating power, 
and thus tacitly aiding capitalists’ downward pressures on wages and conditions.  
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Similarly, the journal emphasised how ‘nons’ did not contribute to union negotiation 
costs, for instance, Trade Boards and Whitley Councils (which the NUGMW 
advocated). Condemnation and simplistic moral tales rather than analysis were 
employed in tackling the problem. Thus, class solidarity and fraternity were 
subjugated to developing the union and thus labour power. 
The NUGMW Journals always contained articles written by women for general 
consumption, as well as specifically for women members.  The articles covered the 
same industrial and international topics as other journal content, but also highlighted 
topics such as maternal care and nutrition, and, very occasionally, articles for 
women as housewives.  Women were ostensibly treated as equal within the journal, 
however, this only pertained until gender interests clashed (such as when war work 
declined and men were afraid that women would still occupy their previous roles) at 
which time patriarchal norms came vigorously to the fore. 
The AEU Journal 
The AEU Journal, published since 1851, was edited by the General Secretary, and 
claimed a circulation of 100,000.100  The spectrum of ideological understandings 
and intellectual debate evidenced in the AEU Journal was far greater than other 
journals analysed.  Articles’ were written from conflicting but primarily left-leaning 
socialist standpoints, many informed by syndicalism, communism, Guild Socialism, 
as well as Labourism.  The views expressed (often cuttingly satirical) by R. B. 
Suthers101 were representative of the most common ideological approaches taken 
by AEU Journal contributors.  I. Haig Mitchel was an exception to the ideological 
norm, self-identifying as a trade unionist, not a socialist, judging socialism, with its 
middle and upper class protagonists, as detrimental to trade unionism. Notably, the 
high profile Marxist, J.T. Murphy,102 was employed as a regular contributor, 
illustrating the AEU Journal editor’s desire to disseminate socialist ideological 
framing of issues and understandings (despite being unrepresentative of the 
membership).  In the early 1930s his articles advocated industrial unionism, 
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amalgamations, and increased shop steward numbers and works councils.  Post 
1935, he concentrated on the dangers fascism posed, geo-politics, and the 
historical background to the prevailing international situation, and advocated the 
United Front.   
The AEU Journal also covered the social side of union life.  They had irregular letter 
pages, but these were typically dominated by union officials and journal contributors 
rather than members. The journal was reformulated in 1933, relegating the 
Organising District Delegates Reports to the back, after the articles on political, 
economic, and industrial affairs.103   The issues of wages and conditions were 
largely confined to the District Reports, the Abstract of the Council’s Proceedings, 
and included in the Editor’s notes at times of conflict.  The journal’s principal articles 
centred on economics, domestic and international politics, and history, providing its 
readership with a political education, socialising them into socialist interpretations 
and understandings of events and issues. The majority AEU Journal voice 
presented traditional patriarchal views, largely ignoring women until the 
rearmaments drive and wartime, when gender issues became salient; dilution, rules 
and agreements, pay (especially equal pay and the protection of the skilled male 
wage), and the post-war position of women, were all then covered.  Women were 
excluded from the union until January 1943, when they were admitted into their own 
section, and not as equals.  
The image of the engineers as the ‘labour aristocracy’ is strongly evidenced in the 
AEU Journal; the image promoted was that ‘man’ is a tool-making animal, and it is 
the engineers that construct ‘man’s’ tools.  The engineers’ status and employment 
opportunities were, like many issues, politicised and exploited to present the case 
for socialism.  The capitalist class was continuously ‘othered’.  For instance, the 
capitalist system was portrayed as structurally impeding the engineer-inventor from 
profiting from their intellectual property (their inventions stolen, obtained under 
deception, or acquired cheaply due to prohibitive patent or development costs),104  
whilst the capitalists were structurally facilitated in the exploitation of engineers’ 
ingenuity.  The AEU Journal also published and politicised company profits and 
                                                          
103 After Smethurst retired as editor and General Secretary August, 1933.  
104 ‘Technicus’, ‘Inventions and Inventors’, AEU Journal, (March, 1934), p. 25.  Also see for instance 
the series by ‘Thaddeus’ from March, 1934 onwards, such as: ‘Thaddeus’ ‘The persecution of John 
Kay’, AEU Journal, (January, 1935), p.19. 
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share dividend payments, which became especially pertinent when wage demands 
were refused as unaffordable. There were regular technical articles, which 
continued through war-time paper rationing.105  The articles presumed a high level 
of prior knowledge amongst the readership on many topics, particularly economic 
questions (unlike the NUGMW); only the occasional articles explicitly directed 
towards youths provided explanations.  The AEU Journals did not employ cartoons 
until 1943 when ‘Giles’ (later of Daily Express) began contributing, initially focusing 
on social rather than overtly political issues, although their cartoons became more 
political when reintroduced in December 1945 
The New Propellor  
The New Propellor (NP) renamed the Metal Worker (MW), April 1946, the journal of 
the Aircraft Shop Stewards’ National Council (ASSNC), edited by the communist 
activist and journalist Peter Zinkin,106 was established in 1935 (at a time when the 
CPGB was pursuing a United Front policy and frowned upon the establishment of 
new rank and file organisations).107 The NP evidenced the significant communist 
sub-culture that existed in engineering and allied trades, which extended to a 
distributional network. The NP’s contributors were trade unionists, but free from an 
obligation to acquiesce in the official trade union policies, thereby giving the journal 
status as an ideological benchmark against which others can be measured.  The 
NP is not included as a co-equivalent of the official union journals, but as reflective 
of, and an influence on, activist’s interpretation of issues and events, and their re-
presentation through their specific ideological framework.   
Overtly, the NP concentrated on those ‘bread and butter’ issues that precipitated 
rank and file grievances.  They emphasised small victories which served to 
establish stewards’ power and support for their role as the workers’ agents. 
However, such coverage was underlain with Leninist logic, whereby worker 
grievances on material issues could be employed to highlight the ‘true nature’ of the 
structural power relationships within the capitalist system.  In this pursuit, they 
regularly exposed aircraft, engineering, and allied industry’s company profits and 
company tax evasion and avoidance schemes, for instance in their pejoratively 
                                                          
105 Articles on, for instance, economic theory were significantly cut during wartime due to paper 
rationing. 
106 Frow and Frow, Engineering Struggles, p.376. 




named ‘The money we earn for others’ column. The NP encouraged readers’ 
contributions, including cartoons.  Cartoons, were significantly more abundant in the 
NP than other journals, providing a readily accessible means of disseminating a 
strong message in a humorous form, thus appealing to the casual reader in addition 
to dedicated activists (these cartoons were reportedly frequently displayed on works 
notice boards).  The educative function of the labour movement was also diligently 
pursued through their numerous (strongly communist biased) reading 
recommendations.  
The inter-war victimisation of militant trade unionists meant that NP articles were 
normally published without attribution.  However, in WWII (when the NP promoted 
the production drive) some attribution occurred, a trend that continued post-war and 
into the Cold War era.  The NP advocated the Daily Worker as the daily paper of 
choice (the AEU and NUGMW journals recommended the Daily Herald).  The NP 
generally followed the CPGB line, including promoting affiliation to the Labour Party, 
the Popular Front, and workplace gender equality.  They recommended greater 
member participation in union branch work to ‘secure the much needed change in 
the ‘be good boys’ attitude of the present officials’.108  Moreover, despite their 
promotion of the trade union movement, they complained that the AEU’s Executive 
Committee used their own journal ‘to promote their viewpoint,’ but denied the NP 
‘the right to have our opinion published, even though they put the journal at the 
disposal of non-members (contra to rule 16, Clause 5, para 3 which gives 
preference to its own members)’.109  
Unlike the subsidised official union journals, the NP was financially dependent on 
sales and financial appeals to continue in publication.110  Its circulation increased 
substantially over the period under investigation, selling 15,000 in March 1937, 
27,000 by May 1939, and almost 45,000 by May 1940 (when the received 
understanding was that the Nazi-Soviet Pact had elicited widespread anti- Soviet 
and anti-communist opinion), 111 eventually reaching some 95,000 in the post-war 
era. 
                                                          
108  Anon., ‘A.S.S.N.C.’, NP, (October, 1936), p. 2.  
109 London D.C. of the AEU ‘Unofficial disputes: The reply of the London D.C. of the A.E.U’, NP, 
(June, 1936), pp. 9 -10. 
110 For instance, the AEU devoted 2d per member from subscription towards the monthly journal. 
111 The extent to which the rises in circulation were due to the journal’s resonance with workers is 
complicated by the increased employment within the aircraft sector due to rearmament and the war. 
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Chapters and Themes 
 
A broadly thematic approach is taken in this study, split chronologically into four 
time periods to facilitate the analysis of the interplay of the multiple factors and 
themes in their wider context and how they shaped political thinking and cultures 
diachronically and synchronically.  The current academic literature on trade unions 
typically focuses on either: i) the early years of unionism; ii) the inter-war years; or 
iii) post 1945.  This study will cover the period 1931-1951: Chapter 1, 1931 – 1937; 
Chapter 2, 1937 to 1941; Chapter 3, 1941 to 1945; and Chapter 4, the period of the 
Labour Government 1945- 1951.  As such, a wide range of political, economic, and 
industrial circumstances are covered, facilitating an analysis of morphologies in the 
political cultures of the unions under scrutiny.   
The themes scrutinised in this study are those that emerged from the journal 
content, rather than preconceived themes being superimposed upon the material, 
although this is done with the understanding that these themes cannot be truly 
isolated; they are interpenetrative, overlapping and interwoven within a complex 
whole, which itself is an outcome of the conjunction of historical and present 
contexts.  
Economics emerge in the journals as a primary theme; one that directly and 
indirectly affects workers’ lives, life chances, and their wider environment.  
Economics manifests itself in multiple forms in the 1931-51 period, including the 
1930s depression and its consequences (including the Government’s economic and 
fiscal policy responses); the Government’s rearmament policy (its financing, 
implementation, and opportunity costs); the Government’s relationship with private 
arms manufacturers, and the ideology and interests that drove such policy choices.  
Economics continued as a major theme post-WWII due to the dire economic 
difficulties and the consequent US loan and the Marshall Plan (and its 
conditionalities, which made the complexities and interrelationships of the 
economic, the international, and ideological spheres overt). 
The economic sphere directly impacted employment and unemployment, pay and 
conditions, which itself informed and elicited debates in the journals.  Such debates 
encompassed a wide range of issues, including: short-term difficulties, legislative 
changes, larger structural and ownership changes, issues around the National 
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Register, Conscription, and the Labour Government’s wages policies.  Women, their 
employment, their treatment, equal pay, and patriarchal attitudes, form another 
theme.   
International affairs emerged as another important area of concern.  This included 
issues of war and peace (which directly affected all other spheres and themes).  In 
1931 WWI was still temporally proximate.  The resultant widespread pacifist 
sentiment combined with the belief that weapon’s technology ‘improvements’ meant 
future wars would create even greater destruction.  This resulted in the vast majority 
of journal contributors advocating a peace agenda in the early 1930s. 
Subsequently, the rise of European Fascism, and its direct and indirect 
consequences and implications including the Spanish Civil War, challenged the 
pacifist perceptions of some (but by no means all) whose deeply held convictions of 
‘never again’ became largely usurped by the imperative of halting fascism.  The 
interrelated strands within this theme that the journals covered (to varying degrees) 
included disarmament, the debates and reactions around the Government’s failure 
to meaningfully engage with the League of Nations and collective security, as well 
as what the journals deemed to be the National Government’s pro-fascist 
sympathies as exposed in their attitudes towards Mussolini in Abyssinia and Franco 
in Spain.  Attitudes of the labour movement towards the United Front, and towards 
the Soviet Union (contextually and ideologically driven) were also debated, as were 
the attitudes and actions of the British Governments. The international sphere 
remained contested post WWII as manifest for instance in the relationships with the 
US (especially financial), the Greek situation, India, the United Nations, and the 
Cold War. 
Russia and communism (both together and separately) emerged as another theme 
in the journals.  The Capitalist West’s economic problems were juxtaposed with the 
apparent success of the Russian Five Year Plans, and their example of socialism as 
practical, a viable form of government.  Russia was held up as illustrative of 
communism as lived reality, not merely a theoretical possibility, where a planned 
economy provided what was considered a real alternative to capitalism.  The 
differentiation in attitudes towards Russian and domestic communism, and the 
variations between journals and over time is an important strand within this theme. 
Interwoven with this are the ideological contestations over what were considered 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of socialism; such understandings themselves 
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informed debates on what structural form industry should take under the post-war 
Labour Government, especially regarding planning, nationalisation, socialisation, 
and worker control.  
Issues around the press, and workers’ education, the unions’ role in educating their 
membership and disseminating ideology, was an ever present theme in the 
journals.112 The unions’ journals supplemented and advertised their own 
publications, educational courses and members’ training courses, as well as 
providing reading recommendations, which combined to form an important part of 
their political work in socialising and educating the membership into trade unionism 
and socialist thinking. Unions worked to influence people and to promote socialist 
understandings and a wide range of policies in the political, economic, industrial, 
and social realms.  It was an on-going process whosoever was in government, and 
was considered vital to counteract the lobbying of capitalists and the power of the 
capitalist press.  
Importantly, interwoven into and informing journal contributor analysis of the other 
themes is the overarching and multifaceted theme of capitalism (and its 
alternatives) including the structure of ownership, industry and society, as argued 
from various socialist perspectives.   
                                                          
112 This was pursued though local meetings, pamphlet and leaflet writing and distribution, door to 
door electoral canvassing, and utilising their own press. The unions also trained members to become 
stewards, union officials, and prospective candidates for all levels of local, district and national 
government. They also provided information for researchers (within the civil service and outside), 
and worked with tripartite corporatist bodies, and challenged the limited understandings of the plight 
of the working classes, of many higher civil servants (traditionally drawn from narrow socio-economic 
and educational backgrounds). See for instance:  A. Taylor, The Trade Unions and the Labour Party. 
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Chapter 1. Depression and Burgeoning Fascism: 1931-1936 
The early twentieth century in Britain was a time of extreme upheaval and change.  
The catastrophe of WWI and its aftermath, wrought profound changes in multiple 
spheres.  Important advances were made in science and technology.  In the 
industrial sphere, women entered the workforce in non-traditional roles (only to be 
excluded again after the war), and attempts were made to modernise, mechanise, 
and rationalise industry (including the introduction of the Bedaux and Taylor 
systems).  Embedded within this environment were the trade unions, whose 
fortunes fluctuated with the prevailing economic, political, and judicial context, the 
cumulative effect of which shaped conditions and people’s understanding of their 
circumstances.  Events of this period left a profound legacy, such as the 1926 
General Strike which persuaded some leading trade unionists like Ernest Bevin and 
Walter Citrine to pursue a policy of seeking influence through incorporation in an 
attempt to become respected partners in state economic management.   
The economic crisis that faced the country and much of the world dominated and 
marred the early 1930s.  The accompanying extremely high levels of 
unemployment, poverty (particularly in distressed areas), changes to National 
Insurance and the Means Test, led to hardship for many, and insecurity for more.  
However, the trade union journals, whilst devoting much space to such issues did 
not portray it as a ‘Moribund Age’ as others have retrospectively.1  In contrast, it 
was the pre-WWI period that the trade union journals portrayed as a dark time, 
where hours were long and terms and conditions of employment dire; a time when 
the unions successfully fought for concessions from the employers (a theme often 
repeated to illustrate the unions’ achievements).  Indeed, the fallacy of pre-1914 as 
‘the good old days’, was the specific focus of some journal articles.2  
1931 witnessed a significant turn to the left in labour politics consequent upon 
multiple concurrent factors.  The economic turmoil in the Capitalist West was starkly 
                                                          
1 For instance, Richard Overy, The Moribund Age, (London, 2009) concluded that, in the inter-war 
period, public perceptions were dominated by a sense of foreboding about the decline and collapse 
of civilization, and nostalgia for pre-WWI society, which was regarded as ideal and progressive.  He 
cites the popularity of fictions such as those of Aldous Huxley and H. G. Wells as symbolic; their 
popularity indicating predictions of an ominous future resonated with the public.    
2 For instance, W. Shilletto, ‘The Good Old Days’, NUGMW Journal, (June, 1931), p.452; A. G. 
Schirn, ‘The Hypocritical “Good Old Days”’, NUGMW Journal, (November, 1932), p.302. 
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contrasted with the perceived success of the Soviet 5 year plans through which 
socialism was transformed from a theory to a viable form of government.3  It was a 
year of contradictions and paradoxes for those in the Labour Movement.  On the 
one hand, capitalism appeared to be collapsing in line with Marxist predictions, not 
only in Britain but in the whole Capitalist World; on the other hand, the Labour Party 
suffered a crushing electoral defeat, whilst depression conditions weakened the 
unions’ negotiating power. Despite this, the union journals portrayed both the trade 
unions and the Labour Party as central institutions securing and promoting workers’ 
interests (working men in the case of the AEU).  There was a minority voice in the 
journals that suggested poverty and destitution could, if not ameliorated, drive some 
to steal life’s essentials in order to survive, causing not only capitalism’s collapse, 
but civilisation’s disintegration.4 However, this was an infrequent topic and usually 
deemed unnecessarily catastrophic.  Nonetheless, a significant minority perceived 
the economic crisis as an opportunity to exercise agency free of capitalism’s 
straightjacket and to rebuild society in a different form.  This opinion was not overtly 
stated by journal contributors, but was evidenced in the surplus meaning within the 
texts; the anti-communist contributors used this as justification for their stance 
against communists, the CPGB, and its affiliates.   
Considering the TUs commitment to the parliamentary path to socialism, and their 
perception that the LP was their child, the 1931 election received very little attention 
in the union journals (especially in comparison with the journals’ vigorous electoral 
propaganda during the post-war elections).  The NUGMW called on their readership 
to vote according to their working class consciousness, and to free the land ‘for 
reversion to the common ownership and control by the people’, but did not push the 
issue.5  The subsequent electoral failure received no significant analysis, it was 
simply blamed on the ‘betrayal’ by MacDonald and Philip Snowden,6 further 
                                                          
3 J. Callaghan, ‘Labour’s Turn to Socialism in 1931’, Journal, of Political Ideologies,14:2 (2009), 
4 For instance, Will J. Sherwood, ‘Fair Warning?  A Rebellious Note Sounded’, NUGMW Journal, 
(November, 1932) p.289.   
5 Peter J. Tevenan, ‘When Shall We Get Down to Brass Tacks’, NUGMW Journal, (February, 1931), 
p. 34.  
6 See for instance, Tubul Cain, ‘Beneath Big Ben’, AEU Journal, (October, 1931), p. 46; T. Cain, 
‘Beneath Big Ben’, AEU Journal, (November, 1931), p. 52; John Gunning, ‘To the Engineering 
Mechanic’, AEU Journal, (January, 1932), p.55; ‘Garw’, ‘In Defence of Mr. MacDonald. A Review of 
Lord Allen’s Pamphlet’, AEU Journal, (February, 1932), p. 43; W. Thorne, ‘General Secretary’s 
Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (November, 1931), p. 586; H. Tracey, ‘The Meanness of the Means Test: 
Why the PACs are Taking Fright’, Electrical Trades Journal, (January, 1932), pp. 4-5; Herbert 




exacerbated by a misinformation campaign regarding an alleged LP plan to 
confiscate peoples’ Post Office Savings accounts.7  The capitalist press was 
blamed, especially Lord Rothermere’s and Lord Beaverbrook’s newspapers, which 
the NUGMW Journal condemned as not being ‘newspapers in the ordinary 
acceptance of the term. They are engines of propaganda for the constantly 
changing policies, desires, personal wishes, personal Iikes, and personal dislikes of 
two men’.8 
 
Economic Conditions and Consequences 
 
The 1930’s economic depression resulted in the labour movement’s effective 
agency being severely curtailed by its structural environment, particularly, as, apart 
from a short period of minority LP administration (which itself followed orthodox 
economic policies), the governments of the day supported those structures.  The 
negative employment climate meant wage cuts, short-time working, layoffs, and 
fears of unemployment.  Thus, articles on economics and economic policy would 
have resonated with journal readers, and the journal contributors framing of issues 
and socialist interpretations of the interconnectedness of finance, industry and 
employment, effectively disseminated socialist understandings through which 
readers could contextualise their own situation.  Most contributors believed they 
were witnessing capitalism’s implosion, the playing-out of the doctrine that the 
bourgeois democratic system ‘carries within it the seeds of its own destruction’.9  
Within this milieu the journals sought to prick class consciousness, and to work for 
and attain socialism, the presumed panacea.  
The journals framed their analysis of Government policy in terms of ‘them and us’; 
‘them’ being the capitalist classes’ for whom the Government acted as agents, and 
‘us’ being the ordinary workers whose welfare was sacrificed to ensure the capitalist 
classes’ prosperity.  The structural class disparities, combined with the preferential 
                                                          
7 W. Thorne, ‘General Secretary’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (December, 1931), p. 602; J. R. Clynes, 
‘The Greatest Lie of the Election’, NUGMW Journal, (December, 1931), p. 608; C. Dukes, ‘The 
Palace of Westminster’, NUGMW Journal, (December, 1931), p. 616.  
8 The President, ’The People and the Press’, NUGMW Journal, (December, 1931), p. 613.  
9 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, 
(1850), pp. 505-11 
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treatment advantaged groups received from Government policies, was continually 
evidenced and noted.  This was exemplified in the Government’s inequitable 
treatment of those who lent money for WWI, who received guarantees and high 
interest, and those who gave their bodies, were maimed or killed, and whose 
families suffered.  The NUGMW Journal reminded readers that amongst these, 
three thousand ex-servicemen remained in mental hospitals, and 30,000 suffered 
from war service related nervous disorders.10  They also highlighted how war 
victims included civilian workers, for instance, iron-ore miners working for capitalists’ 
profits under the guise of ‘the war effort’.  Dust and fibrosis left a legacy of morbidity 
and mortality, and workers’ dependents without their main wage earner.11  The 
journals’ message was stark; workers had sacrificed themselves in WWI and were 
now expected to bear the economic adjustment costs of the peace.  War debt 
interest payments amounted to some £1 million daily (approximately £4,000 million 
by 1931), which the journal contributors considered was a significant factor in 
deepening and extending the depression (exacerbated by the injudicious return to 
the gold standard, gold hoarding by the US and France, and with German 
reparation obligations, an important conduit for its transfer).12   
The language the journals employed in their analysis of this was direct, and often 
visceral or acerbic, designed to reinforce the sense of betrayal many workers, 
particularly the unemployed, felt. Thus, the journals actively moulded and reinforced 
a ‘common-sense’ understanding that: ‘The people fight always, then pay always. 
The owners of property fight sometimes but pay never.  Instead they lend, on the 
finest security’.13  Thus, the journal contributors sought to interpellate the 
readership, appealing to them emotionally as well as intellectually as right-thinking 
people, calling them to connect with the common-sense assumptions and received 
understandings that the journals disseminated, and their ideas around class 
interests, norms, values, and beliefs.   
In addition to castigating the Government’s policy choices as ideologically and class 
driven (to the disadvantage of the working classes), the journals alleged this also 
                                                          
10  Anon, ‘The Terrible By-Product of War’, NUGMW Journal (March, 1933), p.87.    
11  W. J. Lowery, ‘Dust and fibrosis’, NUGMW Journal, (September, 1934), pp. 291-292. 
12  For instance: C. Dukes, ‘Parliamentary Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (December, 1930), p. 298; P. J. 
Tevenan, ‘The Unions are after your Wages.  The unions are after the Employers’, NUGMW Journal, 
(March, 1931), pp. 363-364; P. J. Tevenan, ‘Lunatics at Large’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1932), p. 
69; ‘Shaughraun’, ‘Financiers’ Perpetual Toll’, NUGMW Journal, (September, 1932), p. 242. 
 13  P.J. Tevenan, ‘Lunatics at large’, pp. 69-70. 
47 
 
extended to, and was embedded within, the questions the Government and 
establishment asked.  For instance, with regard to the Royal Commission on 
Unemployment Insurance, the question asked (their terms of reference) was 
restricted to how best to make the fund solvent and self-supporting 14 (and 
arrangements outside the scheme for those capable and available for work).  Such 
question framing was attributed to the power of the capitalists’ classes, and their 
specific disapproval of Social Security spending and high taxes. The Labour 
movement’s efforts to change the terms of reference were unsuccessful.15 
The journals examined here presented unemployment as an inevitable 
consequence of capitalism, to be cured by socialism, with production for use, not 
profit.  However, the journals posited that until socialism was realised, the 
depression could be ameliorated through decreased hours without wage cuts, 
thereby increasing employment and workers’ spending power, and thus effective 
demand.16  The journal contributors unanimously prescribed a reversal of the 
government spending cuts which they considered had worsened unemployment by 
depressing demand.  Instead, substantial infrastructure projects to create jobs were 
advocated.  Unemployment was understood as a national phenomenon, and thus 
the journals recommended a National Insurance scheme funded from general 
taxation to rectify the skewed burden of Poor Law Relief falling on Depressed 
Areas.17  
The Government’s prioritisation of war expenditure over the welfare of the most 
vulnerable in society was condemned, as was the 10% benefit cut (with a 26-week 
annual limit), the increased NI contributions, Means Testing transitional payments, 
and the Local Authority Public Assistance Committee regulations,18 which were all 
implemented after the 1931 Labour administration fell.  The journals further 
                                                          
14 For instance: W. Thorne, ‘General Secretary’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (February, 1931), p. 338; 
W. Thorne, ‘General Secretary’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (June, 1931), p. 442; League of Nations, 
‘International Labour Conference 15th Session’, NUGMW Journal, (July, 1931), p. 491. 
15 See for instance: ‘General Secretary’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (February, 1931), p.338; ‘General 
Secretary’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (June, 1931), p. 442; C. Dukes, ‘Thunder over Westminster’, 
NUGMW Journal, (June, 1931), p. 449; ‘General Secretary’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (July, 1931), 
p. 471. 
16 This argument was used in the unions’ campaign for a 40-hour week. 
17  W. Thorne, ‘General Secretary’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (August, 1932), pp., 193-194. 
18  The Local Authority Public Assistance Committee’s rules (based on Poor Law principles) forced 
many young people into lodgings away from the family home.  T Cain, ‘Beneath Big Ben: Big Battles 
over Unemployment Insurance’, AEU Journal, (February, 1934), p.10; Anon, ‘The Unemployment 
Bill’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1934), p. 91. 
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suggested that the widespread hardship caused was exacerbated by the 
inaccuracies of the Board of Trade Cost of Living Index, resulting in sub-
subsistence pay-outs.19  All such measures were universally framed in the journal 
articles (and NUGMW cartoons) 20 as unjust and class motivated, and were featured 
most months, especially during 1932.  The journals also reinforced their own 
conclusions concerning malnutrition levels and hardships by citing outside 
authoritative sources, including religious groups and even some Tories.21  
The Anomalies Regulations (National Insurance) was regularly featured in the 
NUGMW Journal, especially the position of married women and seasonal workers 
who formed part of their membership.  The journals highlighted the considerable 
time union leaders devoted to representing members at the Courts of Referees, 
appealing against unfair decisions.  Their positive results were published, illustrating 
to readers the benefits of union membership over and above merely workplace pay 
and conditions. The NUGMW Journal, in-line with its ongoing narrative, portrayed 
the ‘nons’ hardships in relation to the Means Test, unsympathetically.22 
Hardship and unemployment, although widespread, were geographically variable.  
The traditional heavy industry and mining areas were especially effected.  
Government inaction over unemployment was denounced, as was their failure to 
make unemployment and its funding a national responsibility, which would have 
relieved local rates and thus facilitated their provision of essential services, such as 
health.23  The NUGMW Journal drew attention to the Government’s failure to forgive 
the ‘Goschen Loans’ (taken during the 1921 and 1926 coal strikes), which Sir 
Wyndham Portal’s Report on the distressed areas made clear, were onerous to 
                                                          
19 P.J. Tevenan, ‘That ‘Fodder’ Basis. What it is and how it Works’, NUGMW Journal, (August, 1931), 
p. 501. 
20 Will Dyson ‘The Meanness of the Means Test’ (Cartoon), NUGMW Journal, (December, 1932), p. 
307. 
21 For instance: ’Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (February, 1932), p. 43; Anon, ‘Another Tory Protest 
about the Consequences of the Means Test’, AEU Journal, (June, 1932), p. 44; Anon, Religious 
Body Protests over Means Test’,  AEU Journal, (July, 1932), p40; Industrial Christian Fellowship, 
‘Starving in a World of Plenty’, AEU Journal, (August, 1932), p. 32; Anon, ‘Archbishop of York on 
Unemployment’, AEU Journal, (April, 1934), p.11; Christian Fellowship Manifesto, ‘Christianity and 
Industry’, NUGMW Journal, (June, 1935), p.175. 
22 Mathew Riggins, ‘Apathy’, NUGMW Journal, (May, 1932), p. 111. 
23  Anon, ‘Unemployment and Rates: Why Councils Should Combine for Relief’, NUGMW Journal, 
(August, 1933), p. 271. 
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Local Authorities.  They called for their cancellation, especially as the amounts were 
inconsequential compared to rearmament expenditure.24   
The journals took up the plight of the unemployed to some extent, but those in 
employment remained their priority.  Moreover, for some contributors, empathy for 
the unemployed was dependent on union membership and activism, ‘be a fighter 
and let them starve who like it’.25 (The journals in general were very negative about 
non-union members; in the NUGMW Journal the anti- ‘non’ propaganda was 
extreme).26  Major unions, the TUC and the LP typically refused to back the 
campaigns and hunger marches of the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement 
(NUWM), regarding it as a CP satellite, ‘elastic in organisation, accessory or 
subservient to the Communist International in all their propaganda’.27 Indeed, in a 
TUC publication, Walter Citrine described the NUWM ’s hunger marches as 
‘attempts to discredit the democratically elected Trades Union leadership without 
serving any useful purpose whatsoever in remedying the conditions that have 
brought about the crisis in unemployment’.28  Such attitudes were evidenced in the 
pernicious reception given to the NUWM  representatives at the 1930 Trade Union 
Congress: 
The usual request to receive a deputation of the NUWM was courteously 
refused by Standing Orders, endorsed by Congress.  Isolated resentment 
was manifested without avail, as the vast majority of delegates would not 
take the protestors seriously, but treated them with good humoured hilarity.29  
Thus, for this speaker (and like-minded members of the unions, TUC, and Labour 
Party), the core values of working class solidarity and fraternity were subsumed 
under anti-communist sentiment.  Nonetheless, although largely omitted from the 
journals, this attitude was far from unanimous in the trade union (TU) and labour 
                                                          
24  George Dean, ‘Goschen Loans. Why not Sweep Them Away’, NUGMW Journal, (October, 1935), 
p. 315.  
25 Fred Smith, ‘My Impressions of the Hyde Park Demonstration’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1933), 
p. 741. 
26 Anti-’Non’ comment was included in most NUGMW Journals, and many cartoons were directed 
against the ‘Nons’, 
27 The Communist Solar System: The Communist International (London: 1933),   
28 Walter M. Citrine, Democracy or Disruption? An Examination of Communist Influences in the 
Trade Unions (2nd Edition) (London, undated), p.30. 
29 R. Spence, ‘Rejection of the Communist spirit:  Trade Union Congress, 1930’, NUGMW Journal, 
(October, 1930), p. 260. 
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movement, for instance the AEU’s own Wal Hannington (National Organiser 1939 
onwards) led the NUWM. 
 
The Economy Under the National Government 
 
The ‘poverty in the midst of abundance’ situation of depressed demand due to the 
working class’s inability to afford goods, was attributed to a misdistribution of 
income and wealth.   Following J. A. Hobson, the NUGMW and AEU Journals 
argued that markets failed to expand in line with the increased productivity attained 
through rationalisation and mechanisation, and that income redistributed in favour of 
the workers was necessary to create effective demand and thus resolve the under-
employment of men and machines; socialism, it was asserted, would rectify this 
situation. 30 Similar views were presented in other union journals, for instance, that 
of the Electrical Trades Journal.31 
The pernicious absurdity of ‘want in the midst of plenty’ also led the journal 
contributors to examine ideas and expediencies such as the social minimum,32 as 
well as issues concerning industrial changes, where technology simultaneously 
increased production, displaced workers, increased debts (due to rising capital 
costs), and contracted workers’ real wages (in-line with Marxist predictions).33 
Although the position expressed in the AEU Journal on technological changes and 
rationalisation was somewhat malleable at this time, contributors agreed that, thus 
far, the employers’ had seized the financial benefits of such advances.  They 
warned that vigilance was needed to ensure that technological and scientific 
advances were not employed for harm, but instead, they should be embraced for 
                                                          
30 For instance: P.J. Tevenan, ‘When Shall we get down to Brass Tacks’, NUGMW Journal, 
(February, 1931), p. 342.; ‘Industrial Christian Fellowship’, AEU Journal, (August, 1932), p. 32; 
‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (February, 1933), p. 35; C. R. Crawford, ‘The Engineer and the 
Industrial Revolution’, AEU Journal, (February, 1933), p. 55; R. B. Suthers,  ‘Lunatics at Large’, p. 
13; T. Cain, ‘Beneath Big Ben’, AEU Journal, (August, 1935), p.11:  Richard M. Fox, ‘The World’s 
Window: The Conquest of Bread’, AEU Journal, (September, 1935), p.16; J. T. Edlin, ‘Intimidation 
Law’, NUGMW Journal, (February, 1931), p. 340; C. Dukes, ‘A Real Crisis or a Big Panic’, NUGMW 
Journal, (October, 1931), p. 566.   
31 For instance: Anon, ‘Thinks. Idle Thoughts of an Idle (Enforced) Fellow’, Electrical Trades Journal, 
(July, 1932), p. 49. 
32 Fred Montague, ‘Why Not a Social Minimum?’ AEU Journal, (January, 1933), p. 51. 
33  C. Dukes, ‘In America and Canada’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1933), p. 65. 
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socialism and the people, as, they asserted, was the case in Russia.34  Machinery 
had the potential to enhance life rather than enslave workers, it just depended on 
how it was employed.  Russia’s rapid development, whilst the Western World 
floundered, was attributed to its application of science, and the efficiency of its 
production for need not profit, by a motivated workforce.   
The journals’ (1933) exploration of the role of technology, mechanisation, and 
rationalisation, and their consequences, extended to ideas concerning the 
establishment of a 'technocracy' (as proposed by a group of US engineers, 
economists, industrialists and scholars), to address the disparity between industrial 
output and purchasing power distribution.35  These ‘technocrats’ acknowledged that 
the current wage labour system failed to distribute the monies by which production 
could be purchased effectively, but did not advocate changing the ownership 
structure.  Therefore, the NUGMW Journal recommended rejecting their ideas, and 
instead endorsed a democratic dictatorship with community ownership of wealth 
production, employing experts in the public interest.36  The AEU Journal advocated 
fundamental changes to the monetary system and the financial mechanism that 
governed production, distribution and consumption.37     
Whereas the journals explored alternative ideas outside the straight forward 
capitalism versus socialism debate, the majority of their economic and fiscal 
coverage was devoted to advocacy of socialism and the condemnation of 
capitalism. This was illustrated in their attacks on the Government’s professed 
inability to afford unemployment benefit (without reducing payment levels), or to 
fund public infrastructure investment, whilst being able to service war-debt interest 
payments and, when sterling came under pressure, to fund the ‘Exchange 
Equalisation Fund’ (with £150 million credit, and £200 million in reserve).38  The 
conclusion of both the AEU and NUGMW journals was that money can always be 
                                                          
 34  Frederick E. Walker, ‘The Rationalisation of the Union, Pt 4.  The Challenge of Capitalist 
Rationalisation’, AEU Journal, (March, 1933), p. 46. 
35 The ‘Technocrats’ recommended that ‘experts’ should be entrusted with ensuring that production 
and consumption were balanced.   They suggested that technological improvements meant that 
enough could be produced by those aged 25-45 years in 4 hours per day, 4 days per week, to satisfy 
consumption.   
36   G. P. Dean, ‘Technocracy’, NUGMW Journal, (January, 1933), p. 85. 
 37 ‘Garw’, ‘Wages, Prices, and Production’, AEU Journal, (December, 1932), p. 44; ‘Garw’, 
‘Production, Consumption and Under-Consumption: More about the Technocracy Revolution’, AEU 
Journal, (January, 1933), p. 58.   
38 W. Thorne, ‘General Secretary’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (September, 1933), p. 217. 
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found to protect ‘The Temple of Mammon’, but is scarce when dealing with 
employment and social need.39  Such examples were regularly highlighted, 
politicised, and denounced, pricking class consciousness with the aim of motivating 
the readership to pursue change through legitimate (parliamentary) means. 
Although the journals shared a common socialist ideological framework, they 
differed in their coverage of government economic policies.  The NUGMW 
concentrated on how these impacted worker’s lives.  Events, facts, and ideas 
around causation were reported, and the dominant narrative expounded by the 
establishment and capitalist press was challenged.  For instance, the NUGMW 
Journal highlighted how, despite the depression: 
After paying wages far higher than in France or Germany, after supporting a 
quarter of our (employable) population in idleness, after adding to the 
country's equipment of houses and roads and electrical plant we still had a 
surplus available to be lent to foreign countries, which in 1929 was greater 
than the surplus for such purposes of any other country in the world, even of 
the United States.40 
The NUGMW Journal provided multiple examples of generous share dividend pay-
outs, 41 that undermined capitalist claims of the unaffordability of wage rises.  For 
instance, the day after a debate between Will Sherwood (NUGMW Industrial 
Officer) and Sir Herbert Austin (Chairman of Austin Motors Ltd.) where Austin 
declared a 40 hour week without pay reduction was unaffordable, he announced an 
Ordinary Share Dividend of 25% with a cash bonus of 75%.42  Calls by economists, 
the Conservative Party, and industrialists, for workers to take a 10-20% wage cut, 
wage cuts in sheltered industries, and a 33% cut in Unemployment Benefit, as a 
                                                          
39  For instance: W. Thorne, ‘General Secretary’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (September, 1933), p. 
217; J. D. Lawrence, ‘The Higher Politics of Trade Unionism:  Pt.6’, AEU Journal, (September, 
1931), p. 39; Anon, ‘Reply to the ‘Christian Lord Brentford’ Attack on Dole’, AEU Journal, 
(September, 1931), p. 50; George Barnes, ‘Money and Mind: More Reflections’, AEU Journal, (April, 
1932), pp. 35-7. 
40  John Maynard Keynes, ‘Is England Down and Out?’  Excerpt of radio speech cited in NUGMW 
Journal, (April, 1931), p. 416.  
41  For instance: P. J. Tevenan, ‘Change the Record!’ NUGMW Journal, (May, 1931), pp. 429-30; W. 
Thorne, ‘Cheek and Impudence’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1931), pp. 380-381. 
42  The previous year (1932), its share dividends were 50% and, in 1931,100%, whilst the market 
value of Ordinary Shares, with a five-shilling nominal-value, had risen to sixty-five shillings and seven 
pence halfpenny; Anon, ‘Friend or Frankenstein: Debate between Will Sherwood and Sir Herbert 
Austin.’  NUGMW Journal, (February, 1933), pp. 353-356. 
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solution to the crisis, were indignantly rejected.43  Thus, what was considered to be 
the self-serving, and untrustworthy nature of the capitalist class was again made 
explicit and underlined.  The language employed by the journal contributors to 
describe the capitalists was stark and pejorative; they were ‘parasites’ fattening 
themselves from the workers’ toil.44 
The AEU Journal also presented the immiseration of workers through pay and 
unemployment benefit cuts as counter-productive, as well as being socially and 
economically unjust. Instead, they advocated Keynesian type public works 
schemes, such as house building (which also tackled housing shortages) to cure 
unemployment and stimulate the economy.45  They vigorously refuted the claims of 
economists like Professor Pigou, who stated that dole payments prevented 
sufficient wages cuts, and kept production costs too high,46 and they condemned 
Chancellor Neville Chamberlain’s stance that public expenditure would push out the 
private sector.47   
The journals use of language embodied emotive as well as descriptive elements, for 
instance, producer subsidies were widely referred to as ‘dole’ for capitalists, to 
which the contributors pertinently added, that unlike the workers’ benefits, these 
were not Means Tested.  Thus, the perception of class based disparity was again 
stressed, highlighting the distinction between socialist solutions (in their various 
strands) in which equality was a core value, and the prevailing capitalist system 
which structurally privileged the most advantaged in society at the expense of the 
least advantaged.  In related articles, the AEU Journals compared how capitalists 
and their press advocates sought public sector economies and the curtailment of 
the social security budget, whilst remaining silent on capitalists’ subsidies, tariffs 
                                                          
43 Thomas Hurley, ‘Oyez, Oyez, Oyez.’ NUGMW Journal, (April, 1931), p. 388. 
44 See for instance: ‘Bros. Fearn & Shaw’, ‘One Day School’, NUGMW Journal, (September, 1931), 
p. 531; J. R. Clynes, ‘To Housewives: Balancing our Budgets’, NUGMW Journal, (October, 1931), 
pp. 563-4; George Oats, ‘Capitalism in Society’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1933), p. 87; ’Editor’s 
Notes’, AEU Journal, (March, 1933), p. 30.  
45  ‘Garw’, ‘The Path to Prosperity. Keynes’s Guidance’, AEU Journal, (April, 1933), p.54. 
46 ‘Garw’, ‘Is the Dole the Cause of Unemployment?’ AEU Journal, (August, 1931), p51. 
47 T. Cain, ‘Beneath Big Ben’, AEU Journal, (March, 1933), p.37. 
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and quotas. 48 R. M. Fox 49 (AEU) highlighted the long standing nature of 
asymmetries of treatment of different classes by drawing parallels between 
Government schemes to destroy produce to maintain producer prices at tax-payers 
expense (of which the capitalists approved), and the Luddite destruction of 
machines to maintain workers’ incomes (which capitalists deplored). 50  These 
disparities, the AEU posited, were also evidenced in the establishment of various 
marketing boards, for instance, the Milk Marketing Board received an advertising 
budget of £60,000, whilst British children were malnourished through poverty.  The 
journals provided their readers with the solution; production for need and not private 
profit would benefit all and no money would be wasted on advertising,51 making it 
the more efficient, common-sense, solution.  Thus, the journals challenged the 
hegemonic histories, narratives, and understandings, employed by the ruling 
classes to present the prevailing social structure and societal contradictions as 
natural, without alternatives, and consequently legitimate.  In doing so they 
attempted to counter the false consciousness which dislocated people from their 
reality.  
Notably, there was a conspicuous silence, in all the journals examined, concerning 
the business failures and bankruptcies of the depression, except insofar as 
lamenting job losses. However, at times expediency usurped their socialist ideology.  
For instance, when work stopped on the Cunard liner (the Queen Mary), some 
3,500 workers laid-off, and a further 10,000 indirectly affected, Sir Percy Bates, 
Cunard’s Chairman stated: 
                                                          
48  Such as the,1929 De-rating Act (costing £41 million in state reimbursements to local authorities), 
£30 million for the sugar beet industry and £30 million in sugar duties grants / rebates; J. D. 
Lawrence, ‘The Higher Politics of Trade Unionism, Pt. 6’, AEU Journal, (September, 1931), pp. 39-
40.  Also see for instance: J. D. Lawrence, ‘The Higher Politics of Trade Unionism (Pt. 2)’, AEU 
Journal, (April, 1931), p. 47; T. Cain, ‘Beneath Big Ben’, AEU Journal, (April, 1932), p.39; W. Thorne, 
‘Parliamentary Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (January, 1935), p.19; W. Thorne, ‘Parliamentary Notes’, 
NUGMW Journal, (December, 1935), p. 361; W. Thorne, ‘Parliamentary Notes’, NUGMW Journal, 
(May, 1936), p. 133. 
49 Note R. M. Fox is not Ralph Fox.  Richard Michael Fox (1891–1969) was a member of the 
Socialist Party of Great Britain and the Industrial Workers of the World, who condemned WWI as an 
imperialist war in which he refused to fight. 
50 R. M. Fox, ‘The World’s Window: Destroying the World’s Wealth’, AEU Journal, (January, 1933), p. 
41.   
51  S. Beare, ‘The National Government’s yardstick’, AEU Journal, (July, 1935), p.18. 
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If the Government will give the Cunard Line a contingent guarantee of £3,000,000 
for a period of not more than six years, work on the new giant liner will be resumed 
immediately.52  
The government obliged.  The monies benefited the owner’s profits, not the 
workers, and the absence of worker or Government stakes in the company 
consequent to their investment was noted.  Will Sherwood, NUGMW’s National 
Industrial Officer, reiterated their opposition to state resources being employed for 
private gain.  He instead argued that state subsidies to shipbuilding should be 
balanced by some degree of public control.  This lack of public control or 
guaranteed repayments also concerned the AEU and the LP53 Nonetheless, 
Government intervention to protect jobs (albeit with misgivings) was approved by 
the NUGMW Journal, in contradiction to their normal attitudes and ideological 
position regarding Government subsidies to industry.54  
The anti-capitalist stance taken by the AEU, NUGMW, and NP journals was shared 
by the secondary journals analysed here.  
 
Banks and Financiers 
The interconnections between the industrial, political, and economic spheres and 
the finance industry, were exposed and explored in the journals.   Financiers’ 
powerful voice, and bankers’ behaviour, were routinely denounced. Outside 
authoritative sources were employed to reinforce the position taken in the journals, 
for instance, the NUGMW Journal published a long quotation from one of President 
Roosevelt’s speeches on the topic.55   
The denunciation of financiers intensified after the MacDonald Government failed.  
The Journals, like most on the political left, unanimously considered that this had 
been caused when parliament had been usurped by international financers’ refusal 
                                                          
52 W. Sherwood, ‘Stoppage of the Giant Cunarder’, NUGMW Journal, (February, 1932), pp. 31-32. 
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AEU Journal, (April, 1934), pp. 8-9.   
54 Ben Smith, ‘The Cunard Problem’, NUGMW Journal, (February, 1932), p.32; The President, ‘Build 
the Cunard: How to Finance it’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1932), p. 72; ‘Annual Meeting of the 
Engineering and Shipbuilder’s Federation at Bournemouth: W. Sherwood President’s address’, 
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of credit unless the government acquiesced with their conditions including the 
reduction of unemployment payments. This was interpreted as ‘dictatorship by the 
bankers’.56   The journals never intimated such a refusal of credit may have been 
governed by the same criteria as credit decisions regarding foreign firms and 
governments.   
The British press, after having blamed the Labour Government for the depression, 
admitted its international nature, but only after the Tory dominated National 
Government took office.57  The journals set the British experience in its international 
context for their readership; National Incomes had dropped some 40%, and only six 
countries remained both on the Gold Standard and without restrictions.  Moreover, 
some twenty-three countries imposed constraints on private and commercial 
payments, further undermining confidence in forward transactions.  The idle wealth 
locked in the banks was condemned, ‘The World is suffering from indigestion 
because it is choking itself with gold.’58 Sixty-six countries met at the 1933 World 
Economic Conference to seek resolutions to the world economic, financial, and 
trade problems.  However, the talks were restricted to resurrecting trade, as 
opposed to interrogating the root cause of the problem.59  Thus, the journal 
contributors framed the issue as participants seeking answers within capitalism to 
resolve the devastation capitalism had itself produced.  The contradictions of 
capitalism were thus laid bare, and the common sense understanding that only 
socialism held the answer to all such economic, and consequently social and 
political problems, were advanced.  
In line with socialist thinking, all official union journals examined here called for joint 
stock banks and the Bank of England to be taken into public ownership.  The Bank 
of England controlled credit (the 1930s credit drought was considered a causal 
factor in the depression), and substantially profited from lending to the state; such 
capitalist self-enrichment through a national institution was antithetical to the 
socialist ideology which the journals’ promoted.  Instead, the journals advocated 
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that the country, not private interests, should control its own credit, as the whole 
population’s welfare was affected by its decisions.60 
The NUGMW Journal informed their readers that the world’s ten largest banks (five 
in both the US and London) controlled some $15,000,000,000 in deposits, 
endowing them with massive power and influence.61  Banks’ ability to create or 
refuse credit ‘with the stroke of a pen’, and thus choose to sustain or destroy 
industries and manipulate markets, was considered capricious.62 The banks and 
financiers were perceived to be directing the employers’ campaign to reduced 
workers’ wages and worsen their conditions by imposing loan conditions premised 
on ‘high wages increase production costs and interfere with dividends’.63   
Perceptions of the financiers’ corrupt nature was reinforced with examples.  The 
NUGMW Journal highlighted topics such as the enthusiasm of the wealthy for tax 
evasion schemes,64 which was linked with their feigned concern for the public 
purse, and also their claims that wage increases were unaffordable, whilst they 
increased dividends.65  Similarly, reports in the AEU Journal ranged from the 
complicity of Price Waterhouse Cooper Accountants (PWC) in accounting 
irregularities, including inflated assets prices, uncovered after financier Ivar 
Kreuger’s suicide,66 to the disastrous 'get rich quick' multi-million pound loans by 
London Financial Houses to Central Europe.  This was exemplified when Germany 
was unable to raise American loans, the City of London lent-long to her and 
borrowed-short from France and America.  When the short-money was recalled, 
London’s financial houses were unable to fulfil their obligations, and the Bank of 
England was divested of its gold, thus contributing to the 1930s financial crisis.67  
Such articles were imbued with the idea that these were the consequences of 
                                                          
60  John McKenzie, ‘Banking and the Present Depression’, NUGMW Journal, (January, 1931), pp. 
321-322; also see, for instance: ‘Public Control of Banks’, AEU Journal, (August, 1932), p. 42.  
61 Anon, ‘Prosperity amongst banks’, NUGMW Journal, (April, 1931), p. 411. 
62  C. H. Kirkby, ‘The First Great Cause’, NUGMW Journal, (September, 1931), p. 542.   
63  W. Sherwood, ‘Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades: Annual meeting at Great 
Yarmouth. Some points from the President’s Address’, NUGMW Journal, (June, 1931), p. 447.   
64 For instance, through specially constructed Swiss limited companies; J. Tevenan, ‘Lunatics at 
Large’, pp. 69-70. 
65 For instance, Anon, ‘Friend or Frankenstein: Debate between Will Sherwood and Sir Herbert 
Austin’, pp. 353-356. 
66 ‘W.W.C.’, ‘Ivar Kreugar’, AEU Journal, (May, 1932), pp. 51-52. 
67  G. R. Mitchison, ‘Socialism and the Banks’, AEU Journal, (September, 1935), p. 25; J. D. 
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capitalism, and that socialism would end such iniquitous and inappropriate 
practices.  
The New Propellor (NP, established September 1935), began a monthly column, 
pejoratively entitled The Money we earn for Others, that listed company results, 
along with shareholder dividends, bonus share issues, and subsequently, tax 
expediencies (July 1936 onwards).68  The NP’s coverage of the topic was stark, and 
stripped of the explanations that the official union journals offered.  Instead it 
presented the abuses and exploitation involved in capitalist industry as needing no 
elucidation or explanation; they were blatantly self-evident. 
 
The WWI legacy, the League, Pacifism, and War 
 
The temporal proximity of WWI, the widespread pacifist sentiment that grew out of 
it,69 and the belief that the ‘war to end all wars’ should be more than a slogan, 
permeated much of the journal content on European issues in the early 1930s.  As 
such, journal content mirrored the popular sentiment.  In terms of the 
reconfiguration of core ideological concepts (following Freeden), 70 the WWI 
experience caused the migration of the concept of international fraternity into close 
proximity to the pursuit of human flourishing within the core cluster.  Such concepts 
were then expressed through peripheral concepts such as the pursuit of pacifist 
policies including disarmament.  Worries over international events and politics were 
present in union journals throughout the 1930s.  The rise of fascism in Europe, 
nationalism, economic nationalism, capitalists’ and financiers’ interests, all 
fermented in the context of economic depression and the perceived injustices of the 
Versailles Treaty.   Such injustices concerned not just the German reparation 
payments, but the war responsibility and disarmament clauses, (and the unfulfilled 
promise that the allies follow suit), culminating in the subjugation of peoples and 
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broken treaties.   Thus, the pursuit of self-interest by capitalists and nationalists in 
Britain and Europe was presented as subjugating international fraternity, equality, 
and fairness (socialist core values), with the consequence of creating an 
environment where desperate people misguidedly turned to seek an escape 
through fascism. 
In the early 1930s the TUs understandings and ideas concerning the League of 
Nations, international affairs, war, and disarmament, largely mirrored that of the LP, 
but with different stresses and foci.  For instance, the NUGMW Journal focused on 
the pacifist case, which it presented vociferously and passionately.  War was 
framed as an abomination, the needless destruction of life for capitalist or imperialist 
gains.  It was consequently condemned as repugnant on moral, humanitarian, and 
for some, religious grounds.  Pacifism was presented as a universal moral 
imperative, not merely a socialist or trade unionist ideal.   
It was unanimously agreed that deals and treaties of the type that preceded WWI 
should be avoided, as they would justify Hitler’s ideology and elicit support for him.  
Instead diplomatic solutions, including sincere engagement in disarmament 
conferences, were always advocated (contra the later position of ‘Cato’ in Guilty 
Men).     
Both the AEU and NUGMW Journals had regular contributors who were themselves 
WWI conscientious objectors.  The Journals also devoted space to other pacifists, 
such as reporting on Albert Einstein’s 1930, New York lecture on Militant Pacifism.71  
The NUGMW published extracts from the publications of the Union of Democratic 
Control, for instance ‘Patriotism Ltd.’72 A NUGMW member on a Ruskin Scholarship 
at Oxford reported in the journal the (now infamous) resolution to refuse to fight for 
‘King and Country’, the failure of Lord Stanley and Randolph Churchill to expunge 
the resolution, and the outrage of the establishment press.73    
The economic arguments employed by journal contributors against war, utilised 
multiple linguistic devises to convince readers of the cogency of their position.  
These ranged from theoretically backed rational argument and explanations of 
economic principles (especially in the AEU Journal), to emotive appeals and 
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attempts to interpellate readers.   For instance, NUGMW contributors such as Chas 
Dukes and Will Sherwood argued that armament’s spending diverted money from 
household expenditure or investment (which would improve sustainable 
employment), and that taxes currently used for armaments, if redirected into 
government infrastructure projects, would create employment and societal 
benefits.74  
13yrs after the ‘war to end all wars’ we are armed to the teeth.  Millions which 
might help the unemployed are frittered away every year on the preparations 
for war.75   
Thus, in addition to the moral imperative and the general good, war was 
condemned on the grounds of the population’s economic welfare, as opposed to 
that of the arms’ manufacturers.  A similar interpretation was disseminated by The 
Clerk (1931) both in their own articles, and in their promotion of the ‘No More War 
Movement’s’ publications, such as Sir Norman Angell’s Will Disarmament Increase 
Unemployment.76   
Disarmament was presented as necessary and urgent; the still fresh memories of 
WWI, and intimate understandings of the reality of military conflict, meant such 
issues resonated with both the journals’ creators and its consumers.  The general 
sentiment of the individual trade unions and the labour movement generally at this 
time was expressed in a manifesto issued by John Bromley, Walter Citrine, George 
Lathan, and William Gillies, which promoted the idea that ‘Disarmament by 
international treaty is not the futile expression of an impotent aspiration’, but ‘the 
vital need of the movement if civilisation is to avoid another, even worse, 
catastrophe.’77  
 
The League of Nations, and the League of Nations Union (LNU), were championed 
in the primary and secondary journals throughout the 1930s.  The vilification and 
belittlement of the League by the capitalist press was criticised as detrimental to 
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improved international relations, disarmament, and peace.  Despite this, a small 
minority voice (much smaller than would have been expected given the powerful 
leftist voice within the journals) warned of the League’s capitalist Liberal 
foundations: 
… one can no more get peace with order in the international world, while 
armed ‘Powers’ claim the absolute ownership of the earth's surface, than one 
can get a planned economy at home while private owners possess the 
machines. 78 
The inclusion of such opinion in the NUGMW Journal amidst the otherwise solid 
support for the League implies that opinion was not as uniform as the usual (edited) 
content implied. 
In 1932, the AEU Journal acknowledged that, on a narrow industrial level, 
particularly in engineering, disarmament would negatively affect their members’ 
employment situation and thus their welfare, (the raison d’etre for the union’s 
existence).  To ameliorate this, they proposed shorter hours, and the help of League 
of Nations’ in re-employment of affected workers, which would off-set job losses.  
Thus, within the hierarchy of competing policies, norms, and values, a desire to 
maintain engineering jobs in-line with the unions’ primary function was subordinated 
to the ideological imperative to seek disarmament as a means of promoting peace 
and disrupting the potential harm and the path dependencies of rearmament: 
inevitable war.79   Nonetheless, the political cultures evidence in the AEU Journal 
articles were not ideologically homogeneous with regards to pacifism or in the 
means of attaining their shared objective, peace.  Moreover, they mutated over 
time, and by 1934 some AEU contributors argued: 
  
Those who make it a principle to utter only the lulling word ‘peace’ are in truth 
passively rendering war possible.  The abstract pacifists are the de facto 
allies of Hitler and Mussolini.80 
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Instead, concrete pacifism through aggressive socialism was advocated to counter 
the fascist threat.81  
 
As the decade progressed the European situation led to the concept of pacifism 
becoming increasingly contested; some perceived war was invariably wrong, others 
considered that Hitler’s and Mussolini’s policies, and their treatment of socialists, 
communists, and trade unionists, necessitated action,82 whilst a significant minority 
argued that pacifism allowed evil.  
The Government’s declared position of ‘collective security under the League’ was 
popular amongst the electorate and in-keeping with the journals’ position.83 
However, the journal contributors considered the Government’s declared position 
with regards to both the League and disarmament to be disingenuous.  Despite the 
changing geo-political environment in the early 1930s, changes in the viability of 
various policy options were rarely analysed or reflected on in the journals.  The 
journals offered no analysis on the difficulties and complexities involved in 
actualising collective security.  There was a general sense within the texts that if 
League members, especially Britain and France, made it clear that they would take 
any action necessary to ensure League decisions were adhered to, then the League 
could deter aggressive behaviour without resorting to force of arms.  No mention 
was made of the fact that what constituted realistic policy options in 1932 were not 
feasible by 1933, when just Britain, France, and weak countries constituted the 
League standing against Japan and the European fascists, or even after 1934 when 
Russia added its strength to the League. The policies advocated remained 
unchanged.   
Concrete policy options were proposed.  The AEU’s George Barnes articulated a 
commonly held position when he proposed a new Commonwealth with an 
international police force replacing all armed forces dedicated to national wars, and 
a tribunal empowered to revise the treaties that underlay much of European 
discontent.84  
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All the journals presented as axiomatic the assumption that capitalist competition for 
markets and resources lay behind all wars.  Increased world industrialisation, it was 
argued, necessitated more and larger markets for surplus production, unaffordable 
to workers as capitalists extracted surplus value as profits: ‘So we have war for 
capturing the markets of the backwards areas; war to injure the industrial powers of 
competitors; war to satisfy the jealousies of capitalists’.85 Thus, journal contributors 
sought to establish an inextricable link between international mistrust, economic 
nationalism, trade barriers, and armament spending. The world economy was 
presented as intertwined, intermeshed and international, a trade based economy, 
‘gradually working towards several great economic units, each labouring under the 
delusion that it can become independent of the other’.86  
The idea that economic nationalism was counterproductive pervaded the AEU and 
NUGMW Journals and was presented as a common-sense assumption.  R. M. Fox 
(AEU) argued that tariffs, like war, harmed the wealth and industry of all parties, 
both immediately and going forward, and instead advocated that rather than ‘beggar 
thy neighbour policies’ such economic decisions should be informed by Hobson’s 
economic theory, which posited that the ‘world is a single economic system and 
improved or impaired productivity and consumption in every part affects every other 
part’.87   Economic co-operation to deal with the root causes of war was presented 
as a necessary condition to maintain peace, along with adherence to treaty 
obligations, and collective security through the League (aspirations shared by the 
LP). 
The malevolent influence of powerful interests, the counterproductive nature of 
rearmament, and the need for collective security, were recurrent themes throughout 
the period.  Both the AEU and NUGMW Journals reported that the atmosphere 
created by the press and politicians mirrored that of pre-WWI, when jingoists (often 
with substantial armament interests) proclaimed that war-readiness was the best 
means of ensuring world peace. By February 1932, articles about the ‘next war’ 
started to appear.  Readers were reminded that war scares periodically emerged, 
but typically disappeared, but military defence chiefs unfailingly call for more 
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armaments.88  Chas Dukes highlighted Sir Austen Chamberlain’s statement in the 
House of Commons ‘It is my confident belief that none of those (foreign) armies or 
naval forces is being piled up against us’ (a view largely backed by the press), 
which was juxtaposed with the Government spending 70% of their 1932 budget on 
rearmaments and WWI debt, in spite of the League of Nations and the International 
Court of Arbitration obligations and restrictions.89 Nonetheless, it was argued that 
trade unionists working internationally had the potential to prevent war.90  
The AEU Journal informed its readership about the multilateral nature of 
rearmament which meant capitalist manufacturers sold armaments to all parties, if 
necessary covertly through second and third countries. 91 This, the journal 
contributors concluded, was a principal factor in the 1932 Geneva Disarmament 
Conference failure.92  The NUGMW Journal denounced the Conference’s focus on 
the restrictions on weapons and regulating war, rather than safeguarding peace.  
Thus, they declared, the Conference’s focus was on ‘how would you like to be 
killed?’ 93 
 
The vast, powerful, capitalist nature of the arms industry was highlighted by the 
AEU Journal which utilised authoritative sources to reinforce their message and 
give it gravitas. For instance, in 1933 they cited, ‘The Temporary Mixed Commission 
to the League of Nations’, whose Report A81.192 concluded that arms firms utilise 
any means, often covert, to stimulate anxiety, and incite re-armament and war.94  
The AEU also included in its recommended reading (1934) Why War? acerbically 
subtitled A Handbook for Those Who Will Be Engaged in the Second World War. 95  
In conjunction with their articles which attributed war’s underlying cause to 
capitalism (including private arms manufacture), the AEU highlighted the National 
Government’s stress on the need for a larger Army, Navy, and Air Force, and their 
somewhat contradictory justification for adding 41 squadrons to the air-force to 
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‘strengthen our influence for peace and avert a race in armaments’.96 The British 
Government’s promises to prevent industry profiteering from their rearmament 
policy was considered a mere repetition of the WWI promises which were proved to 
be false.97 
The journals also evidenced the underlying profit motive regarding armaments by 
quoting the capitalist and financial press.  For instance, the Sunday Times spoke of:  
… the brilliant future that lies in front of Aviation shares in view of the 
disturbed political state of the world and the stress that is being laid upon the 
importance of the air arm in this and other countries.  This agitation for the 
strengthening of Air Force has been going on for quite a long time, and has 
been accompanied by rising prices of the shares of companies that are 
supposed to be benefiting most from Government contracts.98  
Before WWI, annual Government armaments spending was £77million; by 1936 it 
was £190million.  The NUGMW reported, that, not unrelatedly, the capital value of 
13 firms connected with munitions contracts increased from £11 million to £38 
million.99  This, the journal interpreted to be private interests profiting from the 
workers’ taxes (which paid for the arms) and labour (which produced them). The 
journals’ unanimous message until the late 1930s was clear and repetitive; workers 
are exploited in the construction of war materials only to become the victims of their 
deployment, whilst the ownership class profited.  This diagnosis of the problem was 
published in conjunction with the proposed solution: collective action through the 
labour movement to ensure capitalism is usurped by socialism.  R. B. Suthers 
(AEU) caustically postulated that if like bees, the owners/investors died when they 
stung, war would be less common.100  Another AEU contributor suggested that if 
war was financed by the landowners (as it had been historically), instead of by the 
Government through high interest loans financed through taxation, then war would 
seldom occur.101 
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The press advocates of the capitalist arms industry were portrayed in the journals 
as fear mongers. The NUGMW cited Lord Rothermere: ‘We need 5,000 war 
aeroplanes if we are not to remain for ever at the mercy of our neighbours.102  They 
also published the statements he made in France: ‘If I were a Frenchman I should 
not feel secure until my country possessed absolutely overwhelming superiority in 
the air’.103  The NUGMW presented the Tory press as promoting the stance taken in 
the 1934 Government White Paper supported by Sir Austin Chamberlain, and 
backed by Tory statements that ‘Britain must become the most heavily armed nation 
in Europe’ and that ‘Britain must have a bigger air force than any other nation.’104  
Such attitudes, the unions considered, increased suspicion and mistrust, and 
revealed the arms race to be a reality.105 
Some journal contributors, for instance John Brown (an uncharacteristically left-wing 
NUGMW member / contributor and Ruskin student) urged socialists and trade 
unionists not to engage in capitalist warfare, and to enlighten those whose 
reasoning was sculpted by capitalist’s hegemony:  
 … blinded by the distorted education of the State schools and the cinema 
they allow themselves to be dragged to the shambles in defences of rent, 
interest, and profit in another holocaust.106 
Although there was a general consensus regarding disarmaments and pacifism in 
the early 1930s, opinions differed regarding questions of handling war material, 
arms export embargos, and calling a general strike if war was recommended.107  
The National Joint Council of Labour (1934) ‘neither accepted nor rejected’ this as 
policy, instead they recommended convening a special conference if circumstances 
dictated.108  Similar resolutions were presented at the labour movement’s 
International Conference in Brussels, including calls for the abolition of the private 
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manufacture of armaments, and compliance with the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, Article 11.109   
The NP did not promote a pacifist stance, they merely vilified capitalists’ wars as 
tools to advance specific capitalist interests to the detriment of workers (exploited in 
armaments production, their financing, and any fighting).  Nonetheless, they 
accorded with the official union journals (and LP and TUC) insofar as the 
condemnation of the private manufacture of arms was concerned, which they also 
deemed to be a threat to world peace, and the assumption (presented as fact) that 
meaningful collective security would obviate the need for intense rearmament as no 
state would challenge the combined strength of the rest.  In this pursuit, they 
recommended to their readership Phillip Noel-Baker’s The Private Manufacture of 
Armaments,110 and T. H. Wintringham’s The Coming War.111  
Despite different foci and some policy differences, there was much commonality 
between the opinions expressed at the individual union, the TUC, and the LP 
Conferences and Congresses.112 The argument typically centred on how to achieve 
disarmament and peace, unilateralism or multilateralism.  Its advisability was 
assumed. For instance, the Electrical Trades Journal promoted the National Peace 
Council’s pamphlets and message,113 and their recommended reading included the 
publications from the Union of Democratic Control, including The Secret 
International which identified ‘the real enemies of disarmament’ to be armament 
manufacturers and international financiers, who saw war as a profit making 
opportunity.114  The Clerk used their journal to publicise and endorse the 
International Declaration on World Disarmament (promoted by the Women’s 
International League)115 and the National Council for Prevention of War’s Peace 
Year Book.116  Moreover, at their 1935 Annual Conference, The Clerk adopted a 
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motion criticizing the TUC’s policy of supporting a ‘capitalist war’ if ‘approved by a 
capitalist League of Nations’, and also for shelving ‘agitation and preparation for a 
General Strike and other forms of working-class activity against war’.117 However, 
on this particular issue they represented a minority voice in the labour movement. 
 
Thus, the political cultures of the various trade unions, representing a range of 
socialist thinking, was evidenced in their journal articles, Conference resolutions, 
and discussions around disarmament and peace.  The issues lay outside the 
industrial sphere, and therefore what is normally considered the remit of the unions.  
However, the journals presented such questions as extremely pertinent to their 
members, and liable to directly impact them and their families going forward.  
 
International Fraternity 
International fraternity extended beyond seeking to prevent war and workers killing 
workers. As with many issues in the journals, events brought matters to the fore.  
Thus, India became topical as a consequence of the partial Self Government for 
India Bill.  The British Government’s imperialistic behaviour was criticised, 
especially with regards to the suppression of the non-violent Indian Nationalist 
movement.  Colonialist attitudes and ideas concerning racial superiority that 
prevailed in Britain at that time, were absent from the journals.  The AEU published 
sympathetic profiles of Gandhi, Subhas Chander Bose, V. J. Patel and the Indian 
National Movement118 and highlighted the Meerut case to underline the injustices 
imposed on colonial workers,119 and implicitly the injustices the ruling classes 
imposed on all peoples not of their class, including the British working classes.120   
Moreover, as the decade progressed and fascism and international tensions rose, 
the situation  was increasingly framed in terms of  ‘democracy versus dictatorship’.  
The AEU Journal highlighted the disingenuousness nature of the debate, as insofar 
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as India was concerned; Britain was the dictator, and the new constitution 
amounted to an alliance of the ruling class and feudal Lords under the Viceroy’s 
dictatorship. 
The NUGMW Journal accorded with the AEU and others (for instance, The Clerk) 
and the majority of the LP movement insofar as the India Bill was concerned. The 
Bill embodied restricted suffrage, constrained constituent evolution, abandoned 
Dominion status, and entrenched privilege, which were all considered 
unacceptable.121  The NUGMW condemned the attitudes of those like Page-Croft 
and Churchill’s ‘Die-Hard Group’.122  They bolstered their anti-imperialist argument 
by exposing the imperialist record; Indian life expectancy was 23 years, maternal 
mortality 2.5%, and infant mortality 22.3%.  Moreover, only 2% of Indian women and 
of 8% men were educated, and only 3d per head was spent on education.  In 
contrast some £43 million was spent on the Indian military.  The pay and conditions 
of workers were dire and reportedly many mothers resorted to drugging their 
children whilst they were at work.123   
As part of their advocacy of international fraternity both the AEU and NUGMW 
journals also featured articles on foreign countries and peoples, highlighting the 
commonality of the human condition, with differences represented as interesting 
rather than sinister.  The international industrial sphere was also explored, and 
misinterpretations and scapegoating of foreign manufacturers were tackled.  For 
instance, the AEU Journal countered capitalists’ false assertions that Russian 
dumping of cheap exports had caused the depression; they informed readers that in 
reality Russia accounted for 3.6% of world trade in 1913, falling to 1.6% by 1930, 
whilst Soviet imports from Britain increased from £6,900,000 (1929) to £15,000,000 
(1930).124  The international arena was also explored with regard to what lessons 
could be learned; the Russian system and the US New Deal were the most 
common examples cited as functional policies from which Britain could learn.   
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The Rise of Fascism, and the European Situation  
 
Despite fascism’s rise in Europe, the majority voice in the journals continued to 
promote pacifism as an expression of international fraternity up until the time of the 
Spanish Civil War.  Nonetheless, all contributors (in common with the labour 
movement generally) underlined fascism’s malevolent nature, and agitated against 
it.125 Campaigning was international.  For instance, the International Transport 
Workers Federation published their own journal Fascism dedicated to disseminating 
anti-fascist information and framing the debate to counter the escalating threat 
(published in English, German, Swedish and Spanish).126 The individual TU 
Journals repeatedly called for vigilance and active opposition to prevent its spread.  
Concern was expressed that capitalists were directing their press towards 
acquiescence with Germany, and the establishment of an Italian style dictatorship in 
Britain as a defence against the threat posed to their position by democracy and 
freedom for the masses.127  The journals studied here omitted to mention that those 
capitalists whose ideology had the liberal value of individual freedom as their core 
concept, would also have found fascism abhorrent. 
Germany 
As European Nazism rose, international fraternity and understanding embraced the 
German people.  They were portrayed as the victims of the Fascists, whose 
international declarations of peaceful objectives were seen to be strikingly 
inconsistent with their domestic propaganda.128  The links between fascism and the 
threat of war, capitalism, and finance were again reinforced.  R. M. Fox, for 
instance, writing in the AEU Journal argued that,  
Nowhere is militarism native to a people ... Without the reparations wrung 
from the poor it is quite likely that the German people would have turned 
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away from militarism in disgust.  If Hitler leads them back to it now, the 
financiers of Europe and America must bear their share of the 
responsibility.129  
 The Journals quoted authoritative figures who held ideological positions normally 
opposed to those of the trade unions, thus reinforcing their stance as a generally 
accepted position, not merely a socialist position.   
Indeed, in late 1936 the NUGMW still retained this stance, citing the statement of 
Sir Walter Layton (Economist editor, News Chronicle editorial director, and Liberal 
politician):  
… conditions that we most detest in Germany today are the by-product of a 
sense of injustice, and an attempt to keep the German nation permanently in 
a state of inferiority … she has got into that condition because of external 
circumstances for which we must all bear some share of the blame 130 
Hitler’s rise in Germany, and his persecution and suppression of the Left, trade 
unionists and the Jews, were heavily reported in AEU and NUGMW journals.  His 
rise was considered symptomatic of the German recession.  Recruitment to the 
Brown Shirts, the AEU reported, was driven by the promise of ‘pocket-money’ and 
sustenance for the desperate.131  The immiseration of the middle class and the 
disaffection in the old German army (who had lost their status), were seen to have 
combined to produce an environment where Hitler could engender hope and unity 
through ‘othering’, and mobilising racism through anti-Semitism.132   
The journals reports were written with compassion for an oppressed people living in 
poverty, with worker’s freedoms and rights curtailed, forced agricultural employment 
for ex-agricultural workers, and forced relocation of Berlin’s unemployed to 
government schemes.133 These were juxtaposed with the views expressed in the 
British capitalist press.  For instance, the Morning Post declared that ‘He [Hitler] has 
brought order where before was chaos…. He has so far displayed a restraint, which 
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bodes well for the future’.134  The journals of other unions, such as the ETU 
condemned Britain’s ‘jingo press’, which they considered to be ‘full of empty and 
arrogant nonsense about ‘foreigners’.135  Thus, journal contributors reinforced the 
link between the capitalists and their press, and fascism; both were ‘othered’ as 
malevolent forces that acted against the best interest of the working classes.   
 
The journals did not only report the Nazi oppression, but also opposition to it.  For 
instance, the NUGMW Journal published a socialist refugee’s account of Dr 
Goebbels’s campaign against ‘Carpers and Critics’ which was alleged to have 
backfired, engendering anti-Nazi sentiment.136  The journal published an account of 
the ‘International Youth Against War Rally’ (Antwerp October 1933) where some 
65,000 people protested, illustrating to readers the active opposition on the 
Continent to fascism.137  The NUGMW also reported the LP Conference fund-
raising for Hitler’s victims and pledges to boycott German goods.138   
Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, openly repudiating her obligations, stating that 
the French-Soviet Pact had terminated the Locarno Treaty.  Such actions were 
reviled, and considered worryingly consistent with Hitler’s avowed objectives in 
Mein Kampf.  The pre-1936 atmosphere of impending war without a specific enemy 
(Italy and Japan had been considered most likely combatants) was replaced with a 
focus upon Germany.139   
Austria’s fate was reported, including Chancellor Dollfuss’s abolition of the Socialist 
unions (500,000 members), and catholic unions (100,000 members), and the 
confiscation of their funds.   They were replaced with a Trade Union scheme that 
excluded anyone previously arrested for any ‘offence or thought’, or those who 
believed in class warfare.140  The great tenements, symbolic of Vienna’s Socialist 
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Municipal Government (and a signifier of the benefits of socialist administrations) 
were destroyed; this, the journals portrayed as epitomising the fate of the country 
and its people, and the danger fascism posed to all.141   
Pen portraits were published, describing Nazi’s domination and providing personal 
perspectives of events with which readers could empathise; socialists were 
scattered or imprisoned; Jews especially had reason to be fearful, and numerous 
‘respectable’ people were reduced to hungry beggars.  The politics of those in 
control was denounced, and their distinction from the ordinary people emphasised 
and romanticised. ‘Austria is poor - terribly poor. And her people are not the 
business type, but artistic, music-loving, kindly, courteous and beautiful’.142  Other 
unions likewise used their journals to expose their readership to the dire conditions 
suffered by workers and trade unionists under fascism in Austria; all such articles 
carried implicit warnings. For example, the Electrical Trades Journal published an 
account by the Austrian Illegal Free Trade Unions of the Municipal and Transport 
Workers.143  
Italy and Abyssinia 
As European fascism grew and became embedded, the journals provided a 
commentary on what they considered to be the increased likelihood of international 
conflict.  This was illustrated by Mussolini’s attitudes and policies, and embodied in 
his infamous declaration ‘War is to man, as maternity is to woman’.144  By 1934 the 
journals were reporting how the British capitalist press were exalting Mussolini’s 
policies, whilst simultaneously withholding information on the real consequences of 
his rule: increased bankruptcies, increased unemployment, depressed wages, 
women forced back into the home, and the promotion of increased fecundity.145 
Such accounts of life under fascism served both to inform readers, and to warn of 
its dangers and consequences.  Articles described extreme poverty (except 
amongst wealthy rent-extractors), high unemployment, and an atmosphere of fear, 
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where police, army, secret agents, and priests (who were deeply embroiled in the 
system), combined to supress freedom of expression.146  Thus, AEU contributors 
concluded that fascism fears people speaking openly and truthfully.147  
The lead up to, and ultimately, the invasion of Abyssinia, was tracked in the 
journals, along with the actions (and inactions) of the other major actors involved.  
The journal authors unanimously and repeatedly advocated adherence to the 
Covenant of the League (in accordance with the British LP, International Federation 
of Trade Unions (IFTU) and the Labour and Socialist International).148  Italian 
aggression was condemned unreservedly in all the journals analysed.  However, 
the question of sanctions to prevent colonial exploitation drew a mixed response 
(late 1935-6); a minority advocated action independent of the League, others 
professed unshakable pacifism, whilst the majority sought active pursuit of the 
League covenant.149 
The journals, in accordance with their educative agenda, attempted to explain the 
complicated historical background, the interplay and interconnections within and 
between the European powers, the Balkans, and North Africa, both through articles, 
and reading recommendations.150  The A.E.U Journal typically analysed issues in 
greater depth and scope than the NUGMW, including historical European colonial 
activities, their on-going impacts, and contemporary geo-political positioning around 
colonial interests.  Temporal conditions meant there was a particular focus on Italy’s 
history in North Africa, and on British and French interests in the surrounding 
states.151 
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Both the NUGMW and AEU journals’ recommended readings included G.D.H. and 
M. Cole’s The Intelligent Man's Review of Europe Today, and they published 
various articles about specific British interests in Egypt, especially the Suez Canal 
and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.152 Thus readers were informed how the 
confluence of the historical and geo-political context, combined with political 
manoeuvring, and issues of access to raw materials, resulted in Britain’s 
accommodative policies regarding Italy.  Journal contributors denounced the Tories 
in the National Government for offering friendship to Italy in pursuit of a Four Power 
Pact, despite their previous pledges.153  The Hoare–Laval peace terms were framed 
in the journals as a betrayal of Abyssinia, undermining the League, and rewarding 
Italian aggression.154 They reported that even the capitalist press criticised it.  
However, journals’ contributors unanimously agreed that it should not be allowed to 
destroy the League (a position supported by the Nation Council of Labour).155   
The behaviour of Italy in Abyssinia was interpreted in the journals to be further 
evidence of the insidious and invasive ‘tentacles of capitalism’.  The NUGMW 
Journal reported on what they considered to be the disingenuous behaviour of the 
US during the Abyssinian crisis.  The US repeatedly stated their desire to prevent 
war.  However, they simultaneously intensified their exports of the ‘Sinews of War’ 
to Italy. Their exports of oil, copper, steel, motors, tractors and aeroplane engines 
increased 3,100% in a year ($18,000 in November 1934 to $584,000 in November 
1935).  Its vehicle sales increased $6,749 to $71,215 in same period, and its oil 
exports climbed from practically nil to $451,348, thereby sabotaging the League of 
Nations’ policy implementation.156 The union journals argued that the malevolent 
hand of financiers and the hypocrisy of ‘patriots’ was evidenced in Abyssinia’s 
Emperor Haile Selassie being refused a loan (considered too risky), whilst 
simultaneously Mussolini was expected to have no problem raising monies in 
London.157 
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Oil became regarded by the journal contributors as a causal factor in wars.  After 
WWI, Curzon had stated that ‘The allies have floated to victory on a wave of oil’.158  
The AEU now presented oil to be fundamental to Mussolini’s victory in Abyssinia, 
and a factor in the German demand for colonies, whilst the other Powers 
determined to retain access to oil for themselves.159  The AEU condemned the 
British Government for supplying oil, facilitating its supply to Italian forces, and 
profiting from such through their Anglo-Iranian Oil Company holdings and increased 
Suez Canal traffic.160  Thus, according to the journals, the peoples’ fundamental 
security was subjugated to their rulers’ desire to retain or gain access to raw 
materials, and thus wealth.    
British Fascism 
The journals coverage of the German and Italian situation conveyed implicit 
warnings of what could happen in Britain; additionally overt warnings were 
published.161  This related not only to Moseley’s black-shirts, but also to ‘creeping 
fascism’ through the Government’s increasingly planned capitalism and corporative 
tendencies, just as occurred under Mussolini and Hitler.162  Fascism was presented 
in the journals as the capitalists’ response to threats of socialism, and was usually 
linked to militarism and imperialism. Capitalist democracy necessitated capitalist 
control of the means of production, and fascism, it was asserted, had risen to serve 
capitalists, who only endured democracy provided it did not impinge on their power.  
The NUGMW informed their readers that this necessitated the control of the state’s 
armed forces to enable the pursuit of Imperialist wars for world market monopoly 
(including trade and currency wars), the suppression and exploitation of colonial 
peoples, and revolts among workers domestically.163  
Central and major banks were considered complicit; the Banks of England and 
France, the Federal Reserve, and Morgan Ltd, all rescued their own financiers 
when disaster loomed.  The fait accompli of the Russian revolution was seen to 
have spurred the capitalist and financial classes into greater action to prevent 
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contagion. For instance, it was noted that in Poland, international finance backed 
General Pilsudski’s dictatorship in crushing the revolution and a similar pattern 
played-out in Finland and Italy.  Even the Hungarian dictator, Horthy (Hungary was 
supposedly an enemy state) was principally backed by the Bank of England.164  
Britain and France were presented as not yet having succumbed to this doctrine, 
but that they increasingly planned industry and agriculture to bolster the owners’ 
interests (as opposed to socialist planning for the good of the whole society). 165  
Thus, readers were reminded of the extent to which the capitalist classes and 
financiers utilised the state and its resources to further their own interests, without 
regard to the general population; if this could not be achieved through democracy, 
then it could be through fascism.  R. M. Fox informed AEU Journal readers how ‘the 
divine rights of industrial magnates’ and their ‘managerial prerogative’ had replaced 
the ‘divine rights of kings’. 166  The example was given of Thyssen becoming ‘Lord 
of the Ruhr’ controlling its coal, iron, and Siemens electronics, and who, it was 
noted, had in collaboration with industrial tycoons Krupp and Huggenburg, 
organised their fellow industrialists and financiers to bankroll Hitler.167  For the 
majority of journal contributors, the condemnation of the state acting as agents of 
the capitalist class did not preclude their parliamentarianism and belief that the state 
would act as a neutral arbiter under a Labour Government; however, for a minority, 
the capitalist system needed to be dismantled before this could become the case. 
The establishment and activity of the British Fascist Movement under Sir Oswald 
Mosley foregrounded the ‘democracy or dictatorship’ alternatives in Britain.168  The 
journal contributors were acutely aware of the threat such an organisation posed, 
especially to the youth through their employment of uniforms and 
deliberate excitation of class antagonism among politically immature people 
and the inculcation of a political philosophy of violence which converts young 
people to the doctrine that a minority may seize power and rule by force.169  
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Trade unionism was considered an impediment to the spread of fascism; thus 
recruitment, and the active inclusion of youth were presented by the journals as 
particularly important.   A minority voice within the AEU Journals suggested that the 
socialists themselves employed uniforms, banners, and marches, as unifiers, and to 
counter the attraction of Fascists’ regalia.170  The labour movement lobbied the 
Government to follow the French and Belgian example and to proscribe non-state 
semi-military organisations.171  However, the majority considered that the British 
labour movement’s history, with its pursuit of workers’ rights in the common cause, 
enduring imprisonment, hard labour, and even transportations, had endowed it with 
an institutional strength and knowledge, so that if they united nationally and 
internationally, they could render the black-shirts impotent.172 Knowledge, fraternity 
and solidarity would prevail over the evil of fascism. 
Background societal anti-Semitism was illustrated by an advert in The Clerk’s ‘small 
ads’ for a holiday apartment that stipulated ‘No Jews’;173 an editorial apology and 
disclaimer was subsequently published.174  Despite its presence in the wider 
society, anti–Semitism was overwhelmingly absent in the journals.  The Fascist 
marches and the London East End disturbances were condemned, as was the 
European fascists treatment of Jews.  However, there were exceptions. Will Thorne 
suggested that wealthy Jews who had backed Mosley, ‘have learned their 
lesson’.175  Additionally the bringing down of the 1931 Labour Minority 
Administration was described as the conspiracy of, ‘an unholy alliance of Tory 
politicians, Jews and financiers’.176  The NUGMW published a cartoon which 
embodied the same sentiment.177  Nonetheless, a supposed attempt (1933) by 
Jewish financiers to rig markets to prevent Germany from obtaining loans, was 
presented in the journals as fully justified.178   
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United Front and Communism 
 
The rise and spread of fascism, the prevailing and cumulative events in Europe and 
their implications for workers, especially trade unionists, socialists, communists, and 
Jews, led some union journal contributors to call (1934 onwards) for a ‘United Front’ 
against fascism.  Others were dubious, especially the anti-communists who 
interpreted it as merely a CP ploy to further the aims of the Communist 
International.  To underline the malevolence of such organisations and alliances, 
the LP in its pamphlet The Communist Solar System claimed that the German 
Communist Party ‘had made a de facto United Front with the Nationalists and Nazis 
in the Reichstag and State Parliaments’.179  In a similar vein, when introducing the 
TUC Report of the General Council on Dictatorships, Walter Citrine sought to 
conflate communism with the political regimes of the USSR, and the Nazis.180  
 
Anti-communists dominated the upper echelons of the TUC, LP, and many unions, 
including the NUGMW.  Clynes (NUGMW President) cautioned readers to consider 
all appeals for a United Front in the light of the communists’ past behaviour: 
rejecting official decisions and resolutions, undermining unions and their officials 
and majority democratic rule, and criticising the LP. 181 Fred Smith, (AEU General 
Secretary) concurred.182  Instead, unity in-line with Labour Party policy was 
advocated, with the only acceptable ‘united front’ being the three prongs of the 
labour movement: the LP, trade unions, and the Co-op.   
 
Will Thorne (NUGMW) put the United Front into a longer-term context (also 
reflective of his formative experiences) by equating it and its advocates with the 
anarchists at the 1896 International Conference,183 illustrating how the political 
cultures and clashes of the past influenced subsequent thinking.  It was also 
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suggested that the United Front should be rejected because some Liberals (rooted 
in laissez-faire capitalism and thus considered suspect) supported it. 184 However, 
the NUGMW Journal (1936) rejected the accusation that their intolerance of 
factional interests (endorsed by the LP Conference) amounted to ‘steam rollering’ 
minority interests’.185  
 
The positions taken by the protagonists and journal contributors with regards to a 
United Front were at times conflicted and inconsistent, as external conditions, their 
socialist core values, anti-fascism, anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, and their 
perceived need to defend Russia, all interacted and intertwined to shaped their 
various perceptions. Thus, ideas concerning affairs internal intertwined with the 
external event environment to shape understandings and ideological stances. 
  
The AEU Journals presented a range of opinions.  Some had reservations (as 
above), 186 others like J. T. Murphy considered that Government inaction made a 
United Front crucial to ensure collective action through the League, and halt the war 
trajectory.187 The AEU President, J.C. Little, advocated that the whole labour 
movement should unite (despite regarding communists as disruptive),188 and he 
moved the 1936 LP Conference Resolution in the AEU’s name favouring a United 
Front against fascism (defeated 435,000: 1,805,000).189  The Electrical Trades 
Journal advocated a similar stance.190  United Front supporters considered their 
opponents to be aiding the Fascists, and instead advocated combining through Red 
International of Labour Unions (RILU) and IFTU against the common enemy.  The 
IFTU’s refusal was presented in the AEU Journal as serving the fascist cause.191   
 
The United Front debate reflected attitudes within the Unions towards the CPGB 
generally.  Nonetheless, the topics of communism and communists were irregularly 
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raised in the journals, only becoming a feature in response to events and issues, 
such as the call for a United Front or votes for CPGB affiliation to the LP.  NUGMW 
contributors often linked the ILP (post 1932 secession) to the CPGB and 
condemned it equally.192  The anti-communist stance of the labour movement’s 
hierarchies was institutionalised through various rule changes and was 
disseminated through LP and TUC articles pamphlets and speeches.193  Some 
individual unions also institutionalised anti-communism. The AEU rules prohibited 
their EC from circulating the correspondence of the CP Minority Movement through 
Branch or District Committees meetings (endorsed by the AEU’s Final Appeals 
Court 1929).194   
 
The majority voice in the journals (especially the NUGMW) portrayed Communists 
as being as bad as fascists, fellow dictatorships in the ‘democracy or dictatorship’ 
paradigm.195 The CP policy of infiltrating labour organisations and seeking office in 
order to disseminate their own ideology and to shape policies, was typically 
portrayed as a threat to the whole TU movement which had to be countered.  
Nonetheless, the CPGB’s excellent organisation and the communist shop stewards’ 
reputation for diligence, attracted some to the CPGB as a means of achieving 
electoral success, especially at the workshop level where they would be personally 
known to the workers.  Indeed, Nina Fishman asserts that even passionate anti-
communists like Bevin, were cognisant of the fact that ‘without the efforts of the 
communists his own union would have fewer members and far less enthusiasm’.196  
Moreover, sometimes the CPGB, rather than supporting communists in union 
elections, nominated non-communist left-wingers to ensure a left-winger gained 
office by avoiding any anti-CP vote (consistent with the Popular Front strategy).   
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Intra-union ideological differences and anti-communist sentiment was evidenced 
when the AEU expelled a number of left-wing and communist members (later 
reinstated) who had challenged union officials’ acceptance of an employer’s wage 
offer without consultation. Letters were distributed to branches, and were also 
published in the Daily Worker. The formation of Councils of Action was called for, 
and they started their own publication, the Monkey Wrench.  The AEU Journal 
Editor (General Secretary, Smethurst), countered: ‘We are sure they will not 
mislead the membership, and their utterances will receive the contempt that they 
deserve’.197  The Union took the view that the men involved, the Daily Worker, and 
the Minority Movement, were communist, and thus received instruction from 
outside, and sought the destruction of the union.198 Those involved believed that, in 
accepting the employers’ offer without consultation, the leadership had betrayed the 
members. Loyalty to the leadership and adherence to union rules and procedures 
are important parts of TU and socialist doctrine, but the rebels would have also 
been subject to competing values, such as truly representing the workers’ interests, 
not allowing oneself to become incorporated into the capitalist system, and for 
some, loyalty to the CP and its dictates.  Reports of these events were 
conspicuously absent from contemporaneous District or National Organiser’s 
reports published in the journal.    
Such was the anti-communism sometimes evidenced in the journals that, for 
instance, one of the AEU’s contributors (C. W. Hallett) felt compelled to compare 
another (J. D. Lawrence) to the Tory press barons, Beaverbrook and Rothermere, 
and reminded readers that the rulebook stated that ‘all men are brethren; not all 
men except Communists’, that the Soviet Union was not the workers’ adversary, 
and that the CPGB opposed the employers and their advocates in Government.199 
However, Lawrence’s anti-CPGB attitudes did not reflect Tory, or even Liberal, or 
Labourist views.  Indeed, he was a vehement advocate of workers’ control which he 
considered to be inseparable from ownership.  His employment as a regular 
contributor, alongside those theorising from alternative ideological positions, 
illustrated the AEU’s editorial policy regarding the views it chose to disseminate and 
the contested nature of the concepts and issues being discussed.  Lawrence’s 
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inclusion as a regular contributor, along with J. T. Murphy and other communists 
(for instance Wal Hannington and Edmund Frow) and anti-communist contributors, 
demonstrates the multiple-stranded ideological influences within communist, 
socialist and labourist understandings, that combined to form the political cultures 
contained in, and disseminated through, the journal. 
Thus, it was not just the right wing dominated unions like the NUGMW that 
displayed anti-communist sentiment.  Notably, even the Electrical Trades Journal 
promoted the National Council of Labour’s pamphlet The British Labour Movement 
and Communism, sub-titled, An Exposure of Communist Manoeuvres,200 despite 
the ETU being known for its communist contingent.  Such inclusions are indicative 




Russia was only a minor topic during the 1931-1936 period.  The vast majority of 
articles on the topic at this time, especially in the AEU Journals, were concerned 
with trade, such as the Trade Facilities Act,201 and Export Credits.202  The AEU 
contributors considered export bans to Russia in the early 1930s to be politically 
motivated and harmful to the British economy and to engineering employment203 
(Russia purchased 80% of machine tool exports, and had not defaulted since WWI). 
204 The Government justified their decision on the grounds that Russian industry, 
being nationalised, would have a competitive advantage over British private 
industry.205  This for journal contributors was evidence of the superiority of a 
socialist industrial system over capitalism. 
Russia’s presence as an example of lived socialism, permeated the journals in their 
general discussions on industrial and economic topics.  It influenced perceptions, 
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and comprehensions of socialism, as achievable as well as desirable; its 
possibilities and potential problems were explored, especially when implemented 
within a dictatorial system. One NUGMW contributor found visiting Russia a 
somewhat disillusioning experience, with wage inequality and poor standards of 
living and housing.206  Reports in the AEU Journal were more positive; contributors 
reminded readers that whilst wage-gaps existed, all profits went to the people – not 
the few capitalists as was the case in the capitalist world.207  Moreover, the shear 
achievement of transforming the country from the equivalent of 13th century Britain 
with 90% illiteracy pre-revolution, to its current state, was highlighted.208  It was 
further suggested that Russia’s 5 year Plan not only helped its 180 million people, 
but could potentially help all other peoples, as the removal of the private profit 
motive and planning for the common good reportedly increased production by 45% 
over pre-war levels.209  Similarly positive views were expressed in the Electrical 
Trades Journal.210 The language used in relation to Russia and her internal politics 
was typically measured, in contrast to discussions around communism, it was 
devoid of emotion.  
Worker Control 
 
Divergent opinions were evidenced in the journals regarding workers control in 
industry.  The union officials typically accorded with the TUC 1933 Brighton 
Conference (amended NUGMW resolution) that:  
… wage earners of all grades and occupations have a right, which should be 
acknowledged by law, to an effective share in the control and direction of 
socialised industries 211  
on the grounds that: 
If it is necessary, in the interest of justice and equality, to have direct Labour 
representation up in the governing bodies in the political sphere, it is equally 
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necessary to have direct Labour representation upon the governing bodies in 
the industrial sphere.212  
The resolution was passed but faced criticism by some such as J. Jagger 
(Distributive and Allied Workers), and A. J. Dobbs (Boots and Shoes Operatives) 
who criticised the resolution for not going far enough, Jagger was particularly critical 
of Herbert Morrison’s consideration that university educated administers and 
technical experts belonged at the top with workers still below.213 
The NUGMW Journal published a ‘Readers Forum’ on the subject that showed rank 
and file enthusiasm amongst correspondents for the principle of workers’ control 
went further than that of the leadership. Debates covered the different forms worker 
control might take.  A very small minority took a reformist stance, suggesting, for 
instance, learning from The Ministry of Labour ‘Works Committees’ Inquiry 1919.214 
However, the vast majority advocated full ownership, not shared control, arguing 
that genuine control was indivisible from ownership (which would be resolved under 
socialism).  They posited that capitalism needed to be usurped and the education 
system changed, pointing out that all traces of workers’ control achieved thus far 
(for instance, employers’ acceptance of Workers’ Councils) were only accepted if 
they assisted managers, and did not encroach on managerial prerogatives.215  Thus 
those NUGMW members participating in the Readers’ Forum were ideologically 
significantly to the left of the journal contributors (typically their union officers).  They 
were not necessarily reflective of the average journal reader as they were a self-
selecting sample of those motivated enough to contribute. Nonetheless, the journal 
editors considered their opinions warranted publishing. 
The subject of workers’ control was rarely mentioned in the AEU Journals during 
this period (although very much in evidence from the 1940s onwards).  This is a 
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surprising omission given the proportion of left-wingers amongst the AEU’’s regular 
contributors and its highly political commentaries, especially as the TUC was 
deliberating the matter, culminating in their detailed report to their 1932 Newcastle 
Congress and decisions at the 1933 Brighton Congress.  The few discussions 
reported in the AEU Journal centred on the technicalities of transference of control 
from the private to the public sectors, and the different forms labour representation 
could take in future socialised industries.216  Members’ apathy with regards to the 
topic was blamed, illustrated by a report that 50,000 watched Arsenal play Albion at 
football, whilst nearby under 50 attended a lecture on factory control in their 
workplace.217  The membership’s views on worker control (bottom up) was 
juxtaposed with the example of Morrison’s London Passenger Transport Bill and its 
'Appointing Trustees' which selected the Board (the usual 'esteemed gentlemen', 
many knowing nothing of either London or transport).218 
Other unions took similar stances on worker control.  For instance, Frank Foulkes 
(ETU) reminded readers of their journal that the ETU rulebook Clause 2, Rule 1, 
advocated ‘supporting policies which will ultimately give the workers control of 
industry.’219  The Clerk journal, when propagating the benefits of union membership, 
tied it to the goal of worker control: ‘It is not a far step from trade unionism to 
workers’ control.  One leads to the other.’ but he added the caveat that the time 
might not yet be right for it to become a reality (1932).220  Complete workers’ control 
was rejected by the TUC and LP hierarchy, who typically favoured a Board 
appointed on merit by Ministers.   
Education 
 
Education was considered vital if political thought and policy ideas of the labour 
movement were to be operationalized, and not merely considered of academic 
interest.  Education was seen as a means to practical ends, not merely as an end in 
itself.  It imparted wider knowledge and deeper understandings, as well as 
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benefiting others (such as serving in courts of referees, or disseminating knowledge 
at branch meetings).221    
Herbert Bullock (NUGMW) summed up the labour movement’s educational 
objective: 
Our first job is to get to Know. ‘Knowledge is Power,’ then we must Feel the 
import of what we have learned, and that should lead to Action.  Unless we 
apply our knowledge it is all in vain.222   
The ideology that underpinned their education policies entailed political action and 
the real world, and the preparation of an educated working class to play a proactive 
role in the predicted socialist future.  Such aims, ideals, and educational training 
and encouragement, were shared with the LP, for instance, through their study 
circles, study guides, and other publications.  
Both the AEU and NUGMW journal contributors stressed the need for effective 
working class education.  The Workers’ Education Association (WEA) and the 
National Council of Labour Colleges (NCLC) courses were promoted. Courses in 
working class history and Marxist economics were especially advocated to counter 
the indoctrination into class collaboration through the capitalist’s misrepresentation 
of reality. 223   Education, it was thought, facilitated the critical assessment of what 
was considered pernicious propaganda disseminated through the capitalist press.  
In this, the trade union movement saw itself as central.224  Moreover, a minority 
argued that education needed to be student centred and intensive in order to create 
a socialist ‘advance guard’.225  J.W. Smith (AEU) advocated a Marxist education, 
and criticised the WEA which taught ‘laws of diminishing returns’, which he 
considered damaging; he also criticised the NCLC as catering for ‘pedants and 
snobs’.226  
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Nonetheless, there was overwhelming support for the education offered through the 
WEA and NCLC which the AEU and NUGMW funded, and regularly publicised.  
Other union’s favoured one over the other, for instance The Clerk overwhelmingly 
promoted NCLC rather than WEA courses.   
Courses offered to union members included: English Socialism - aims and origins; 
English - elementary and advanced (including article writing and Labour journalism); 
Public Speaking; Chairmanship; Working Class History; European Industrial History; 
Social History, Economics - Orthodox and Marxist; Economic Geography and 
Imperialism; Esperanto (Elementary and Advanced); Local Government; History of 
the British Working Class; and Industrial History of Modern Europe. Additionally, 
union and TUC scholarships and day, weekend and summer schools were made 
available.  The journals published reports of members’ participation at such events 
(always positive).  The A.E.U. journal carried regular advertisements for books and 
educational courses outside the union structures; the persistence of these is 
indicative of them achieving a good response.  Both journals published book 
reviews, although the NUGMW only published about a third of the number of the 
AEU. They both reviewed a number of books in common, such as: The Everyman's 
Library series; The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind by H. G. Wells; The 
Intelligent Man's Review of Europe To-day, by G.D.H. and M. Cole; Practical 
Socialism for Britain by Hugh Dalton; and Soviet Communism by B. and S. Webb.   
The A.E.U. strongly encouraged the auto-didactic tradition, encouraging readers to 
inform themselves, and recommended multiple books on economics and political 
economy, as well as classical socialist texts, for instance, Lenin, Marx, and books 
on labour history (as did The Clerk Journal).  The NUGMW on the other hand 
focussed on the lives of trade unionists, or books that illustrated a point they had 
been making in the journals.  For instance, J. B. Priestley’s No Coats for Soldiers 
describing the destitution amongst those who fought in WWI and were then cast 
aside,227 or Sawdust Caesar by George Seldes which condemned the personality 
and actions of Mussolini, reinforcing the Journal’s narrative.228 More surprising 
recommendations included Harold MacMillan’s Capitalism Abandoned, although 
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this brought disapproval in the NUGMW Readers’ Forum.229  Once the NP became 
established (1936 onwards) it had by far the greatest number of reading 
recommendations, overwhelmingly written from a communist perspective. 
The education provided by the labour movement was considered a counter-weight 
to the prevailing education system, which served to elicit a mind-set and 
comprehensions that maintained and bolstered the capitalist system, rather than 
providing an understanding of the political-economic system they lived under.  On 
leaving state education, students were socialised into believing that no fundamental 
change of the current system was necessary.230  Thus, although the employer class 
did not attain its position through education, education was needed to counter their 
power and the capitalist class society that maintained them.  Nonetheless, within 
the NUGMW Journal, there were occasional reports of members’ apathetic attitude 
towards education, accompanied by texts testifying to its importance.231 
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Chapter 2.  Conscription for Men But Indemnity for Wealth: 1936-
1940 
 
The Spanish Civil War 
The 1936 election of the Popular Front in France, was welcomed in the journals.  It 
illustrated the potential for socialist electoral success, and the advantages of having 
a government that represented workers (and implicitly the necessity to work for 
such ends).  The Government’s subsequent fall demonstrated to the journal 
contributors the dangers embodied in the forces of capital, which seek to prevent or 
crush such developments.1  The fascist regimes in Italy and Germany provided the 
background against which, firstly the French Popular Front fell, and then the 
democratically elected Spanish Government suffered insurrection.  Such an 
environment was perceived as ominous.  Nonetheless, despite such events, and 
the poor British electoral results, the journals presented the labour movement in the 
late 1930s not only as a ‘can do’ organisation, but ‘must do’ if British workers were 
to avoid the repression their European counterparts endured. 
The initial journal reaction to the victory of the Popular Front in the 1936 Spanish 
General Election was somewhat muted, they merely reported that the Spanish 
Republican Coalition Government was a Liberal Republican and intellectually 
dominated administration, in alliances with the trade unions, socialist and left-wing 
groups, not Socialist or Communist as British capitalist press reported.  The 
subsequent uprising under Franco was interpreted as fascist by the Labour 
movement and Party, and denounced (notwithstanding the contested nature of this 
categorisation).  It was held up as a warning of the menace fascism posed to 
organised Labour and democracy everywhere.  An upswing of sympathy and 
support for the Spanish Republicans ensued.  Hindsight shows that sympathy and 
funding for the Republicans peaked when the war was already lost (late 1936-
January 1937).  Nonetheless, in terms of the unions’ political culture, the conflict 
was profound and pivotal; the post WWI vehement anti-war stance and ‘never 
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again’ mind-set was squarely challenged (the rise of Hitler had already undermined 
this stance for a minority).  The image of fascism as an ‘evil’ was amplified by Italian 
and German military activity outside their borders, leading some to believe that 
fascism had to be defeated by any means to protect democracy (and for some, to 
protect the USSR).  Spain acted as a focus and catalyst, raising both political 
awareness and class consciousness within the British labour movement.2  No 
mention was made in the journals of the pre-1936 attacks on the Spanish 
Republic’s Government by leftist forces (anarchists of the Confederacion Nacional 
del Trabojo (CNT) / Federacion Anarchista Iberica (FAI) and socialists followers of 
Caballero), indicating the continuance of the ‘them versus us’ and ‘good versus bad’ 
schism that the journals employed. 
The journals unanimously presented the Chamberlain Government as being 
ideologically sympathetic to fascists, and its response to the Spanish situation was 
interpreted as class motivated and embodying their antipathy towards any 
government that represented working-class interests.  The AEU bolstered such 
assertions by reporting on how the British Government’s benches in parliament 
greeted with ‘malicious delight’ the 1936 Republican military set-backs, how 
Franco’s Mediterranean successes were ‘greeted with Tory laughter’,3 and how 
attacks on British ships were tolerated.4  The British Government reaction was 
presented as a betrayal of the Spanish people, democracy, and British seamen: 
‘They are gambling that a rebel victory will be won before the bombing of British 
ships forces public opinion to demonstrate its hostility to Mr. Chamberlain’s 
leadership’.5  The other journals’ analysed, concurred with this sentiment.   
Sections of the British press (August 1936 onwards) were similarly accused in the 
various journals of ideological sympathy, and tacit and sometimes outspoken 
support for Franco.  Lord Rothermere’s press (Daily Mail and Evening News) was 
universally condemned by the journals for positing that ‘only a fascist victory’ could 
save Spain, that Spanish fascists represented ‘a Christian, civilised, anti-Bolshevik 
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world,’6 and for rebranding the fascist insurgents ‘nationalists’.7  Moreover, the AEU 
accused the Rothermere and Beaverbrook Press of misrepresenting the 
Republicans as ‘Reds’ and ‘Communists,’ and sensationalising their brutality.8 
Unlike the AEU and NP journals, the Labour Party and TUC leaderships were 
suspicious of Spanish socialists whom they considered to be of the far left by British 
standards. Such a stance accorded with the TU and Labour Party understanding 
that the capitalist press was aligned against them.  Nonetheless, the whole left 
shared in their condemnation of the way the capitalist press framed issues, 
incorporating anti-labourist and anti-socialist views, whilst reinforcing capitalist 
understandings.  The need to counter such capitalist framing was considered an 
imperative, and strengthened the perceptions about the importance of their own 
press and propaganda efforts.  The journals were constantly engaged in this; their 
socialist framing of issues and policy promotions were designed to both reinforce 
their socialist readers’ ideological understandings, and to awaken new 
understandings in those who had formally internalised the hegemonic capitalist 
views propagated through state institutions (especially schools) and civil society.   
The conflict in Spain was presented as a ‘civil war’ in name only; instead it was 
considered to be two European fascist countries invading an independent state to 
aid a fascist insurgency in contravention of international law, offending natural 
justice, and raising the extremely ominous spectre of a European fascist empire.9  
The overriding sentiment amongst the journals was typified in the AEU National 
Committee’s resolution appealing to, ‘… members to give every possible assistance 
to our comrades and fellow workers of that country who are so heroically fighting 
the powers of international fascism’.10 (unanimously adopted).  The AEU Journal 
(and The Clerk, NUGMW and NP) urged the labour movement’s leaders to rethink 
their non-intervention stance (subsequently overturned).11 Readers were advised to 
regard the ‘Non-Intervention Committee’ assertions in light of the British 
Government’s position as agent for class-interests (concerned with business, 
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investments, trade routes, and strategic military positions), and their desire to 
strengthen capitalism worldwide.12   
The AEU Journal (and NP) in line with their educative agenda and their political 
framing of events and issues, presented the Spanish situation as part of a complex 
geopolitical whole, where ideology, Spanish domestic politics, economics, 
commerce, military expediencies, and ambitions all interacted.13  They reported on 
Spanish history, the Spanish Republican Government policy agenda, the fascist 
treatment of the National Confederation of Labour (CNT), fascist raids on left-wing 
parties and trade unions, and the confiscation of their press and their leaders’ 
imprisonment.14  Such accounts reinforced the danger fascism posed, whilst also 
‘othering’ the capitalist class backers. The message, explicitly and implicitly 
conveyed was that even when socialist democratic electoral victories were secured 
and socialist policies implemented, the capitalist class, domestically and 
transnationally, would attempt to pervert democracy if their interests were 
threatened.  The AEU Journal utilised Chamberlain’s policy towards Mexico to 
further elucidate and reinforce this perception.15 The NUGMW Journal largely 
accorded.16  International solidarity and fraternity in the face of fascist aggression 
were advocated in line with socialist doctrine.  
Fighting fascism was deemed essential, as attaining 100% union membership was 
senseless when, if fascist expansion continued, the labour movement would be 
destroyed. Empathy was expressed for their Spanish ‘brothers’ who were ‘bearing 
the brunt of the fighting ... resisting a dastardly and criminal attack upon democracy 
and freedom’.17  Similar attitudes were articulated in the Electrical Trades Journal 
and The Clerk.18   The dilemma facing individuals considering travelling to Spain to 
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fight, was addressed in the journals, both directly and through fiction, but remained 
unresolved.19  All the journals reported their unions / groups contributions to the 
International Solidarity Fund, Spanish Medical Aid, and the Voluntary Industrial Aid 
for Spain, which were framed to elicit a sense of duty towards the Spanish victims of 
fascism.  Any atrocities committed by the Republicans were conspicuous by their 
absence, despite the prominence given to them in the international capitalist press 
in the early months of the conflict. The AEU contributors, in contrast to those who 
followed a strictly labourist approach, deemed non-parliamentary action as both 
necessary and justified, only the form this should take was debated. 
In an article that exemplified the principal change in the political culture exposed in 
the union journals at this time (1936-7), NUGMW General Secretary Chas Dukes, a 
WWI conscientious objector, explicitly called for the Spanish Republicans to be 
supplied with war materials equal to those the fascists supplied Franco.20 
Nonetheless, this change was neither uniform nor instant, and multiple voices 
expressed positions which conflicted and mutated. Thus, Dukes’ previous pacifist 
stance, was like many at the time, that of moral- pragmatism, whereby fighting 
fellow workers in capitalist / imperialist wars (like WWI) was rejected, but this was 
mutable in exceptional circumstances, like the imperative to halt fascism in order to 
prevent what they considered was a greater evil enveloping all.  This stood in stark 
contrast to the religious pacifism (famously articulated by Landsbury).  
Empathy, concern for the future and moral outrage, rather than political analysis, 
dominated much NUGMW coverage.21  British deaths in Spain were published: 
… we must pay a tribute to a fellow worker who gives his life in defence of 
those things he held worthwhile ...  defending …  the rights of common 
people to elect what Government they choose, and the right of all workers to 
build up a Trade Union Movement.22   
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In stark contrast to their normal stance, non-parliamentary action was presented by 
the NUGMW as justified; however, its expedience was questioned due to concern 
as to whether the Spanish situation could be isolated.23       
The NP summed up the imperative produced by the interconnected and overlapping 
nature of fascist policies as: ‘Save Spain, Save Britain, Save Peace’.24  The British 
Government’s non-intervention policy was judged to be disingenuous, ‘window-
dressing’ to avert a public backlash.    The NP’s contributors considered the 
Government’s policy towards Spain was consistent with its endeavours to 
undermine the League of Nations and collective security.  Letters from a pilot 
attempting to travel to Spain to fight (after being refused a passport under the 
Foreign Enlistment Act) were published, acting to reinforce the urgency of the 
cause.25 In line with their communist stance, non-parliamentary interventions were 
considered a necessary expedient in Spain to prevent a fascist outrage.  
The journals recommended further reading (which reflected their ideological 
interpretations of the situations).  The AEU Journal recommendations included: The 
Drama of Spain, by A. Romos; The Truth about the Spanish Rebellion, by London 
Trades Council (also recommended by the NP); The Spanish Problem, by TUC;26 
Britons in Spain, by William Rust; Britain in Spain, by ‘Unknown Diplomat’.27   The 
NP’s recommendations were typically written from a left-wing or Communist 
perspective, and included: A Reporter In Spain, by Frank Pitcairn; The Drama Of 
Spain, by Oliviera; Arms For Spain, by Harry Pollitt;28  Spain In Revolt, by H. 
Gannes and T. Repard; British Medical Aid In Spain, by News Chronicle; Forward 
From Liberalism, by Stephan Spender;29 and Spanish Testament, by Arthur 
Koestler.30 There were also notable omissions, like George Orwell’s Homage to 
Catalonia or Franz Borkenau’s The Spanish Cockpit?  NUGMW did not recommend 
any books on the Spanish situation.  
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Interpretations of the Wider International Situation and Britain’s Responses 
 
Increased international tensions and war fears made international affairs salient.  
The Italian offensives in Abyssinia, and the Japanese in China, exposed the 
disinclination of Britain and France to take decisive action through the League of 
Nations, significantly undermining its status.  Indeed, the Government’s actions and 
inactions were judged in the journals to have created a world safe for war-mongers, 
and their refusal to effectively back the League was perceived to have given the 
dictators a free-rein.  The unions, in line with the rest of the labour movement, felt 
this must be reversed.  The NUGMW Journal contributors complained that the 
League was deliberately starved of funds whilst ‘the two largest democratic 
countries in Europe, France and England, spent £750 million on armaments’ 
(1938),31 which, they believed, if spent on collective security (alongside monies from 
other members), would have meant peace could have been maintained.  Collective 
security through the League was presented as both morally desirable, and the 
obvious means of achieving optimal outcomes for all concerned. There was no 
mention in the journals that the only League countries with significant forces at this 
time were France, Britain, the USSR, plus Poland and Czechoslovakia (pre-
occupation).  Instead, the impression given was that the whole collective carried 
importance.  The viability of collective security, if the political will existed, was never 
questioned.   
The journals unanimously advocated the League’s re-empowerment to provide the 
infrastructure for adjudicating international grievances and thus avoid war.  For 
some, this included, launching joint military actions against aggressor states if 
necessary. 32  Unlike the AEU Journal, the NUGMW offered very little analysis on 
international issues, tending instead to make declamatory and evocative 
statements, and simplistic moral judgments, employing rhetoric, rather than 
evaluation. Thus, the texts embodied authorial intentionality; they sought to 
stimulate readers into taking note and acting accordingly, before it was too late.  
                                                          
31  H. Bullock, ‘The League of Nations Union,’ NUGMW Journal, (February, 1938), p. 71.  
32 For instance, R. Ralllinson, ‘Whither Europe?’  AEU Journal, (May, 1938), p., 194.  
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Ideas around rearmament that were expressed in the journals began mutating from 
1936-7, at which time they were somewhat fluid, reactive, and sometimes 
contradictory.  They reflected the range of opinions expressed at the Labour Party 
Conference (1937), ranging from the small minority who accorded with George 
Lansbury’s staunch pacifism,33 to the majority ‘realist’ voice, expounded by Bevin, 
and shared by the NCL: 
… in a world where dictators were showing no respect for the sanctity of 
treaties, and were breaking their pledged word without the slightest 
compunction, it would be madness for Britain to be unarmed.34   
However, notwithstanding Bevin’s brutal denunciation of Lansbury’s position, the 
NUGMW Journal presented his views as venerable, commenting:  
Undoubtedly every delegate was as pacifist in outlook as the section led by 
Bro. George Lansbury … but there was really no alternative, in the face of 
the attitude of some other nations.35   
This report, as all such reports, was mediated through the ideology of the listener-
author, and thus reflected their understandings and was framed accordingly.  The 
Clerk journal reported divergent opinions, including the condemnation of the LP, 
who as they supported rearmament, ‘stood on a common platform with avowed 
enemies of the working-class … Its internationalism had been lost’.36   
The AEU (and The Clerk) journals, in line with the trade union movement’s 
educative imperative, explored geo-politics and foreign affairs, and how the histories 
of the relevant countries had fed into the prevailing situation. J. T. Murphy (AEU) 
wrote a series of articles framing the current context in terms of the imminent 
danger fascist aggression posed, adding Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Finland, and 
Japan to his coverage of Italy, Germany and Austria. 37  The AEU recommended 
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reading World Affairs and the USSR written (from a communist perspective) by 
W.P. and Zelda Coates.   
Consternation was expressed throughout the journals at Soviet Russia’s exclusion 
from the negotiations regarding Germany’s territorial ambitions in Central Europe.  
This fact was brought into sharp relief as Britain was seeking agreements with 
fascist aggressors.38  Moreover, any peace negotiated outside the League would 
require USSR to be included in any alliance, along with France, the US, and the 
smaller ‘peaceful’ countries.39 The NUGMW Journal, framed the non-completion of 
an Anglo-Soviet Pact as encouraging the fascist Powers’ continued aggression.40  
The NP concluded Britain’s prevarication and procrastination was because she 
found alliances with socialist states unpalatable. 41 No consideration was voiced in 
the journals over the difficulties bound up in ensuring that the USSR’s Western 
neighbours allowed Soviet troops to occupy forward positions within their territory 




Condemnation of the Munich agreement was common to all the journals, and 
Chamberlain’s claim to have secured peace was deemed disingenuous in light of 
the ongoing panic about defences, and talk of conscription.42  The supposed public 
jubilation at war averted was never evidenced in the journals.  Indeed, the AEU 
cited the work of Tom Harrisson (British Mass Observation) which indicated the 
contrary was the case.43  
There was universal sympathy expressed in the journals for the Czech people as 
the victims of the Munich Agreement, and outrage at their betrayal, and the 
                                                          
38 T. Cain, ‘Beneath Big Ben: Arms and the Man’, AEU Journal, (April, 1938), p. 140. 
39 C. Dukes, ‘General Secretary’s Memoranda,’ NUGMW Journal, (August, 1939), pp. 480-484.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Anon, ‘Secretary Reports Progress at Fourth Annual Meeting of A.S.S.N.C.,’ NP, (June, 1939), p. 
7.   
42 F. A. Smith, ‘Editor’s Notes,’ AEU Journal, (October, 1938), p. 386-7.   
43 Tom Harrison (British Mass Observation) found that over 54% of the British public considered 
Chamberlain`s negotiated agreement unjustified, adding that only 800 people congregated in 
Whitehall and 1,000 outside Downing Street despite concentrated Press, cinema and B.B.C. 
propaganda, promoting Chamberlain’s achievement.  ‘Victlean,’ ‘Science Newsreel,’ AEU Journal, 
(November, 1938), p. 452. 
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architects and advocates of that betrayal: ‘Those who have derided the League and 
weakened Collective Security carry a heavy responsibility for the events of the last 
few weeks’.44 Powerful capitalist interests, those who deemed democracy too 
expensive, and provided the fascists credit, were considered beneficiaries of the 
crisis.45  The NUGMW Journal protested: 
 We are not permitted to disturb or stop fascism. ... And when steps were 
taken to claim Sudeten areas in Czechoslovakia, we bowed to the money-
bags (just as we did in 1931 …)46  
Contemporary events were linked with the Government’s past behaviour, reviving 
memories of benefit cuts (blamed on the financiers), and the betrayal of WWI 
veterans who were discarded as surplus to requirement.  Thus the journal 
contributors recruited recent history as a ‘what do you expect’ textual device. 
The AEU Journal, continued their narrative that the Government acted as the 
agents of the moneyed classes under the ‘Americanised, moneyed, sly, furtive, self-
righteous influence of the Astor group’ (the Cliveden Set).47  The Foreign Office 
itself was deemed the ‘commercial department’ of transnational class interests.48 
Understood from this perspective, Chamberlain’s appeasement policies, culminating 
in the Munich Agreement, his ‘peace with honour’, was deemed to be a triumph for 
class enemies.49  The AEU Journal concluded that: ‘There is in our ruling class a 
dangerous anti-democratic element, and they will interpret the Munich agreement 
as a pledge of solidarity with the Totalitarian regimes’.50 They, and their ideas were 
portrayed as a danger to democracy, organised labour, and the working classes, 
and in voicing such concerns explicitly, the authors effectively presented a schism 
                                                          
44 C. Dukes, ‘The Crisis and After,’ NUGMW Journal, (November, 1938), p. 258-9.  
45 C. H. Kirkby, ‘The Great Betrayal,’ NUGMW Journal, (November, 1938), p. 264-5. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Cain, T., ‘Beneath Big Ben:  What the Change in Foreign Policy Means,’ AEU Journal, (March, 
1938), p. 98. 
48 H. L. V. Morgan, ‘The Diplomacy of a King,’ AEU Journal, (June, 1938), p. 228. 
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between trade unionists who held the legitimate moral high ground, and the 
moneyed friends of fascism and their Tory allies.   
The NP position was clear, printing their 1938 A.S.S.N.C. Annual Conference 
Resolution:  
the pro-fascist policy of the National Government is responsible for the 
continued fascist aggression … We therefore protest against and repudiate 
all suggestions for co-operation of the Trade Unions with this pro-fascist 
Government in the production of Armaments.51  
In the years preceding the war, the NP’s stance (in-line with CP policy) was hostile 
to what they perceived to be the danger of another capitalist, imperialist war (akin to 
WWI), where British workers were exploited, sacrificed, and compelled to kill other 
workers. Despite sharing an anti-war agenda with much of the labour movement 
(pre-war), it was qualitatively different to those founded on pacifism.  Indeed, they 
advocated collective security, embodying a meaningful alliance with the USSR, and 
implicitly condoned a war against fascism on this basis; a view increasingly 
expressed by contributors to the other journals analysed as the decade progressed.   
 
Arms Embargos  
 
Success in war is dependent on adequate supplies of hardware, munitions, and 
finance.  Thus, the provision of finance for fascist regimes, including Government 
Credit Guarantees for Italian loans from Britain’s private financiers, was 
denounced.52  The NUGMW Journal highlighted the extent of foreign loans 
originating in Britain (for private profit) which entailed huge national costs (funded by 
the tax-payer), for instance: the £20,000,000 lent to pre-Hitler Germany; 
£11,000,000 to Greece; £7,500,000 to Hungary; £3,000,000 to Danzig; £16,000,000 
to Turkey, and in 1938 negotiations were ongoing for a £9,000,000 loan to Bulgaria; 
many of these loans were in default.  Moreover, all the principal journals reported 
                                                          
51 From, 1938 onwards the NP (and occasionally the AEU Journal,) referred to Chamberlain as the 
‘pro-fascist’ Chamberlain and the Government as the ‘so called’ National Government; Anon, ‘No Co-
operation: Third Annual Meeting on Arms Speed-Up’, NP, (April, 1938), p.9. 
52 For instance: F. A. Smith, ‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (March, 1938), pp. 94-96.  
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that some loans given as Export Credits, were spent elsewhere, including in 
Germany and other anti-democratic states.53  The Clerk journal blamed the 
capitalist’s imperative to crush socialism for the fact that Britain’s financiers chose to 
fund German rearmament, and for encouraging their aggression.54 Thus, 
international finance and armaments manufacture were linked with the threat of war. 
As military conflict appeared increasingly inevitable, calls for embargos increased,55  
particularly from the AEU, many of whose members were engaged in airplane, 
shipping, engine, and munitions production.  The AEU Journal reported Germany’s 
reliance on imports for their rearmaments program, and their pursuit of self-
sufficiency. German scientific advances, including discoveries of substitutes for 
imported raw materials were tracked throughout the 1930s and 1940s in their long 
running columns, A Science Newsreel and Modern Workshop Practices.  They 
presented an embargo as practical, as only about 20 minerals were essential for 
armaments, and the responsibility, risks, and costs could be spread over multiple 
countries56 (the British Empire and the US being the principle suppliers).57  Oil was 
an essential war material.  The Russian – Italian dispute over non-payment for oil, 
led to Russia cutting supplies, thereby impacting fascist aggression ‘rather tha `n 
passing pious resolutions’ (albeit financially motivated). Furthermore, as nine 
powers controlled 96.4% of oil production (all League members bar the US), oil 
embargoes were also considered practicable.58  The AEU further postulated, that if 
labour movements combined: 
 … to tell their Governments that the workers will not produce, handle, or 
transport war material for other Governments to use for the destruction of 
freedom and democracy, then war will be prevented.59  
To underline this point they quoted Leon Jouhaux, (General  of the Conderacion 
Generale du Travail (CGT)) who posited that, as trade unionists’ only weapon 
against fascism was the workers’ boycott: ‘The trade unions, in their defence of 
                                                          
53 W. Thorne, ‘Parliamentary Notes,’   NUGMW Journal, (December, 1938), pp. 364-5.   
54 Anon., ‘Youth and the War,’ The Clerk, (December, 1939), p., 196. 
55 F. A. Smith, ‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (April, 1938) p. 134-137.   
56 ‘International’, ‘How a Workers’ Embargo would Work,’ AEU Journal, (July, 1938), pp. 272-3.  
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liberty, should refuse to deliver goods which may be necessary for the fascist 
countries to carry on their campaign’.60 The message was explicit; states acting 
through the League could severely impede fascist states’ rearmament and thus 
aggression; workers also had this power, if they acted in unison, in accordance with 
the fundamental tenets of trade unionism.  The journals sought to generalise this 
policy by reporting appeals from all parts of the labour movement for such 
Government embargos, and urged the Labour Party to pursue such policies.61  
In addition to criticising the Government and capitalist firms, the AEU Journal also 
criticised the TUC’s position, that there was ‘no alternative’ to their policy of 
attempting to influence the Government, and their rejection of requests for a 
conference to discuss the situation (1938).  The AEU’s General Secretary accused 
them of thwarting the Movement’s desire for policy reconsideration.  Such 
disagreements exposed the differing responses within the TU movement when 
values such as international fraternity, solidarity, nationalism, representing 
members’ wishes, and political expediencies, came into conflict. 
AEU Journal contributors highlighted Government facilitation of the export of 
materials whose short supply was supposedly impeding British rearmament; they 
backed this claim by publishing export figures,62 and directing readers to the Daily 
Herald’s detailed accounts. 63 The link was made, implicitly and explicitly, between 
firms’ pursuit of export profits and Government facilitation of such exports, 
shortages claims, and the appeals for workers to increase production in the national 
interest.64  R. B. Suthers postulated that the proposed arms embargoes had been 
‘rejected by capitalists who grow fat on selling them [such] goods’.65  The NP 
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65 R. B. Suthers, ‘Not a Very Good World that we Live in,’ AEU Journal, (February, 1938), p. 76. 
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accorded, and The Clerk included the Labour Research Council’s (LRC) Engineers 
and Profiteers in their ‘Bookshelf’ column. 
The NP proposed embargoes on parts, engines, and planes exports to Japan,66 but 
provided little detailed analysis.  Incidents were reported, such as Glasgow and 
Southampton Dockers’ refusal to unload Japanese goods, which was contrasted 
with the Government refusal to impose embargoes.  The NP published export 
figures which disproved Government claims that slow progress in aircraft and 
munitions production was caused by a shortage of metal working machine tools.67  
Government policy choices, actions and inactions, combined with their decision to 
send an Air Mission to the US when there remained surplus capacity in Britain (with 
short-time working, unemployment amongst engineers, idle Shadow Factories, and 
the laying-off of staff), 68 were interpreted by the NP as being motivated not by 
need, but by Government desire to empower employers’ in their endeavours to 
degrade worker’s wages and conditions, and pressure workers and their unions into 
acquiescence69 (although such imports soon became a necessity).    
The NUGMW Journal did not analyse the embargo issues and the politics 
surrounding them in any depth.  Nonetheless the topic was evidenced. They 
adopted a similar position to the AEU, informing readers that sanctions had already 
proved successful; for instance, the US’s helium embargo against Germany, which 
it was thought to be stock-piling for war purposes.70    
 
Popular/ United Front 
 
The United Front and Popular Front continued to be a divisive issue within the 
labour movement.  The continuing differences of opinion were evidenced in the 
journals.  The majority opposed a United Front, but a powerful minority, especially in 
                                                          
66 Anon., ‘Aircraft Support of Spain. Dockers Refuse to Handle Japanese goods,’ NP, December, 
1937), p. 4. 
67 For instance, Anon., ‘The Money We Earn for Others,’ NP, (November, 1938), p. 4; ‘Airmail,’ NP, 
(November, 1940), p. 4. 
68 Anon., ‘Government Blackmail,’ NP, (May, 1938), pp. 1-2; Also see: ‘Airmail’, NP, (November, 
1940), p. 4; ‘London Conference Report - Production Experts Say Second Front Now’, NP, 
(September, 1941), p. 1; Also see: ‘Editor’s Notes: Problems of Production’, AEU Journal, (June, 
1941), p. 45; ‘Editor’s Notes: Outlook for War’, AEU Journal, (June, 1940), p. 193.  
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the AEU Journal (like J. T. Murphy) and also The Clerk, considered the fight for 
socialism had to be subsumed to confront the reactionary powers that endangered 
democracy and sought to destroy all workers’ movements.71  Thus, on this like 
many issues the union journals acted as advocates for the particular strand of 
labourism or socialism they backed, and attempted to convert readers to their 
particular ideological interpretations.  The AEU and The Clerk journal contributors’ 
majority voice sympathised and promoted the Socialist League’s policies (before its 
1937 disaffiliation), whilst the NUGMW followed the Labour Party leadership line, 
which they deemed ‘realist’ and practical.   
The continuing differing interpretations and priorities by the unions and their journals 
contributors, was evidenced in their 1939 Labour Party Conference reports.  The 
AEU reports focused on their own resolutions: the future socialisation of the 
engineering industry; increases to the old age pensions; the condemnation of 
conscription and condemning the National Service scheme as a pro-fascist 
forerunner to industrial conscription.72  Conversely, the NUGMW focused on 
disparaging Cripps and the Popular Front.73  They called into play the ‘class card’, 
highlighting Cripps rise in the Labour Party and linking it to that of Oswald Mosley; 
both were deemed illustrative of the working-classes socialisation into deference 
towards the upper classes.  
… these men attained cabinet rank in less time than would be required of a 
rank and filer to qualify for the post of ward secretary in a local party. Social 
standing and wealth can put a person right in the front rank of Labour over 
the heads of men and women who have given the best part of their lives to 
our movement.74   
The ‘othering’ of those born into higher social classes was recurrent in the journals; 
in this case the NUGMW Journal sought to discredit the Unity Campaign that Cripps 
promoted by discrediting the messenger.  
The New Propellor advocated the United Front.  Although the issue was not widely 
covered, they recommended readings including London Gay - Healthy, Happy, by 
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the CPGB. (which called on Mr Morrison to engage in a United Front ‘before 
fascism wipes us off the map’75) and Son of the People, by Maurice Thorez, a 
French Communist leader, anti-fascist and United Front protagonist.76  They also 
recommended The United Front, by Georgi Dimitroff (Head of Comintern), which 
focused on the Co-operative Movement’s declaration for the United Peace Alliance, 
and for unity of action of Labour and progressive people.77   
 
 The Nazi-Soviet Pact 
 
Notwithstanding the Soviet’s desire for a defensive pact being thwarted, the 
subsequent Soviet– Nazi Pact, and the Red Army’s advance into Poland and 
Finland shocked the journal contributors, challenging unquestioned assumptions 
about the world’s only socialist state; it appeared incompatible with the Soviet’s 
League of Nations’ membership, Litvinov’s peace agenda, and its previous 
vehemently anti-fascist stance.78  A considerable anti-communist backlash was 
evidenced in the NUGMW and the AEU Journals.79  Even the Left Book Club’s 
Victor Gollancz published a pamphlet which appealed to communists to recall 
Hitler’s atrocities, and that, notwithstanding German and British imperialists’ 
similarities, if Hitler was victorious, the labour movement would be eradicated.80 The 
AEU Journal highlighted the pamphlet. Until this point, the AEU portrayed Soviet 
foreign policy as peaceful, and her concerns defensive, and argued that had the 
British, French and US governments accepted Litvinov’s invitation the previous year 
for a conference on collective measures to prevent fascist aggression, subsequent 
events would have been different.   
The NP and The Clerk journals81 on the other hand encouraged readers to look 
deeper into the issues, and reminded readers it was a ‘Non-Aggression Pact’ forced 
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on them by circumstance, not an aggressive alliance.  The widespread notion that 
the Soviet–Nazi Pact would cause communists to abandon their anti-fascist stance, 
was not evidenced in any of the journals, only the reactions of those who feared it.   
The journals tracked the unfolding European crisis, particularly the Finnish situation, 
and expressed anxieties that Western Powers might instigate hostilities against 
Russia.82 The AEU and NUGMW Journals denounced the invasion. 83 Nonetheless, 
even the NUGMW noted that Japan’s action in Manchuria, Italy’s in Abyssinia, and 
fascist action in Spain, all broke the League’s Articles, but incited no forceful 
response.  The crises in Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland had similar 
outcomes.  Yet, Britain and France sought decisive action through the League in 
respect of Finland, suggesting that only when the Soviets not the fascists were the 
perpetrators, resolute action was required. 84 This again reinforced the journals’ 
narrative, that Britain’s Government (and that of France) felt an affinity for the 
fascists, and remained hostile towards any government that represented workers’ 
interests, thereby again linking the Government and the fascists as the hostile 
‘other’. 
The NUGMW Journal quoted Stalin’s speech of August 26th 1939:  
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explicit. We stand for 
peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries ... for 
the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for 
the independence of their country.85  
He was accused of duplicity, and the Soviet Dictatorship was portrayed as 
equivalent to the Nazis, aggressive and seeking world domination.  The Labour 
Party and the National Council of Labour (NCL) concurred regarding:  
                                                          
picture, see: The Editor, ‘All About the War and what we kill each other for’, The Clerk, (December, 
1939), pp. 179-181; M. Joseph, ‘Correspondence’, The Clerk, (February, 1940), p. 26.  
82 For instance: R. B. Suthers, ‘Ought we to Stop Stalin Spreading Socialism’, AEU Journal, (March, 
1940), p. 92.  
83 J. T. Murphy, ‘A Disservice to the Working-Class’, AEU Journal, (February, 1940), pp. 64-65; T. 
Cain, ‘Beneath Big Ben: Crisis Reaches its Climax’, AEU Journal, (September, 1939), pp. 365-366; 
Smith, F. A., ‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (December, 1939), p. 478; R. B. Suthers, ‘Are You 
Silently Building a New Order’, AEU Journal, (January, 1940), p. 12; Fox, R. M., ‘The World’s 
Window: Outposts of the Baltic AEU Journal’, (January, 1940), p. 24. 
84 C. Dukes, ‘General Secretary’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (February, 1940), pp. 97-100. 




… the splendid achievements of the Finnish nation in social legislation and in 
the building up of a Trade Union, Co-operative and political organisation of 
the working-class on the foundations of true Democracy and calls upon the 
free nations … to give every practicable aid to the Finnish nation …86   
This interpretation, meant that many concluded that Soviet behaviour proved they 
should be categorised as dictators (such as Hitler) in the ‘Dictatorship versus 
Democracy’ paradigm, and by implication, so did all British communists.  However, 
such interpretations of the domestic politics of Finland can be seen as illustrating 
the extent to which changing contexts can alter perception. 
In contrast to the AEU and the NUGMW Journals’ portrayal of Finland as a 
democratic state, the NP condemned it as a near fascist capitalist state.  Moreover, 
the NP referred to the Finnish Prime Minister as ‘Butcher Mannerheim’, (the 
country’s Chief Banker), and reminded readers that his General, Wallenius, led the 
Finnish Fascist Party.  The NP recommended D.N. Pritt’s book Must War Spread? 
which stated that the British Government considered that democratic Spain was not 
worth losing British lives over, but indicated that Finland was.87 The British 
Government’s motives in planning to send arms to Finland to help them fight 
Russia, which was not Britain’s enemy, were questioned, especially given the 
repeated warnings regarding Britain’s own arms shortages.88  The NP also 
recommended  Pritt’s Light On Moscow, which blamed the Chamberlain 
Government for failing to procure an Anglo-French- Russian Pact, which, if secured, 
Pritt postulated, would have meant Britain seeking Russian occupation of Western 
Ukraine and Western Byelorussia.89  Thus the NP readership was informed both 
directly and indirectly that the British Government’s position, supported by many of 
the labour movement’s leaders, was founded on anti-Soviet and anti-communist 
ideology, rather than the problematic of the unfolding international situation. The 
position of The Clerk contributors was nearer to that of the NP than the AEU and 
NUGMW Journals.   
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The prevailing perceptions persisted after Britain declared war on Germany.  The 
AEU and NUGMW Journals continued to allege that Communists engaged in:  
… furtive propaganda which aims at fomenting industrial unrest and 
magnifying every grievance … with the objective of disrupting the 
movements solidarity … taking their instructions from countries populated by 
a fear-ridden species which we have no desire to emulate.90   
This ideas environment meant the official union journals reinterpreted the long-
standing aircraft industry wage claims (ongoing since August 1938) as communist 
plots to undermine the country and the war effort.  However, no evidence of such 
sentiment was evidenced in the NP, who (pre-Operation Barbarossa) largely 
ignored the war situation, which the CPGB, following Moscow, depicted as an inter-
imperialist war.  They instead continued to promote workers’ pay and conditions in 
industrial disputes in their customary manner.    Nonetheless, the fall out meant 
many shop stewards and workers’ representatives being silenced, disciplined or 
even prosecuted for merely expressing the same sentiments as ‘Cato’ had in Guilty 
Men. 91  ‘Nons’ in particular were accused of enmity towards their left-wing 
workmates.  Ignorance was blamed for their failure to recognise that socialist, 
Communist and the militant Trade unionists had most to fear from Hitler. 
Conditions in the Fascist States 
 
‘Fascism’, as an ideology was deconstructed in the journals as extreme capitalism, 
with rigid hierarchies and total suppression of organised labour and political 
opponents. The journals had a common interpretation of life under fascism, 
although with different foci.  The NUGMW Journal concentrated on descriptions of 
life and working conditions; the AEU focused more on fascist ideology and its policy 
implications; whilst the NP explored the consequences of fascism for socialists, 
communists, trade unionists, and workers generally.  The articles all contained 
implicit or explicit warnings of what would be awaiting the British population if 
fascism spread, and the imperative to challenge those Government policies which 
indirectly or tacitly supported or facilitated it.  
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The journals’ usual mantra regarding the inadequacies of British wages and 
conditions, was replaced with reports of the substantially worse conditions under 
fascism.92  Italian real wages (1935-1937) had fallen by a third and the fascist trade 
unions imposed on workers were not designed to defend living standards.93 
Japanese workers’ dire position was described and blamed on Japanese ultra- 
capitalism, under which banking interests held tremendous power, and 70% of 
commerce was controlled by fifteen ‘houses’.   This was seen to have manifested 
itself as Japanese fascism, the force behind her armed aggression, and her 
economic imperialism imposed on China.94   
The persecution of Jews, trade unionists, and social democrats was exposed and 
condemned by all journals. The NUGMW reported on the Government White Paper, 
‘Papers Concerning the Treatment of German Nationals in Germany’ (1939), which 
outlined Nazi tortures against those whose ‘crime’ was their political allegiance, 
religious faith, or race.95 Reports in the Daily Herald and Manchester Guardian 
describing the horrific conditions at the Buchenwald and Dachau concentration 
camps were also cited, and readers were informed (December 1939) that the British 
Government had long held these reports.96   It was noted that Nazi atrocities against 
the Jews were widely publicised and condemned, but the atrocities against trade 
unionists and socialists were largely ignored outside the labour movement; 97 their 
lives, it was concluded, were of no importance to the capitalist press; thus, by 
implication, neither would the lives of British trade unionists or socialists if fascism 
was to triumph in Britain. 
The AEU Journals interrogated fascist ideology itself, and explored the use and 
misuse of the term ‘socialism’, including the pre-fix ‘National’, and thus elucidated 
the importance of political language in conveying meaning, and its control.  The 
British and continental education systems were contrasted.  British education was 
said to emphasise individualism; European education was reported to be 
community focused but became ‘perverted into a fanatical belief in the state’ in 
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fascist Germany.98  Further reading was recommended to apprehend the intense 
and belligerent nationalism arising from ideas around an omnipotent State.  The 
AEU recommended Robert Brady’s The Spirit and Structure of German fascism and 
E. Ashton’s The Fascist - His State and His Mind.99  Nazis racial theories in relation 
to their interpretation of international law and associated rights was also explored, 
including how Russia was attributed no rights, and Democratic States’ rights were 
dependent on their ability to fight.100  
The NP presented the dire conditions of working classes under fascism as 
common-sense assumptions.  The actions of allied governments caused concern; 
the French Government crackdowns on organised labour provided a menacing 
forewarning of what the British Government might attempt to impose.101 This 
disquiet about Government coercion was reinforced by the wider context of British 
armed assaults on strikers in India and Rhodesia.102  Thus, the supposed pursuit of 
‘freedom and democracy’ by capitalist governments was presented as embodying 
illegitimate, undesirable, and morally indefensible practices, that were an anathema 
to right thinking people; in short, it was the opposite of the political culture and 
policies embodied within trade unionism, labourism, and socialism. 
 
 
The Impact of the International Situation on the Economic Sphere 
 
 The AEU highlighted the ideological nature of the National Government’s policy 
choices.  For instance, when increased armament production was required, 
capitalist firms (considered by Government as the natural providers) were engaged 
to undertake production, construct new factories (Shadow Factories), extend 
existing works, and to facilitate subcontracts, all financed at Government (tax-payer) 
expense.103  The scale of public money going to the armaments industry was 
                                                          
98 ‘Victlean’, ‘Modern Education’, AEU Journal, (January, 1938), p. 12.   
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unprecedented; press and Parliamentary reports of its misuse resonated with the 
public who were being lectured about belt-tightening and increasing productivity in 
the national interest, whilst employers attempted to depress wages.   
The AEU Journal highlighted the Committee of Public Accounts and the Select 
Committee on Estimates reports, which exposed non-competitive tendering, un-
costed estimates, and suppliers refusing to facilitate price checking.  Additionally, 
profiteering rings were alleged, with price-fixing and the organised sharing out of 
work.104 The AEU drew parallels with war profiteering during WWI which they 
reported was estimated to have enriched some 3,600 people by some 
£3,000,000,000.105 The private manufacture of arms continued to be denounced for 
its profiteering, bribery, and exports to aggressor countries (until proscribed).  
Beyond the pragmatic concern of not arming potential enemies, it was deemed that 
‘[t]here is something morally repugnant in the thought that weapons made by British 
workmen should be used to kill British soldiers.’ 106  Some considered that the 
Government’s armaments policies amounted to providing exporters with huge 
profits at tax payers expense.  For others, it was the disposal of essential 
armaments and material that would become vital to the national interest if war was 
to become a reality.  This point was deemed particularly pertinent as the armed 
forces were suffering on-going supply problems from Government contracted firms 
(some of which were operating on short-time, which the journals attributed to 
deliberate management policies to increase prices).  For the vast majority of AEU 
and all NP contributors, such issues bolstered the case for state ownership and 
control, and emphasised the need for better planning, in line with labourist and 
socialist thought.107  Such solutions, in pursuit of optimum results for the nation and 
its workers, were presented as common-sense, natural, and obvious. 
Armaments spending increases precipitated escalations in borrowing and the 
National debt.  Various taxes were increased.  However, notably for the journal 
contributors, the National Defence Contribution was not.108 Borrowing continued to 
increase, but revenue lagged. In WWI Excess Profits Duty had initially yielded £140 
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million annually, and £420 million when the rate was increased to 80%.109  In 
contrast, when it was introduced, the WWII Excess Profits' Tax and the National 
Defence contribution were initially forecast to yield only some £42 million and £28 
million respectively. Even after the war commenced, Sir John Simon initially chose 
not to increase them; war ‘profiteers’, as arms manufacturers were dubbed, still 
retained 40% of their excess profits.110  The journals backed up such assertions 
with extracts from capitalist publications.  For instance, the NUGMW reprinted 
charts and details from The Economist’s study into company profits.111  The AEU 
and NP conveyed the same message through publishing company results and tax 
expediencies.112  Readers and their families could not avoid taxes, shareholders 
could. Inconvenient facts that might undermine the journals’ principal message were 
omitted, for instance, no mention was made of the increase in Excess Profits Tax to 
100%. 
Nonetheless the Government needed funds.  America’s Neutrality Acts (1935, 
1937)113 and ‘cash and carry’ requirement, was deemed by AEU contributors to be 
merely a financial expedient114 but meant that imports necessitated exports of gold 
or goods.115 The Government’s National Savings and Defence Bonds Schemes 
were employed to help finance Government short-falls.  The official union journals 
all promoted them and cited authoritative figures, like Douglas Jay.116  However, a 
minority voice urged caution, fearing that voluntary factory savings schemes might 
harm future wage negotiations, as employers would cite workers’ savings records in 
attempts to show increased wages were not necessary.  This topic resonated, and 
was shown to have establishment backing as indicated by Professor Beveridge’s 
letter to The Times advocating the fixing of wages by Central Government 
(removing a primary function of the unions).117   The NP did not promote the 
National Savings scheme. 
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The journals pointed out that although the wealthy claimed they could not afford 
more taxes, they were willing to lend the Government money in return for a good 
rate of interest. Similarly, journal articles discussed how purchase-tax was 
introduced, but no capital tax. They also discussed the privileged treatment of 
landowners.  For instance, the Air Ministry paid £160/acre for 243 acres of de-rated 
agricultural land valued at £10/acre, justified on the grounds of the possible 
‘injurious affects’ to the remainder of the owner`s estate’; the journal pointed out that 
other locals got nothing.118 The disparities of treatment based on class were yet 
again underlined,119 and the case for land nationalisation, or at least paying existing 
agricultural prices for land required for public works (and thus not gifting tax-payer 
money to landowners), was brought to readers’ attention. 
The generous tax treatment of the wealthy was juxtaposed to the Government 
decision to include Co-operative societies in the flat 5% tax on company profits, 
whilst also extracting tax (indirectly) from co-operators.120  This was interpreted as 
political, and was contrasted with Government producer subsidies, import duties, 
quotas/restrictions, and Empire preference, which were deemed to be enforced 
consumer and tax-payers’ ‘gifts’ to shareholders.121  The contrast with Government 
treatment of society’s needy was stark, and exemplified by the differences between, 
on the one hand, the ideological understandings and priorities of the socialism 
which the unions expounded, and, on the other hand, Government policies.  This 
analysis was generalised in the all union journals and shop steward papers; it 
served not only to elucidate class based prejudices in Government policy formation, 
but it also embodied the imperative to secure a government that was not beholden 
to the ownership class.   
The NP advised readers not merely to accept companies published profit figures, 
but also advised them on how to assess such profits (explaining profits secretion in 
‘stocks’ and ‘work in progress’, fictitious advances, imaginary reserve funds, over-
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depreciation, miscategorisation, and non-declaration of all property (later capitalised 
with bonus shares issues).122  Multiple examples were given.  They also exposed 
how, for instance, the Annual Report of the aircraft manufacturer Boulton Paul, 
stated that in addition to nearly quadrupling profits (largely based on Government 
contracts), ‘should we find ourselves with redundant buildings or plant we shall be 
entitled to compensation’123 from the public purse. Comparisons were made with the 
position of workers, who, when surplus to requirement, were discarded without such 
compensation.   
The NP contributors believed that capitalist manufacturers and their Government 
advocates had disregarded the increasing threat of Nazism, except as a lucrative 
export opportunity.  Although issues like tax avoidance and evasion were 
evidenced, the NP concentrated on the production inefficiencies and costs of 
capitalist armaments manufacture, for which the Government (and thus taxpayers) 
were grossly overcharged.124  There was a presumption amongst the authors that 
this was a common-sense understanding that their readership shared, or would 
share, once exposed to the facts.  The alternative, well-planned nationally owned 
production, was framed as the obvious solution (a policy prescription they continued 
to promote throughout the war). 
The NP also exposed links between public policy, the policy-makers’ private 
interests, and powerful commercial and financial interests.  For instance, they 
informed readers that fifty-one Conservative MPs held 109 directorships in 
engineering, iron, steel and coal, of whom twenty-three had aircraft interests.  Peers 
also had interests in lucrative Government contracts, such as Lord Austin, Lord 
Nuffield of Morris Motors, and Lord Perry of Fords (the latter two did not permit 
trade union activity).125  Similarly, NP readers were informed that British Aluminium 
Company directors included Sir Ronald Charles, a member of the Council of the 
Army and the Home and Empire Defence League (established to engender public 
concern towards defence needs). Their profits increased £171,512 to £765,128 
(1937-1938), net of the directors’ fees.126  Such links further reinforced the 
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argument for nationalisation. Their readership could map networks of powerful 
individuals and interests within industry and Government, and thus judge their 
decisions, policies, and claims with a fuller understanding. Wider reading was again 
recommended including The Private Manufacture of Armaments, by Phillip Noel 
Baker.127   
Food and Shelter 
The NUGMW and the AEU Journal contributors considered it perverse that 
unprecedented resources were being invested in armament manufacture, and so 
little in food production and storage, especially as food shortages in Central Europe 
were an important factor in ending WWI.128 Public welfare and sufficiency was 
central to the socialist thinking propagated by the journals.  The 1930s depression 
was sufficiently recent to ensure that food security was in the working-class public’s 
consciousness as war threatened.  Moreover, the NUGMW and the AEU Journals 
informed readers of the prevailing widespread nutritional problems amongst the 
poor, even in peace time;129  some 10,000,000 lived below the Rowntree minimum 
(family weekly income of 53s/wk.) required for the barest essentials.  Consequently, 
the Government’s professed concerns about the population’s health, and its keep-fit 
campaigns of the late 1930s, were interpreted as pertaining to war readiness, not 
welfare issues. 130   
Even amid the war fears of 1938 the Government opposed increasing agricultural 
production, believing it would endanger Empire trade and producer prices.131 The 
NUGMW reported the response of The Times (10th January 1938) to the 1938 
bumper harvest, that ‘the only solution is to restrict production’.132  The AEU 
implored the Government not to follow their favoured policy of destroying crops to 
maintain prices, and instead recommended storage akin to Germany.  The NUGMW 
Journal used this example of food to exemplify the foolhardiness of production for 
profit and not for use.  They noted that Soviet Russia had increased food production 
and reduced prices steadily in State and co-operative shops.133  The veracity of 
                                                          
127 Anon, ‘The Private Manufacture of Armaments’, NP, (November, 1936), p. 9. 
128 Anon., ‘Mr. Clynes on Food in Wartime’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1938), p. 68.  
129 David Adams, ‘Food, War and Peace’, AEU Journal, (August, 1938), p. 326.  
130 W. Thorne, ‘Parliamentary Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1937), p. 69.   
131 R. Roberts,’ Too many Workshops in the World’, AEU Journal, (August, 1938), p. 322. 
132 J. R. Clynes, ‘Another Crisis. Too much Food’, NUGMW Journal, (February, 1938), p.74. 
133 C. Dukes, ‘General Secretary’s Memoranda’, NUGMW Journal, (April, 1939), p. 224.  
116 
 
such reports went unquestioned, and the Soviet situation (as reported) in respect of 
planning, efficient production, and food supply, was presented as being very 
attractive and efficient. 
The need for shelters in war-time existed along with the need for food.  The 
widespread anxiety about aerial attacks and the bombings of civilians, brought the 
issue to the fore.  The journals followed the work of Professor J. B. S. Haldane, 134  
and the NP recommended his books ARP,135 and Science in Peace and War,136 
and the NP and The Clerk recommended Science and You.137  The AEU attributed 
air-raid shelters low priority to Government policy being shaped by the shelters cost, 
and the lack of exceptional profits available (unlike armaments) which meant that 
capitalists did not agitate for their construction.  Moreover, the paucity of pre-war 
public shelters, when unemployment remained problematic, further reinforced ideas 




The devastating unemployment of the depression left a legacy of regionally 
problematic and chronic ‘forced idleness’, as the journals described it.  December 
1936 saw Wales still suffering 15.5% unemployment, Northern Ireland 16.6%, 
Northern England 11.8%, and Scotland 10.2%.  In contrast, London had only 3% 
unemployed, and the South-East even less.139 The arms boom saw employment 
rise.  The unions, and thus the journals, continued to be principally concerned with 
working members, but they campaigned for the revision of the Unemployment 
Assistance Act, to eliminate the Household Means Test, to improve allowances, and 
for the Government’s Unemployment Insurance Fund surplus to be retained for 
future needs.140   
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The journals considered that the capitalist class benefited disproportionally from the 
economic upturn generally, and rearmament specifically.  The AEU Journal 
highlighted how National Income rose by £300 million (1937), but wages by only 
£25 million.  The contributors postulated that had wages accounted for a higher 
proportion of the National Income, effective demand would have increased, off-
setting the risk of a slump.141 The journals regularly drew comparisons between the 
Britain and the US, where Roosevelt’s New Deal had improved wages, increasing 
effective demand, and thus creating more, better paid jobs.  Chamberlain’s refusal 
to contemplate U.S. style public-works schemes was attributed by the AEU Journal 
to a ‘fear of the lessons extensive public-works would teach’,142  and a consequent 
public demand that public enterprises replace private.  The assertion was 
supported, for instance, by reference to J. W. Spiller, Chief Engineer, Crown Agents 
for the Colonies, that ‘A well-conceived programme of public-works is essential for 
colonial developments’.  An editorial comment was added ‘Can we be a colony?’143  
Thus, they made clear that talk of colonial development through British state actions 
sat alongside a ‘do-nothing’ policy in Britain itself. The benefits of public-works 
schemes was an unstated common-sense assumption generalised amongst the 
journals.  The differences both within and between the journals was on the degree 
to which it was considered a necessary ameliorative, or that only a fully planned and 
socialised economy was the solution. 
 
Army Recruitment, the National Register, and Conscription 
 
From January 1937 onwards, the Government’s army recruitment policy caused the 
journal contributors concern.   Ministers had appealed to employers to grant 
workers leave of absence to attend Territorial Annual Camp Training, and to offer 
time-expired soldiers first chance of vacancies.  The AEU and NP journals deemed 
that if companies could discriminate, then their claims of skilled labour shortages 
were false.144  This combined with workers’ experiences of short-time working and 
engineering unemployment, was used by the journals to show how claims that 
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dilution was necessary were disingenuous.145  The AEU Journal published, the 
‘Ministry of Labour Gazette’ unemployment figures: In March 1938, some 80,000 
registered for employment in engineering were jobless.146  By mid-July 1938 it was 
93,039, (up 37,410 on the previous year).147 
 The NP published multiple letters from aircraft workers complaining that despite re-
armament, some had been without work for months, and ‘waiting time seems to be 
the order of the day (and night)’.148  They also reported that Trade Union officials 
were being pressured to accept dilution and abandon hard won terms and 
conditions (as in WWI).149  The NP condemned F. A. Smith (General Secretary 
AEU) for stating that workers should co-operate with the Government ‘speedily and 
without friction in industry’,150 as dilution, and the degradation of workers’ 
circumstances, were both unfair, and counterproductive, as tired workers were more 
prone to mistakes and accidents. Pilots’ lives, the NP alleged, were being 
endangered through poor aircraft quality consequent upon skilled men being 
replaced by ‘boys’, and speeding-up, ‘all for the sake of profit’, and not through 
sabotage, as the capitalist press sometimes alleged. 151 
The AEU and NP Journals reported that thousands of engineering workers had 
received recruiting leaflets in their pay–packets stating that: ‘The Company is 
prepared to give special consideration to Territorial Soldiers especially when taking 
men on for work in the out-of-camp season.’ 152  Moreover, notices were posted, for 
instance, at the Rolls-Royce Works, Derby, promising men attending Territorial 
Army, Army or RAF Reserves training camps, full rates plus war bonuses whilst 
away.153 This was deemed to be symptomatic of the Government and employer’s 
sense of entitlement, to direct workers free-time as well as their working time.  
Moreover, the NUGMW Journal highlighted how such policies differentiated workers 
according to their acquiescence with Government desires, limiting workers’ free-
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choices, and making the army the only route into employment for some, especially 
as army pensioners could accept lower pay.154  It was considered retrograde, and 
an unwarranted interference in the jobs’ market (a position that, for the unions, was 
context dependent, conflicted, and sometimes contradictory). Subsequently the 
NUGWM reported that employers further exploited their asymmetric power 
relationship to coerce workers into approved behaviours; for instance, the dismissal 
of conscientious objectors, exempted from conscription conditional upon continued 
local government service.  Likewise, some industrial employers sacked such 
workers, despite their legal status.155 Thus, the journal contributors, through their 
articles, made visible the often obfuscated power of the capitalist class and the 
Government, which they employed to ensure compliance with their dictates. 
Chamberlain’s appointment of Sir John Anderson as Minister for Air Raid 
Precautions (ARP), the National Register, and Industrial Conscription schemes, was 
considered ominous by the NP, who informed readers of his past career: Joint 
Under-Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (at the time of the infamous Black 
and Tans actions); Home Office Permanent Under-Secretary of State when, in 
1925, twelve CPGB leaders were gaoled for being Communists; and since his 1937 
return to England, a director of Vickers, Midland Bank, and ICI, before which he was 
in Bengal (where he inaugurated the terror campaign against the peasants).156  
Exposing his record would have left workers in no doubt of his ideological stance 
(and that of those who appointed him), and the consequent danger he posed to 
workers’ status and welfare.  
The National Register was interpreted as a direct attack on workers’ freedom by the 
AEU, NP, and The Clerk journals,157 a precursor to industrial conscription, which 
they believed would inundate industry with dilutees, undermine trade unions, and 
depress wages and conditions.158  The NP believe it underlay the rejection of the 
aircraft workers’ pay claim.  This they linked to the hegemonic concept of the 
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‘national sacrifice’, which they judged was, in reality, workers being sacrificed ‘on 
the altar of shareholders' dividends’.159. Moreover, it was deemed to be another step 
towards fascism by the ‘pro-fascist’ Chamberlain.160 
The unions considered the subsequent introduction of military conscription to be a 
betrayal, given Chamberlain’s previous assurances161.  The irony of using 
compulsion in pursuit of ‘freedom and democracy’ was sarcastically highlighted; the 
AEU Journal noted that Chamberlain was never renowned for championing either, 
and Churchill’s answer, whatever the problem, was military, including against British 
workers in industrial disputes.162   
The restriction of conscription to the human component of national resources was 
vehemently and unanimously condemned, especially as private wealth was exempt, 
a distinction considered both unjust, and motivated by class interest.163  Moreover, 
conscription, the journals unanimously argued, meant the country’s youth was 
forced to bear the consequences of eight years of Tory policy, which had wrecked 
the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, and produced huge 
quantities of armaments, depriving the country of the means to finance public 
infrastructure, housing, education, and social services.  Furthermore, conscription 
was considered unnecessary as some 258,384 Territorials existed with over 500 
applications being received daily (April 1939). 164 Even the NUGMW, the most right-
wing of the journals, complained that the Military Training Bill empowered the 
Government with: 
… the right to steal from a defenceless section of the community their 
freedom to say whether or not they are prepared to give their lives to 
maintain a system of society whose main concern is the preservation of 
profit.165    
                                                          
159 Anon., ‘Our Reply’, NP, (December, 1938), p. 1.  
160 Anon., ‘Limitless Greed’, NP, (January, 1939), pp.  1, 11.  
161 C. Dukes, ‘General Secretary’s Memoranda, NUGMW Journal, (June, 1939), pp.  352-355. 
162 R. M. Fox, ‘Barrack Square’, AEU Journal, (June, 1939), p. 248.   
163 W. Thorne, ‘Parliamentary, £.s.d. and the War Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (June, 1940), p. 346. 




The 24th August 1939 ‘Emergency Powers Bill’ in essence, granted the 
Government near dictatorial powers,166 and importantly for the unions, the ‘Control 
of Employment Act’ severely restricted skilled labour’s mobility.  Distrust in the 
Government was reinforced by speculation about press controls, and the expedient 
employment of the Official Secrets Act to protect Ministers from uncomfortable 
questions.167 The AEU contributors highlighted the multiple secret parliamentary 
sessions that went unrecorded in Hansard, which they considered ominous;168 
conversely, the NUGMW Journal presented it as a necessary expedient.169 
The journals expressed deep concern at the poverty pay levels of conscripts.  The 
NP through its letters pages debated whether workshop collections to relieve 
families’ immediate needs should be pursued, or whether to agitate for increased 
allowances; ‘Right not Charity’.170 Opinion was divided.  The NUGMW Journal 
reported how the union had made representations to employers, sometimes 
successfully,171 thereby illustrating that even in wartime, and with their members 
conscripted, the unions could still positively impact their members’ wages and 
conditions.  
The unions’ ethos of inclusion and keeping members in touch with their working-
class and trade union roots was evidenced in the NP’s decision to suspend 
conscripts’ subscriptions, and send them copies of their journals.172  Some NUGMW 
branches established funds to send parcels, which apart from expressing fraternal 
sentiments, were thought might stimulate active interests in the TU movement, and 
the creation of a more equitable peaceful society.  NUGMW also published some 
recipients’ responses.  For instance, ‘it is not just … paying your subscriptions … 
but to know, that it thinks of its members outside working hours’.173  Furthermore, 
the parcels countered their officers’ preconceptions of unions as: 
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… a bundle of cut-throats whose main object is to push the country into all 
the strife they possibly can, and cannot see that it is the vast majority of 
workers who stand the brunt of this war and the trouble afterwards.  
Publishing such correspondence highlighted trade unionism’s community nature, 
and effectively reinforced working-class unity and support, whilst highlighting the 




The journals voiced concern about women workplace exploitation.  There was 
typically no deliberate denigration or castigation of women; indeed, their treatment 
in the journals was largely divergent from typical accounts of the era, and the 
grievances voiced were normally at the firm or workshop level. Equal pay for equal 
work was prioritised. However, such articles often betrayed the fact that the pursuit 
of equal pay was primarily a protection mechanism for the male wage.   
War made women’s place in industry visible.  Initially the expectation was that 
women would willingly relinquish their place in industry when male labour returned.   
The NUGWM and TGWU submitted policy statements to the Engineering 
Employers’ Federation (1940) which included clauses specifying the temporary war-
time nature of female employment, with normal practice to be resumed when 
hostilities ended, and assurances that suitable male labour would be prioritised.174 
No such conditions were suggested for men who were taken on at this time.  There 
was no outcry from women evidenced in the journals (1939-41).  The language 
employed embodied the infantilising of women, who were regularly labelled ‘girls’, 
and often referred to alongside youths.  Articles like NUGMW Journal’s ‘A Word with 
the Wife and Mother: What Trade Unionism Means to you’175 or the suggestion in 
the NP for a ‘Women’s Page’ that proposed topics such as, aircraft workers’ wives’ 
letters, cookery hints, household tips, dress-making and knitting designs, 176 
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exposed implicit assumptions that betrayed unconscious, ‘traditional’, unquestioned 
gender attitudes of patriarchy as the natural order. The explicit gender 
discrimination, the language used when referring to women, and the surplus 
meaning in the texts illustrated not only the widespread acceptance of sexism within 
the workplace, but also its acceptance as a cultural norm which was embedded in 
society and institutionalised, and which women generally (as well as men) 
internalised and with which they acquiesced.  It is only with the passage of time that 
such received understandings and unquestioned assumptions, invisible to 
consumers of the texts at the time of their publication, are rendered visible. 
The NUGMW traditionally included women members, and their monthly ‘Notes from 
The Women’s Department’ principally dealt with the same industrial issues that 
concerned the men, focusing on different trades (laundry, nursing, and the 
establishment of Whitley Councils for sweated trades where appropriate).  Thus, 
despite the gender discrimination that existed as an unquestioned common sense 
understanding, the union considered that they performed the same role for their 
female members as their male counterparts.  In keeping with received 
understandings (and practice) of gendered roles, topics like nutrition, children’s 
education (and scholarships aimed at women) were reserved for articles for women, 
and included reports of collaboration with the wider labour movement, Women’s 
Councils, and Conferences.177   
Women’s membership of the NUGMW reached 47,000 by January 1938, 11% of 
their total membership,178 by mid-1940 it was over 60,000.179  NUGMW women 
campaigned for equal Unemployment Insurance Fund contributions and benefits, 
and the resolution of the anomalies that disadvantage married women.180 Like their 
male colleagues, women sought a gender neutral ‘rate for the job’.    Greater 
bargaining power was needed to garner rights, which itself required increased 
female organisation; the NUGMW (along with others) campaigned to recruit women 
entering the workforce and through the medium of the journal continually stressed 
the advantages for potential as well as existing members. The Clerk similarly 
pursued the equal pay agenda. 
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The AEU was traditionally a bastion of male exclusivity.  They rarely referred to 
women, and believed that women would not want to join them, and, implicit in their 
comments of the time, was the unavoidable conclusion that they did not considered 
them fit to do so; they were a craft union that focused on time-served engineers.  
Indeed, in response to a London press article (1934) about the AEU considering 
admitting women, the Journal editor retorted; ‘This is news to us, and those 
responsible for the story betray little acquaintance with conditions in the industry or 
with the policy of the union.’181  The prevailing grass roots opinion was also 
expressed: 
At every branch meeting we are grousing against encroachments … Who 
does the encroaching? The unskilled workers and the women owing to the 
development of machinery.182  
 However, rearmament and war forced changes.  Initially, the AEU called for women 
to be organised by other unions, only deciding to admit women in 1942, (passed 
117,233: 90,550, effective January 1943). 183  The District reports occasionally 
referred to specific cases of contested dilution, which were typically resolved locally.  
Just one article in this period was devoted to the position and progress of women 
over the previous century, and how traditional conventions were being dispensed 
with.   Equality was seen as distant, but one contributor predicted that there was 
‘little doubt that this will be attained within the lifetime of most of us’.184 However, 
even in an article on gender equality and increasing female wages, women’s 
growing presence was presented as concerning and requiring careful monitoring, 
especially as the pre-WWI norms were never reinstated.185 Nonetheless, by 1947, 
some 5% of AEU stewards were women.186 
 The NP encouraged women to organise and had lobbied the AEU to open a 
women’s section.  Fred Smith (AEU President) was castigated by female NP 
contributors for promoting equal pay for women in engineering, whilst at the time, 
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his union (pre 1943) excluded them.187  The NP, always presented women as equal 
by right, and promoted equal pay for equal work – but, tellingly, still referred to them 
as ‘girls’.  Multiple examples of cross-gender support in industrial action were 
evidenced: 
The support given to the girls by the men is a welcome sign of the new spirit 
in our industry, which is leading to all aircraft workers … acting as one body 
in defence of and in securing improvements in working conditions.188   
The shared experiences of working under an exploitative capitalist system, and the 
common requirement for worker organisations regardless of gender was highlighted 
in somewhat optimistic terms: 
… for the first time the girls … recognise that their interests are identical with 
the men’s and are jostling them for a voice in factory affairs.  The men are 
holding out the welcoming hand and are eager to assist in the solution of the 
girls’ problems.189   
The need for effective shop stewards for women was also expounded.  
Notwithstanding this, there were multiple occurrences of male industrial action when 
they were replaced with women dilutees.  For instance, 600-700 AEU members 
struck at Rolls Royce when sixteen women were put onto machines previously 
manned by male youths in breach of the Procedure,190 suggesting the rank and file 




The war and its context driven expediencies and consequences were evidenced in 
the journals in multiple forms, from wartime legislation, to Union offices being 
bombed, and paper rationing affecting journal output.  For instance, the AEU 
Journal’s book reviews ceased (resuming December 1945) and international 
coverage was dominated by the war context. The NP was subjected to an export 
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ban; its editor was under threat of conscription (deferred). Wartime ushered in 
publishing delays for the journals due to the Censors.191  Wall newspapers were 
mounted in workshops to supplement limited journal runs, including AEU Journal 
articles, the Daily Worker (except when banned under Regulation 2D), and the NP, 
in full, or just the cartoons.192 It also saw all the official union journals filled with 
patriotic rhetoric.  The NP was an exception; they emphasised that optimum 
production required strong Trade Union representation and consultation, 
appropriate ARP measures, and decent working conditions.   
WWII was known as the ‘Engineers War’. Yet, despite five years of rearmament, 
four White Papers, and the recognised need for consultation with unions (1936 
White Paper), journal contributors believed wartime labour planning barely existed 
outside a few meetings over labour supply to fulfil armament production.  The AEU 
Journals expressed resentment.193   A ‘Central Joint Advisory Council’ for liaison, 
co-operation, and consultation to optimise wartime productive capacity was 
established, but its ‘strictly limited’ remit, and usefulness were questioned.194  
Nonetheless, multiple regional boards and committees with TU and employer 
representatives were established, bringing the unions into closer working 
relationships with both government and the employers, increasing their influence 
on, or incorporating them into, Government and employer organisations.  This 
enabled the unions to inject their own ideological understandings and policy 
prescriptions at multiple levels into the Government itself, through participation on 
various boards and commissions and consultations, as well as through their 
traditional industrial work.  The NUGMW’s leadership regarded this incorporation as 
source of pride and a reflection of the direction of their political ambitions:  
Our own Trade Union through the TUC, unlike the last war, is in close 
contact with the Government day by day … The PM desired the co-operation 
of the trade unions in the national effort ... We are now recognised as 
partners in the national effort.195   
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The AEU Journal continued to give voice to a range of socialist political cultures 
which promoted diverse and contradictory ideas.  For instance, W. J. Smith 
declared:  
… socialism is dead in the interests of another war and because we are all 
too busy helping the ruling class to win it when the war on the worker still 
goes on.196  
Other AEU articles condemned those who had impeded and opposed the peace 
movement, the League, and collective security, urging readers not to submit to 
simplistic race hatred.197  Conversely, I. Haig Mitchel condemned the AEU for 
publishing articles denouncing the Great Powers’ failure to address fascist 
aggression in China, Abyssinia, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.198   
Nonetheless, the labour movement generally promoted national unity, and the 
majority voice deemed the war to be a necessary evil. Contempt for the wealthy 
was unanimous, the ‘pseudo-patriots’ who boasted of having a ‘stake in the 
country’, but filled The Times classified columns, letting their houses as they 
abandoned the cities, whilst simultaneously pontificating that workers must remain 
in the national interest.199 These were the same wealthy individuals whose tax 
evasion schemes the journals revealed ‘the wealthy … and the Noble Dukes, whose 
patriotism is now at fever pitch … and the clever gentlemen in the financial laundry 
business’200 who combined to pursue self-interest at the expense of the state.  
Thus, the journal contributors sought to continue to politicise such issues whilst 
highlighting the malevolence of capitalism within an environment where war loomed 
(and became a reality) by exposing the hypocrisy of those with power and influence 
who professed patriotism as a self-seeking expedient.  Moreover, the idea that 
having a stake in the country (owning property) made one intrinsically more 
patriotic, was challenged.  Such re-framing of issues sought to expose the 
readership to realities that the capitalist classes sought to obscure.  In doing so the 
journals (especially the AEU and NP) attempted to raise class consciousness and 
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engender an imperative to challenge the system that they saw as being maintained 
and propagated by the bourgeoisie, in the interests of the bourgeoisie. 
The AEU Journal accused the Government and employers of utilising the capitalist 
press to engage in misinformation, and of feigning a shortage of engineering 
workers.  For instance, Sir Patrick Hammon (Conservative MP and director of five 
engineering firms) stated that trade union leaders refused to accept women 
workers, except under conditions which made their employment impossible; he left 
unstated what ‘conditions’ he considered ‘impossible’.201  Such allegations were 
considered profit motivated, as the union’s principal ‘condition’ at the time was equal 
pay for equal work.  Monitoring dilution was reportedly difficult and depended on 
shop stewards’ presence and vigilance.   
Collective bargaining continued to be vigorously pursued, and the sliding scale was 
rejected as it was deemed to undermine bargaining rights.  The message that 
‘Labour must continue in war as in peace to press its rightful claim to share in the 
prosperity of industry, was reinforced.202  The AEU Journal indignantly reported 
(embodying a ‘what else do you expect’ stance), that some employers were ‘playing 
upon the ignorance of the workpeople regarding the various legal enactments and 
regulations’, attempting to enforce overtime and clamping down on any trade union 
activity.203  The majority voice in the AEU Journal (unanimous in the NP) looked to 
the workers’ long term welfare and deemed that depressed wages and conditions 
when labour demand was high, would mean further deteriorations post-war. A small 
minority voice dissented.  For instance, J. Finney condemned the AEU National 
Committee for pursuing a 3d/hr wage claim against their EC’s advice, as 
irresponsible in war-time.204  In this context the AEU and NUGMW leadership 
continued to deter unofficial strikes, appealing to the core concepts of solidarity, 
obligation and loyalty which underlay the labour movement.   
The journals continued their longstanding call for the nationalisation of both the 
Bank of England and joint stock banks in the interests of the population, especially 
as banks were considered to have overcharged the Government for credit at a time 
of national emergency, creating inflation for the public, and rewards for their 
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shareholders.205  The Government ignored calls for war material industries to be 
directly controlled and instead established individual committees to oversee each 
commodity. In WWI, such controllers were independent.  In WWII controllers with 
strong vested interests in the commodity they oversaw were appointed.  The AEU 
Journal informed readers that, for instance, the Head Controller for Aluminium, was 
Hon. G. Cunliffe, Director, British Aluminium Company Limited; for alcohol and 
solvents, A. V. Board, Chairman, British Industrial Solvents Limited; for iron and 
steel, Sir A Duncan, Chairman, British Iron and Steel Federation.206  Railway 
shareholders also had their welfare ensured; the expected cost to the tax payer was 
£40 million.207 Thus, the journals made clear that all was political, and that 
Government policy choices presented as  expedient means of dealing with 
particular situations, should be analysed.  In practice, such analyses generally 
exposed the pursuit of class interests, to the detriment of the workers. 
The establishment and capitalist press were condemned for framing of wage issues, 
whereby wage-earners who sought pay rises were portrayed as ‘wicked’ in the war 
context; the role of wage increases in causing inflation was emphasised, and 
repeated appeals were made to workers to curtail their spending and invest in war 
bonds. The journals sought to challenge such interpretations and exert control on 
the discourse and language.  The AEU drew attention to ‘employers who interpret 
patriotism as a readiness on the part of the workpeople to accept low wages and 
bad conditions without protest’.208 They advised their readers that real-wages were 
falling and reported on shareholder returns outstripping wages.   Suthers somewhat 
superfluously commented ‘Such is equality of sacrifice’.209  Any suggestion of trade 
union organisation or recognition was characterised as impeding national effort and 
destroying national unity.’210   
Although the ideas and understandings around the exploitation of the working 
classes by the capitalists remained unchanged, the language and framing of that 
exploitation mutated; capitalists as parasites living off workers’ labour were re-cast 
in the war context to become capitalists exploiting the nation’s plight for their 
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personal enrichment. This itself was underlain with the idea that capitalism as a 
system, coupled with the determined maintenance of hierarchies and policies of 
competition rather than co-operation, and the promotion of private interests not 
public, both in Britain and imposed at Versailles, combined to create the war 
situation. The NP recommended the book War Profits; Trade Unions Policy in War, 
by Maurice Dobb.211 Thus the message was disseminated that lessons must be 
learned from the failures that led to war, and for all to be politically aware, and 
prepared to stand together to ensure that the policies that facilitated the rise of 




The rise of fascism and the dangers of the evolving international situation ‘where 
millions of people are instructed to ignore their heads and think with their blood’ 212 
accentuated the need to understand the complexities, problems, and possibilities, of 
domestic and international affairs through education. Both the AEU and NUGMW 
maintained their educational provision, principally in collaboration with the NCLC, 
and WEA. They arranged free or reduced fee courses, postal courses, weekend 
and summer schools, and awarded scholarships, and advertised TUC and other 
bursaries.  War meant the Labour College was transformed into a hospital, 
precluding residential courses but the Colleges correspondence courses continued. 
The dynamic and challenging international environment and the growth of fascism 
resulted in new courses being introduced.213 
Notwithstanding the prevailing preoccupation with issues emergent from the war 
context, long standing courses grounded students in the socio-political and 
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economic issues that shaped lives, and also those topics that would enable them to 
become effective as future activists within union and labour politics (as outlined in 
Chapter 1).   
Education of children and youths was similarly considered important by the unions 
and they agitated for changes in the law.  The Education Act, 1936 (effective from 
1st September, 1939) raised the statutory school leaving age from fourteen to 
fifteen years.  However, the exemption of 73,000 children from this provision on 
grounds of going into 'beneficial employment' outraged the journal contributors 
(especially in the NUGMW Journal).214  They had instead advocated that: all 
secondary education should be free; school leaving age increased to 16 years 
(without exemptions); maintenance grants paid; universal multilateral schools under 
a single administration established; and greater access to, and facilities for, higher 
education.215  Both the AEU and NUGMW journals denounced the prevailing 
system for disadvantaging working-class children, and its role in maintaining 
capitalism, the class system, and the structures that supported them.  The NUGWM 
typically concentrated on the beneficial effects of continued education as well as the 
knock-on reductions in unemployment, whilst the AEU provided more detailed 
analysis of the consequences of the education system.   
The inequities in education, and therefore the life-chances of working-class children 
were considered self-perpetuating and structural within the class economy, and 
therefore unjust.  The education system exemplified the ‘them and us’ divide.  The 
£15 per child, per annum, of public money spent on elementary education was 
deemed insufficient, a fact confirmed by employers who complained that many 
school leavers were functionally illiterate.216  The AEU Journal readers were also 
informed of how workers’ children were further disadvantaged by the dearth of 
scholarships for secondary education, 13.7% (1937) benefited (rather than the 
13.2% in 1929).  Moreover, many state school places were occupied by fee-paying 
middle-class children of below scholarship standards, displacing more intelligent 
working-class children.  The academic research of Gray and Moshinsky was cited; 
they found that 80% of the most intelligent children came from state schools, 20% 
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from private preparatory schools.  Of high ability children, seven fee-paying pupils 
went on to received further free education for every one non-fee-payer, and that half 
the high ability working class children were deprived of secondary education due to 
insufficient places.217  Equality of education was presented as a necessary condition 
for a fair society, without which the dynamics of domination were liable to continue. 
The AEU Journal further underlined this point by citing Professor John Hilton, 
whose studies concluded:  
The rule is, the old school tie for the old school posts …Of 55 Bishops, 52 
were at public schools.  Of 24 Deans 19 were at a public school; of 156 
County Court Judges, Recorders, etc., 122 are public schoolites: of 210 
home Civil Servants receiving more than £1,000 a year, 152 have old school 
ties; of 82 directors of the Big five banks 62 were at public schools.  Take the 
present cabinet, there are 21 Ministers, 20 went to public schools, and of 
those 13 went to Oxford or Cambridge.218   
Thus, the dominant state ideology facilitated inequality, and the ideological state 
apparatus was perceived as institutionalising that inequality, and thus ensuring that 
it was self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing. 
It was not just the access to education that was criticised in the journals, but also its 
content and function.  The AEU Journal reported the NCLC assertions that the 
education children did receive acted to shield and justify the capitalist system. It was 
therefore postulated that if a new social order was to be established, the Working-
Class Movement must develop appropriate education.219  Effective working-class 
education was therefore considered a necessary condition to dispel the fears that 
the ruling classes employed to restrict workers’ freedom.  True freedom was 
possible, obtainable through education offered by the Labour Colleges, the Left 
Book Club, trade unions, the Labour organisations, WEA, and the Adult School 
Movement.220 The prevailing educational system, of private education, social class, 
and the privilege of wealth, was perceived as preventing effective democracy.  One 
contributor posited that 95% of people had been conditioned into either a servile 
                                                          
217  R. Rallison, ‘Education for Democracy Pt.1’, AEU Journal, (September, 1938), p.360. 
218 ‘Victlean’, ‘When will we Learn?’ AEU Journal, (December, 1938), P.486. 
219 Tom Williamson, ‘A Chapter in Working-Class History’, NUGMW Journal, (June, 1940), P.370.  
220 S. A. Inscoe, ‘Your Freedom at Stake’, AEU Journal, (February, 1939), P.67. 
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mind-set, or misplaced, blinkered snobbery.221  Thus, education was portrayed as 
being fundamental to counter the hegemonic ideology of the ruling classes that was 
institutionalised in the education system, and the social and political systems more 
generally.   
                                                          
221 R. Rallison, ‘Education for Democracy Pt. 2’, AEU Journal, (October, 1938), p.404.  
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Chapter 3. No Going Back: 1940-1945 
  
Winston Churchill’s 1940 statement: ‘If the British Empire lasts another thousand 
years, this will always be our greatest hour’, was met with incredulity by the journal 
contributors.  Rather, the NUGMW prophesised, that a century hence: 
No Foreign Office will blow the trumpets of war to arouse the passions of the 
little people. No back-stairs meetings, secret sessions, suborned agents, 
spies and ambassadors to cheat and finesse. The whole corrupting system 
will be swept away… Socialism will have removed the causes of friction 
between nations. … By the simple process of Education, Example and 
Evolution, in that order. By eliminating the sordid system which breeds 
individuals whose fetid mentality only sees in the rows of crosses in a 
soldiers’ graveyard, plus marks on the credit side of the ledger recording their 
success in the lust for power and wealth. …  History has only proved … force 
of arms is the most unpractical way of securing either Peace or Justice.1 
Thus, Churchillian rhetoric was met with socialist rhetoric steeped in the 
understandings of the inter-war period.  The sentiment was generalised throughout 
the different journals.  
A basic, somewhat sparse, narrative of the war provided the backdrop for all other 
activity.  The journals, being monthly, tended to provide key updates and comment.  
The NUGMW was keen to demonstrate that the Labour movement had sought to 
curtail Hitler before the war.  J. R. Clynes declared:  
Our Union may claim definite association with the policy of re-armament … at 
the Labour Party Conference in 1937 it was I who moved the re-armament 
resolution at the request of the Party Executive.2   
Although Clynes was being truthful, this position was contrary to the overwhelming 
sentiment expressed in the NUGMW  Journal at that time (and the previous position 
of the Labour Party and movement), which stressed that national rearmament never 
prevented conflict, and advocated collective security through the League (as 
                                                          
1 A. J. Parkes, ‘1940 - and All That’, NUGMW Journal, (November, 1940), p. 641.  
2 J. R. Clynes, ‘Our Demands to Resist Hitler’, NUGMW Journal, (November, 1942), p. 378 
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discussed in Chapter 2).3  Some contributors continued to argue that had 
democratic states acted in unison, Nazism would not have triumphed, and that the 
League did not fail, but was killed by states which prioritised self-interest, self-
protection and economic nationalism over international co-operation and world 
peace.4  The message of strength through unity was reinforced, and shown to be 
evidenced internationally, as well as in the domestic and industrial spheres. 
There was a concerted effort to show this war was different from the last.  When J. 
McHale (AEU) complained in 1941 that the British Government’s war propaganda 
was substantially poorer than in WWI,5   it elicited the response that WWI’s 
unpopularity necessitated propaganda, requiring:  
… every conceivable device - official and unofficial. Flappers gave white 
feathers to skilled men who had been specially exempted; Kitchener pointed 
his finger … Horatio Bottomley … invoke[d] the aid of God Almighty; and 
famous actresses gave free kisses … on condition that they joined up. The 
real winner, however, was ‘Poor little Belgium.6 
Such propaganda was deemed unnecessary in the fight against fascism.   
War conditions precipitated growth in union membership and funds, and an 
increased sense of their own significance.  The unions used their journals to 
publicise their influence on a wide range of issues: unemployment benefit; 
workman’s compensation; women’s pensions; as well as influencing industrial policy 
through ministerial consultation, seats on National Advisory Boards, joint 
committees, and the National Labour Supply Board.7  Additionally, the National 
Arbitration Tribunal was established,8 and changes to the Fair Wages Clause for 
firms engaged on Government contracts achieved.9  The NUGMW contributors 
                                                          
3 See for instance: C. Dukes, ‘General Secretary’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (June, 1936), p. 176; A. 
S. Dopson, ‘Weekend School on British Foreign Policy’, NUGMW Journal, (August, 1936), p. 246; C. 
Dukes, ‘General Secretary’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (August, 1936), p. 248; C. Dukes, ‘General 
Secretary’s Notes’, (October, 1937), p. 293; ‘Chairman’s Address to Congress: Liberty and 
Dictatorship’, NUGMW Journal, (July, 1938), p. 44. 
4 See for instance: C. Dukes, ‘General Secretary’s Notes.  The League of Nations in war time’, 
NUGMW Journal, (January, 1941), pp. 24-26. 
5 J. McHale, ‘What’s Wrong with the Propaganda Machine?’ AEU Journal, (March, 1941), p. 75. 
6 W. McLaine. ‘What is Wrong with the Propaganda Machine?’ AEU Journal, (May, 1941), p. 130. 
7 A. J. Caddick, ‘Our Movement has Power’, AEU Journal, (January, 1941), p. 12. 
8 The National Arbitration Tribunal was directed to record changes in industrial practice and act as 
Arbitration Court post-war to avoid the type of difficulties experienced post WWI type with regards to 
the restoration of trade union practices. 
9 Anon., ‘Why not Now?’ NP, (October, 1942), p. 4  
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boasted that the trade union movement was never before as highly esteemed or 
accepted as a pillar of the national life,10 ‘second only to Parliament itself, in 
regulating the means whereby we shall see this war through’,11 a position that was 
unimaginable in 1931.  The AEU Journal concurred, stressing their role in 
maintaining stable labour relations, and arguing that the engineers’ importance to 
war production meant they deserved a greater voice in national governance.   Thus, 
the union leaders publicised the extent to which, through working with the 
Government and engaging in corporatist policies, unions’ power, influence, and 
reach had been augmented.  Despite their mistrust of the National Government 
(apart from Bevin et. al.), it was hoped that the idea of trade unions as partners in 
running industry would become reified and extended.   This would have been an 
influential factor in activists’ and officials’ understandings (to varying degrees) of the 
potential possibilities for corporatism post war.  The publication of such issues in the 
journals served to reinforce in the minds of members and potential members, ideas 
of trade union power and utility. 
  
The Economic Environment 
 
The ongoing theme of inequality of sacrifice continued to be generalised throughout 
the journals.  Contributors highlighted examples that would resonate with their 
readership; such as the £5,000 annual salary of the Unemployment Assistance 
Board Chairman, and other high officials’ remuneration. 12 These figures were 
published alongside accounts of moneyed interests calling on the Government to 
introduce wage stabilisation programmes ‘in the national interest’, and to counteract 
a supposed wage push inflationary cycle. The journals pointed out that wages 
lagged behind price increases.13  
                                                          
10 Anon., ‘The Trades Union Movement’, NUGMW Journal, (December, 1941), p. 577; J. R. Clynes, 
‘Trades Unions and Peace Plans, World Trades Union Conference’, NUGMW Journal, (April, 1945), 
p. 100. 
11 ‘C.M.S.’, ‘Ourselves at the TUC’, NUGMW Journal, (October, 1942), pp. 352-355. 
12 I. Haig Mitchel, ‘The Open Door’, AEU Journal (August, 1940), p. 265.  
13 C. Dukes, ‘Danger of Inflation’, NUGMW Journal, (July, 1941), p. 376. 
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The exemption of industrial profits from compulsory savings and tax avoidance 
devises available for capitalist but not workers, 14 compounded perceived 
disparities.  Much of the coverage was general, reinforcing the message of 
unfairness in the current system, and the employer classes’ utilisation of Parliament 
to legislate to protect their position, whilst burdening the workers.  However, specific 
policies were also proposed in the journals; F. A. Smith (AEU General Secretary) 
suggested company reserves should be invested in a National Depreciation and 
Renewals Fund until required for peace-time repairs and renewals.15  The 
Government took no such action. 
Perceived misallocation of public funds was reported in all the journals, but was a 
particular focus for the NP, which highlighted cases like English Electric’s take-over 
of D. Napier & Co. (with £750,000 of public funds) through the Government 
purchase and lease back of company assets for the duration. Napier’s shareholders 
and directors were offered £1 English Electric stock (value 46s.) for every five 
Napier 5s. shares (value 36s.3d.), and Napier directors also received compensation 
for loss of office.  The deal was arranged by Lazard Brothers & Company, which 
had connections to both parties.16 (The same Lazard which brokered the 2013 Post 
Office share sale.) 
The NP’s long running column, ‘The Money we Earn for Others’, continued until 
August 1942 (resurrected in 1947), but they continued to publish company results 
outside this period, (the Electrical Trades Journal covered similar topics, but 
typically focused on the electricity industry,17 the AEU and NUGMW chose not to 
published company results in the war period).   
The NP highlighted the Chancellor’s 1941 White Paper which disclosed that total 
company profits in 1938 (during the armaments boom) were £1,117,800,000, 
whereas by 1940 they stood at £1,514,000,000,18  which was presented as war 
profiteering, and implicitly companies’ obvious ability to increase wages. The NP 
considered company claims that the Excess Profits Tax (EPT) ‘robs them of 
                                                          
14 F. A. Smith, ‘Editor’s Notes: Wages, Profits, Prices’, AEU Journal, (December, 1940), pp. 362-3; A. 
W. Pepper, ‘Something Rotten in the State of Denmark’, AEU Journal, (August, 1944), p. 244.  
15 F. A. Smith ‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (October, 1940), pp. 304-5.  
16 Anon., ‘Generous Terms for Naps’, NP, (January, 1943), p. 2.  
17 For instance: Anon., ‘Company Structure in the Electricity Supply Industry’, Electrical Trades 
Journal, (January, 1945), pp. 6-7. 
18 Anon., ‘The Budget’, NP, (April, 1941), p. 3. 
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incentive’, were highly disingenuous in the increasing profits environment (the 
national interest was not considered an incentive insofar as capitalists were 
concerned).19 The 1941 decision to give a 20% post-war rebate on EPT, whilst 
increasing Income Tax rates and lowering personal allowances (bringing many 
lower-paid workers into Income Tax for the first time) was deemed illustrative of the 
burden of war cost being forced onto ordinary workers. 20  Moreover, the NP’s 
continued publication and framing of company results, in addition to highlighting 
disparities of sacrifice, provided a conduit for disseminating their particular 
interpretations and understandings, as opposed to competing strands of socialist, 
labourist, or trade unionist positions articulated in the other journals. 
 
The Impact of War on Industry 
 
Many of the unions provided the Government with interest free loans.  The NUGMW 
promoted this action as illustrative of their patriotism, highlighting the lack of such 
initiatives from corporations and wealthy individuals with available finances.21  The 
official union journals continued to promote the National Savings schemes.22  The 
unions secured an agreement with the Government and the Employers’ 
Confederation that workers’ wartime savings would be excluded from wages 
negotiations and Means Test assessments.  Nonetheless, the AEU contributors 
argued that the monies lent to the Government through these schemes by between 
seven and eight million individuals, were to be repaid largely out of taxes taken from 
those same people.23  Readers were warned that if voluntary savings were 
insufficient, compulsory savings schemes might be introduced.24  Schemes like 
Keynes’ Compulsory Savings Plan were discussed in the journals and analysed in 
                                                          
19 Anon., ‘The Money we Earn for Others’, NP, (December, 1940), p. 2; Anon., ‘The Money we Earn 
for Others’, NP, (February, 1941), p. 2. 
20 See for instance: T. Cain, ‘Beneath Big Ben: The Tax Payers as Toad Under the Harrow’, AEU 
Journals, (May, 1941), pp. 120-121; Anon., ’The Budget’, NP, (April, 1941), p. 3. 
21 C. Dukes, ‘General Secretary’s Notes:  the NUGMW in War-Time’, NUGMW Journal, (August, 
1940), pp. 480-484. 
22 Government advertisements were published as well as articles. For instance: Anon., ‘Trades 
Union Congress and National Savings’, NUGMW Journal, (May, 1942), p. 182; Anon., ‘Savings 
Appeal: Necessary in War and Peace’, NUGMW Journal, (November, 1943), p. 329; H. N. Harrison, 
‘Dockyard Workers and War Savings’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1942), p. 103. 
23 R. B. Suthers, ‘You can’t Judge Cigars by the November Picture on the Box’, AEU Journal, (April, 
1943), p. 106. 
24 T. Williamson, ‘Municipal Services and National Savings’ NUGMW Journal, (August, 1940), p. 496. 
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classist terms, then forcefully condemned as further advantaging the moneyed over 
the workers.    
From their very inception, the restoration of war-time suspended trade practices 
concerned all the unions, and readers were reminded of the post WWI experiences.  
Concerns extended to non-industrial legislation, such as Regulation 18B (detention 
indefinitely without trial), which, it was predicted, might prove difficult to rescind 
(mirroring Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) post WWI), and was potentially 
applicable ‘against a quite different class of persons’.25  The AEU considered the 
attitudes of wartime Government, TUC, and the LP’s to be autocratic, dictating to 
the unions predetermined policies.  They complained of the ineffective joint 
consultation machinery, for instance, regarding female labour, or skilled men’s 
reserve occupational status.26 Nonetheless, the AEU’s and NUGMW’s policy was to 
acquiesce in the wartime legislation, but the AEU remained  vociferous in 
attempting to hold the government to account, ensuring that policies to maximise 
war production were effectively and fairly implemented, and that legislation was 
founded on need, not capitalist class interest.27  Such journal content carried the 
implicit message that the unions were actively seeking to protect the workers’ 
interests despite the wartime context.   
The Joint consultations between Mr. Bevin, the TUC, and the Employers’ 
Confederation, resulted in compulsion being applied to labour. However, the AEU 
Journal predicted that: 
They will ignore, …the real ‘bottle-neck’- the placing of contracts, the 
allocation of materials, the provision of machine tools ... planning of 
production, the full utilisation of industrial plant, the clearance of output ... the 
equitable distribution of ‘national work’ … in accordance with a general 
plan.28  
The journals, especially the AEU and NP, reported that Government and industry’s 
planning failures resulted in misallocation of skilled workers, raw materials, 
components, machinery workshop layout and conditions; these problems were then 
                                                          
25 R. B. Suthers, ‘December Promises to be a Lively Month’, AEU Journal, (December, 1941), p. 319. 
26 For instance: F. A. Smith, ‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (1941), pp. 285-6; A. H. Bone, ‘Creeping 
Paralysis’, AEU Journal, (August, 1942), p. 209.  
27 W. H. Thomas, ‘The Essential Works Order’, AEU Journal, (July, 1943), p. 181. 
28 F. A. Smith, ‘Editor’s Notes: Conscription of Labour?’  AEU Journal, (February, 1941), pp. 34-5. 
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exacerbated by inept foremen, officials, and management, and poor co-operation 
between the Government Departments.29  They evidenced their claims not only on 
reports from the workshops, but also cited the Select Committee Reports into labour 
in the aircraft industry30 and the Beveridge Committee investigation into ‘uses made 
of skilled men in the forces’.31  
The Essential Works Order (EWO) covered 7,000,000 workers by 1942.  In its first 
year, one in 10,000 workers were prosecuted, and one in 50,000 imprisoned. A few 
employers were prosecuted, but none imprisoned. Occasionally, managements who 
disregarded the Order were removed or threatened with de-scheduling and loss of 
their workers,32 and (infrequently) replaced.33  Such disparity of treatment was 
deemed to be political, and the anger expressed against it was scathing in the AEU 
and NP journals.  This was highlighted through the example of the anti-fascist trade 
unionist, J. Mason, who was imprisoned without charge under Regulation 18b34 
(after a works’ clerk reportedly mislaid his sick-note).35  
The EWO procedures elicited discontent, as they precluded the worker’s right to 
dissent, circumvented democracy, and imposed bureaucratic rule.36  Moreover, the 
machinery for avoiding dispute’s judgements were considered biased, and 
themselves a cause of industrial unrest (for instance, in the 1943/4 Engineering and 
Allied Trades Award claim).37  H. N. Harrison (NUGMW), Confederation of 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions’ President, considered the judgement 
inadvertently incited unofficial stoppages and served to encourage employers to 
prolong negotiations.38  Calls were made for a re-examination of compulsory 
arbitration and Tribunal powers, especially as the wartime Industrial Truce 
precluded other options.39 The NP recommended reading The Rights of Engineers 
                                                          
29 F. A. Smith, ‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (February, 1942), pp. 33-34. 
30 F. A. Smith, ‘Editor’s Notes: Problems of Production’, AEU Journal, (June, 1941), p. 145; F. A. 
Smith, ‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (August, 1942), pp. 201-2. 
31 F. A. Smith, ‘Editor’s Notes: We Told Them So!’ AEU Journal, (March, 1942), pp. 62-3. 
32 H. S. Dickenson, ‘The 1941 War Baby’, NUGMW Journal, (October, 1942), pp. 362-3.   
33 Anon., ‘Management Changed by Workers Pressure, NP, (January, 1942), p. 2.  
34 The same Regulation under which Sir Oswald Mosley was imprisoned. 
35 Anon., ‘Sheffield Demands Free J. Mason: Anti-Fascist Imprisoned, no Charge Brought’, NP, 
(August, 1940), p. 1. 
36 Jack Yarwood, ‘Majority Rule’, NUGMW Journal, (November, 1943), pp. 340-1. 
37 John C. Mc.Vicar, ‘Trouble! Trouble! Everywhere. Why?’ NUGMW Journal, (February, 1944), pp. 
40-41. 
38 ‘The Address: Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions Annual Meeting’, NUGMW 
Journal, (May, 1943), pp. 133-135. 
39 H. N. Harrison, ‘National Arbitration’, NUGMW Journal, (August, 1943), p. 236. 
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by Wal Hannington, and D. N. Pritt’s pamphlet, Regulation 1AA; Guide to 
Engineering wages and conditions. 
The NUGMW, whilst acknowledging the hardship and restrictions on workers, 
presented the EWOs as necessary, and rallied members to acquiesce, whilst 
promising to fight to ensure fair play.40  War-time industrial action was minimised.41 
Thus, accusations that Communist agitators (pre-Operation Barbarossa) were 
instigating industrial unrest, was either highly exaggerated, or the communists were 
extremely ineffective in this pursuit, or both. 
Workers, especially the engineers, were cognisant of the fact that victory depended 
on them. Maximising production through fully utilising labour and equipment, and 
minimising waste were considered imperative. The AEU Journal contributors 
however, made clear that a necessary condition for maximising production was that 
the workers believed their efforts were in the national interest and not just 
shareholders’ profits.42  The inefficiencies of capitalist production continued to be 
elucidated, and state ownership and direction promoted. The AEU Journal cited 
Clement Davies in The Times who complained that the Government ‘refuses to 
control or direct the industrial and productive units, but leaves them to fight for 
existence as in pre-war days’.43  Moreover, the structural conditions imposed for war 
production increased industrial concentration, advantaging big business, and further 
extending monopolies, facilitating their potential to ‘rationalise’ post-war, to the 
workers’ detriment.44  Thus, issues around production were framed to emphasise 
both overtly and implicitly the inefficiencies of capitalist production, and how 
planned socialist production would be more efficient and would therefore better 
serve the national interest, whilst also creating a fairer society.  Moreover, texts 
dealing with the asymmetric treatment of the different classes contained much 
                                                          
40 H. N. Harrison, ‘Shipbuilding and Ship-Repairing Industry: Industrial Registration’, NUGMW 
Journal, (April, 1941), pp. 146-7. 
41 Bevin reported that between EWO’s introduction and 27th January, 1943, 1,034 trade disputes 
were reported; 498 were disposed of without reference to arbitration, and only 366 had been referred 
for settlement to the National Arbitration Tribunal (and some 170 ongoing). However, the press only 
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through trade disputes, compared to 12,000,000 days in the last two years of WWI.  For discussions 
in the journals, see, for instance: Anon., ‘Trade Disputes’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1943), p. 70; C. 
Dukes, ‘Trade Unions and the War’, NUGMW Journal, (January, 1942), pp. 25-28; T. Cain, ‘Beneath 
Big Ben’, AEU Journal, (August, 1941), pp. 204-5. 
42 F. A. Smith, ‘Editor’s Notes: Man-Power and Production’, AEU Journal, (March, 1941), pp. 62-3. 
43 R.B.  Suthers, ‘Appeasement is Ended at Last’, AEU Journal, (August, 1941), p. 206. 
44 R.B.  Suthers, ‘The Right Time for a General Election’, AEU Journal, (April, 1941), p. 94. 
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surplus meaning aimed at inciting and reinforcing class consciousness, in order to 
elicit support for socialism. 
Excessive hours were a cause of concern in the journals, especially as it was found 
that long hours failed to increase production.45 Notwithstanding the production 
imperative, the journals defended wage increases and absenteeism.  The press and 
some politicians cited high wages as causing apathy, but the unions countered, 
situating the blame in the realities of the war circumstances: black-out working; 
longer hours; speed up; arduous conditions; reduced time off; limited rations and 
travel; and the difficulties for women to access food shops when in full-time work.46  
Implicit within such accounts was the understanding that the capitalists, their press, 
and their advocates, would always blame the workers for any production problems, 
rather than analysing the situation. 
The NP attacked what they considered to be the counterproductive policies of the 
Government, such as the ‘10% plus-cost’ basis for armament industry payments, 
which rewarded inefficiency and encouraged the over-pricing of jobs.47  The 
prioritisation of capitalist class interests over national interests was also denounced.  
For instance, Tory MPs campaigned to cancel Regulation 54C.A,48 which had 
production implications, but also embodied class disparities as 'Workers may be 
moved from job to job by the Minister of Labour. But not … the directors’.49  The NP 
informed its readership about the business interests of the group’s leader, Mr. O. E. 
Simmonds, MP.50 Mr Lyttelton, Minister of Production, decided to refer the matter to 
the Craven Committee, where the two protagonists were big industry advocates, Sir 
Charles Craven (Chairman) and Lord Weir.51  
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46 T. Williamson, ‘Absenteeism’, NUGMW Journal, (April, 1942), pp. 146-7.  
47 See, for instance: Anon., ‘Resolutions Adopted at the London Meeting: Cost Plus 10 %’, NP 
(September, 1941) p. 1; Beacontree AEU, ‘Airmail’, NP, (July, 1940), p. 4. 
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The Minister of Labour established a Women’s Consultative Committee to advise on 
women’s recruitment and registration and the various legislative changes.  Such 
changes, as indeed all industrial matters, led to calls for all women to be unionised.  
Female NUGMW membership increased, exceeding 70,000 by April 1941,52 and 
257,000 by the end of 1942, (out of 720,000 total membership).53  Miss D. M. Elliot 
attributed rising membership, in part, to established trade unionists being evacuated 
from large industrial centres and disseminating the union message.54  Nonetheless, 
there were accounts of local resentments.  For instance, complaints from male 
union officials that ‘the average woman war-worker needs to be reorganised after 
every transfer and every suspension. They are not really trades unionists,’ and the 
organisation of women was described as involving the ‘trifling task of changing 
human nature’, amidst complaints that under half of them intended remaining in 
industry post-war.55  It was further suggested that: 
… the woman worker is generally superior to the male worker on jobs of 
repetitive monotony. Few men have that faculty. If the job is not sufficiently 
difficult to compel their interest, they get bored, ‘fed up,’ and, finally, 
rebellious … [the] health and happiness of our people depends on an 
acceptance of, and a return to, the old principle of the male doing the great 
bulk of industrial labour.56  
 Thus, patriarchal attitudes and sexual discrimination permeated these trade 
unionists’ thinking explicitly as well as implicitly.  Despite their self-identification as 
socialist, for such contributors, the core socialist concept of equality did not extend 
to women.  Indeed, the depth of the discrimination is most evident in the surplus 
meaning within the texts, for instance, at a conference when the improved position 
was noted, it was noted that:  
… still some few … say that women are a nuisance … Glad I am that we 
have now come to the day when it is the minority who say it openly. What 
you say secretly, I do not know. I do ask that you will be patient and that you 
                                                          
52 D. M. Elliott, ‘Notes from the Women’s Department’, NUGMW Journal, (April, 1941), pp. 148-50. 
53 Anon., ‘Membership-Plus 122,000’, NUGMW Journal, (April, 1943), p. 97. 
54 Anon., ‘Women in Industry’, NUGMW Journal, (July, 1941), p. 307-312. 
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will realise that if women are a nuisance they are only a nuisance because 
they care and want to get things done.57 
Men who similarly sought improved conditions were not considered a nuisance. 
Notwithstanding their discrimination on gender lines, the NUGMW fought to counter 
problems regarding overwork,58  or lack of work.59  They agitated for improved 
conditions including good day nurseries (near workplaces), shelter provision for 
those bombed-out, requisition of empty homes, nursing and medical services 
aligned with shelters, canteens and food distribution, and evacuations.60  The plight 
of the 10,000,000 women who were often invisibly engaged in domestic work was 
also raised: billeting munition workers; looking after evacuees; voluntary tasks; or 
part-time work, in addition to their family responsibilities.61  
J. R. Clynes articulated a minority view, blaming unorganised women for their own 
predicament.62  However, this was not solely sexism, he equally blamed 
unorganised men for their misfortunes, casting them as enemies of organised 
workers, and as bad as the employers. The solution proposed, was to recruit 
women and educate them in trade unionism, and then agitate jointly for improved 
terms and conditions and a ‘rate for the job’.63  It was suggested in the NUGMW 
Journal (in complete contradiction to much of their commentary on women’s place 
in industry) that members learn from the Russian example, where women effectively 
perform men’s jobs.64   
As the war progressed, women’s post-war status became increasingly topical. 
Women considered that they had earned their place in economic life, including 
equal access to employment, and, where appropriate, retraining.65 The equal pay 
for equal work mantra continued in all the journals.  Nonetheless, a minority of 
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women feared equal pay might result in their gradual exclusion from industry. 66  As 
war work diminished, women were redirected back into the cotton mills, much to 
their displeasure, as wages were low and conditions poor.  Those so directed 
determined to ensure their children escaped that fate.67 
A minority voice in the AEU Journal welcomed women’s inclusion and the equality 
principle. 68  The majority sought the protection of the primacy of skilled men.  
Female ‘dilutees’ entering the industry continued as a live issue for the AEU.  
National Women’s Agreements were signed (22nd May, 1940),69 but female 
recruitment, especially when male labour was available, continued to cause 
workplace resentments and non-co-operation.70 By June 1943 the AEU had some 
65,000 women members.  Special Central Conferences with the Engineering 
Employers' Federation, and National Women’s Conferences were instigated.71 
Nonetheless, female AEU members were not treated as equals.  For instance, the 
five women elected to attend the 1943 National Committee, were only given non-
voting delegate status.72 
F. A. Smith made clear the androcentric nature of the AEU, stating that the union 
had made: 
a moral and a political pledge to the men who have left the industry to serve 
the nation …They have a first claim … of employment in the industry when 
demobilisation begins.…the only alternative would be an unthinkable form of 
sex war, with the possibility of many employers using the skill of the women 
as a lever for enforcing wage cuts.73    
The fate of women AEU members post-war was not a major concern.  
Equality and fraternity were usurped by male self-interest, and patriarchal norms 
(sometimes bordering on misogyny) both within the workshop and the society in 
which they were embedded.  Thus, what had previously existed as an invisible 
common-sense part of social and industrial relations evidenced principally in the 
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surplus meaning within the journal texts, was given greater prominence and thus 
visibility by the prospect of peace, and the perceived threat women posed to male 
domination in the industrial workplace, and its potential knock-on consequences for 
societal gender relationships.  
Unlike the majority voice in the other journals, the NP continued to advocate gender 
equality, stressing organisation and unity.   They reported occasional instances of 
overt discrimination, and commented on its unacceptability.74 They also began a 
women’s section and column, encouraged female readers to submit letters,75 and 
dealt expansively with women’s bread and butter issues.76 A small minority female 
voice blamed women themselves for their failure to garner a National Wage 
Agreement; again, this was attributed to past failures to engage in trade unionism; 
77 a position Stafford Cripps also adopted.78   
 
Joint Production Committees 
 
The need to maximise production, interspersed with rhetoric around the necessity to 
defeat the fascist threat, dominated coverage.79  Joint Production Committees 
(JPCs) were proposed as a means to these ends.  JPCs were no great concern for 
the NUGMW contributors.  When first established they were reportedly ‘viewed with 
something akin to awe by members engaged on and in an industry where the old 
ideas still flourished’.80  The AEU contributors took a contrary stance, believing they 
impacted on fundamental trade union and socialist principles; their desirability was 
contested.  Some considered that big armament firms would be the main 
beneficiaries and suggested that war production and Russia would be best helped 
by agitating  
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for the abolition of all profit making in munitions, State control of the factories 
and banks, and then, and only then, would the whole working class become 
a real production committee.81   
Alternatively, Edmund Frow presented the ‘common-sense’ argument that if 
production was to be optimised and waste minimised: ‘co-ordinated direction of 
armies is necessary, so is the co-ordinated direction of production’82  For Frow, and 
his fellow communists, achieving both increased production and increased worker 
control, were steps forward, and by disseminating the rationality and expediency of 
their position, they hoped to enlighten readers, and even convert them to the cause.  
Other contributors proposed that JPCs offered the opportunity for workers to gain 
management knowledge and experience that would facilitate their future 
encroachment on managerial function and potentially the occupation of 
management roles.  However, readers were warned that employers might merely 
achieve a workforce disciplined by their fellow workers, and that employers would 
always defend their managerial functions: ‘Remember 1922’.83  Yet others 
suggested that limited liability companies with professional managers, meant 
managers could easily be transferred in the future to State employment.84 Others, 
posited that JPC advocates were guided and motivated purely by their communism, 
not the best interests of Britain or British workers, and suggested that JPCs were 
aimed merely at aiding Russia, and ‘only incidentally to rearm ourselves.’85  
Consequently the policy should be repudiated. After some months of debate JPCs 
were considered a welcomed expedient, and ultimately the AEU Journal 
recommended that they should be made compulsory in major industries.86  
The AEU Journal reported that the principal obstacles to JPC’s success was 
management and employer mistrust, specifically their paranoia over managerial 
functions.87  The opposition to JPCs of major industrialists, like Sir Alfred Herbert 
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and Lord Nuffield, was deemed ‘indicative of their willingness to retard the war-effort 
rather than lose privileges’.88  Austin Hopkinson MP was quoted as stating:  
I cannot look at the evil faces of some labour leaders without a deep sense of 
humility. How greatly must we capitalist employers have neglected our duty if 
the workers choose to follow not their natural leaders but men as these …We 
want more autocracy.  I am autocratic; because of my birth, my breeding and 
intelligence I am fitted to lead.89  
Similar attitudes were attributed to Alvis’s Chairman, T. G. John.90  The inclusion of 
such quotes in the journals illustrates how, in their constructed narrative, they 
utilised Tory and Capitalists’ derogatory statements to elicit gut reactions from their 
readership, thereby reinforcing the ‘them and us’ schism, and elucidating the 
capitalists view of the workers (however highly skilled).  Moreover, it aligned the 
minority of AEU Journal contributors who eschewed JPCs, with the capitalists, 
thereby discrediting them.  
The NP’s position on JPCs accorded with the CP’s, and the AEU Journal’s 
communists and left-wing socialist contributors. It highlighted poor planning, the 
subjugation of efficiency to management’s desire to retain their managerial function, 
the prioritising of profit over production, and employer neglect of workers’ health and 
safety.  A unified plan for production was advocated, with Regional Boards, 
compulsory JPCs (made up of shop stewards not appointed workers’ 
representatives).91 The NP considered that the consequences for the shop steward 
and trade union movements of such wartime industrial structures was potentially 
very positive: 
… one of our greatest gains has been the training of thousands of workers to 
become capable negotiators at the source of grievances - the factory … The 
shop stewards of today may well be, indeed must be, the legislators of 
tomorrow.92  
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Thus, reflecting the confidence in the movement that their elevated status and voice 
would continue and further increase post-war. 
Until Operation Barbarossa the NP had largely ignored the war, except insofar as it 
impacted on worker’s freedoms through war-time regulations, conscription, and the 
direction of labour, ARP, and daily difficulties.  However, Russia’s entrance into the 
war precipitated the NP losing its political cutting edge, and subordinating political, 
welfare and victimisation issues, to production maximisation. In Freeden’s terms 
there was some rearrangement of core concepts. Thus, whilst socialist core 
concepts and the welfare and interests of the workers, class solidarity (and related 
‘othering’ of the management / ownership class) remained central, they were as a 
temporary expedient, supplanted and marginalised by the imperative of defeating 
Hitler and defending the only existing Socialist state, as well as their own country, 
and the socialist and labour movements (and themselves).   
 
Attitudes to Communists 
 
The ‘People’s Convention’, a CP organisation established before Germany invaded 
Russia, embodied the shared common-sense understandings that the journals 
propagated regarding post-war aspirations.  The AEU’s National Committee’s 
passing of a resolution supporting negotiations for the ‘Peoples Convention’ 
precipitated a mixed response from contributors.  The People’s Convention’s CP 
sponsorship meant it was automatically denounced by many anti-communists, and 
its ‘People’s Peace’ element was, for some, an anathema in the war context.93  
Others defended the Convention, highlighting widespread press misrepresentation, 
and urging readers to consider it dispassionately, and in its entirety. ‘The People’s 
Peace’, its AEU advocates stated, was a long-term policy ‘without conquest or 
capitulation’, which did not recommend negotiating with Hitler.94   Moreover, they 
posited that the six point programme: raising living standards and providing 
dependant’s allowances; adequate ARP; restoration and extension of trade union 
and democratic rights, and civil liberties; friendship with Russia; and a Government 
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truly representative of the working people, were all policies that the whole labour 
movement should support, and which the author attempted to persuade the 
readership to adopt. 95  In this pursuit, the article obscured the fact that whilst such 
policies in broad terms had widespread appeal, the specifics the CP desired, 
diverged from those coveted by non-communist socialists, labourists, and trade 
unionists. 
The Clerk officially opposed the People’s Convention, stressing that it was contrary 
to Labour Party and TUC policy, and rebuked a number of their prominent members 
who publicly supported it.96 The NP contributors, in line with CPGB policy, were 
strong supporters.  They recommended reading D. N. Pritt’s, pamphlet Forward to a 
People’s Convention’.97  
Events intervened with the German attack on the Soviet Union, and all talk of the 
Peoples Convention ceased.  British-Soviet relations were transformed.  Churchill 
announced that the attack prefaced an invasion attempt on Britain, and promised 
the Soviets aid, making it difficult to disparage communists as fifth columnists. The 
journals generally reacted positively to Soviet help in the war. Some reconsidered 
their own ideologically driven preconceptions, but many, like Bevin and Dukes, and 
most NUGMW contributors, did not.  Indeed, for some, their anti-communism 
increased, as worries emerged as to how the changed context might bolster 
communist influences in Britain.98    
Nonetheless, the NUGMW Journal generally subjected communists to very little 
scrutiny except when they perceived domestic communists to be a threat within 
their union or the wider labour movement.  For instance, in 1940, the communists 
only featured in two articles: first, the reproduction of a Manchester Guardian article 
(11th April 1940) in which the CPGB blamed the British Labour and Trade Union 
leaders, Chamberlain, and Reynaud, for extending the war,99 and second, Ernest 
Bevin’s statement:  
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Let this be said for the working people, even the communists, there is no 
evidence in Norway, Holland, France, or Belgium, that any part of the 
working class, whatever their political party may have been, operated as Fifth 
Columnists. The Fifth Columnists came from higher up. The people I have 
lived with are under no delusions about Hitlerism. It is those who would be 
the first to be wiped out in every country. 100 
The article’s author added: ‘And so say all of us.’ 101 
The CP’s desire for Labour Party affiliation caused particular antipathy and 
precipitated increased anti-communists rhetoric (1943-4) in the NUGMW and other 
journals, such as, (contestably) in The Clerk.102  Chas Dukes accused them of being 
divisive and fractional, and of exploiting the Russian Army’s successes to promote 
their cause and candidates, to secure official control over, and finally, dictatorship 
of, the labour movement.  He complained, ‘They are intolerant of minorities, and 
those who cannot be pressed into their particular mould’, proclaiming: ‘the CP 
stands for a dictatorship … Their policy is to liquidate their opponents, and not to 
convert them’.103   Thus the NUGMW, like much of the right-wing of the labour 
movement, utilised the Soviet Government’s dictatorial characteristics and actions 
(known and expediently ignored or disbelieved by many on the left), to disparage 
British communists and to ‘other’ them from the type of socialism they themselves 
promoted.  
Other NUGMW contributors accused ‘certain groups’ (Communists) of undermining 
the Labour Party in parliamentary divisions, being behind the miners, docks, and 
engineering worker’s unofficial strikes, and consequently responsible for the 
negative press the unions received, suggesting their behaviour was revenge on 
Bevin for wartime restrictions of organised workers.  ‘Anti-war’ and ‘Trotskyite’ 
agitators were condemned (especially Trotskyists for coveting world revolution), and 
they were accused of wanting to establish nationally militant trade union 
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committees. 104 Those who in 1943 advocated Labour’s secession from the electoral 
truce, or withdrawal from the Coalition, (principally supporters of the CP affiliation to 
the LP) were similarly denounced. 105 The ILP was accused of being Trotskyist 
inspired, and ‘Independent Socialist’ candidates were condemned for supporting a 
union of all Left parties: ‘disintegrating forces unleashed by the fungus growth of this 
passing moment--this so-called ‘United Socialist’.106 Thus the NUGMW contributors, 
through rhetoric, sought to counter the positive fallout communists enjoyed from 
Soviet successes, and to ‘other’ communists as they did the employer class, in 
order to persuade readers to adhere to the line that they and the Labour Party 
promoted. 
The NP and AEU journals were amongst those which repeatedly credited the Soviet 
Union army’s successes and Russia’s evident advances to the Communist system, 
suggesting that ‘Moral purpose and a scientific planning are the secrets of Russian 
success’.107 There is substantial evidence from opinion polls conducted during the 
war that most people came to similar conclusions.108 The AEU Journal promoted 
unity against fascism, and advocated full trade union rights to Communist members 
at the Labour Party Conferences and TUC.109(A position also supported by The 
Clerk, but somewhat less enthusiastically).110 Jack Tanner told readers that the 
Communist International’s decision to dissolve itself, removed the LP’s main 
premise for refusing Communist affiliation,111 and compared the antipathy some felt 
towards the CP to the antagonisms between America’s AFL and CIO, which 
weakened US and international trade unionism.112  The moral was clear, strength 
through unity.  Nonetheless, the AEU hierarchy sought to distance itself from the 
communist leaning National Shop Stewards Council and other Shop Stewards’ 
organisations.113 
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The NP supported CP affiliation to the LP, and for all political levy payers to be 
eligible as trade union delegates at the Labour Party conferences.114 They repeated 
Harry Politt’s appeal for Labour and progressive forces to unite, the desirability of an 
electoral truce,115  and supported the AEU National Committee’s resolution 
appealing to the Labour Party to convene a conference of progressive parties to 
achieve Labour movement unity. 116    
 
The International Scene 
 
There was a received understanding that the British were able and moral, and the 
enemy incompetent, ruthless, and immoral. Nationalism rather than accuracy 
abounded, especially in the NUGMW Journal. This was exemplified in their 
description of the unmitigated disaster at Dieppe:     
We were all thrilled when we heard and read of our own brilliant offensive 
raid on Dieppe. …this action so dashingly carried out, with its perfect 
synchronisation of air, land and sea forces will undoubtedly result in the 
saving of thousands of lives.’117 
The US’s position was considered crucial.   American help, especially lend-lease, 
was welcomed; 118 as was their refusal to recognise the transfer of European 
colonial possessions, and instead to hold them in trust.119  The journal contributors 
viewed the upcoming US election with apprehension, as, although Roosevelt’s 
opponent, Vendell Willkie, offered all support short of war, he was backed by big 
business and the Nazis,120 and was considered a reactionary enemy of the labour 
movement (although supported by the CIO’s John L. Lewis):   
American industrialists are heartily sick of the … gallant President’s gesture 
in the direction of a wider freedom and a fuller democracy. …many of the 
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American commercial men are determined to get their own back as soon as 
the present emergency is over. 121 
The NP highlighted Henry Ford’s refusal to manufacture 6,000 Rolls Royce Merlin 
Aero Engines for the British Air Force, and Hitler awarding him the ‘Grand Cross of 
the German Eagle’ in 1938.122  Thus, there was a generalised effort by journal 
contributors to again reinforce the link between capitalists (and their advocates) and 
fascist support internationally. 
Such understandings were also applied to the defeat of France.  The AEU Journal 
reported that France was ‘betrayed by a self-elected Government dominated by 
fascists whose friendship of the Nazis has long been notorious’. 123   They theorised 
that France’s 200 richest families, who ‘practically control French finance and 
industry sold out in the hopes of saving their property’ 124 (the same interests who 
the journal contributors held responsible for ousting of M. Blum).  The AEU warned 
Churchill to guard against powerful British financiers and industrialists, who ‘would 
rather lose the British Empire to the Nazis than permit the people of Britain to own 
and rule the country’.125   
In contrast the NUGMW Journal coverage on France’s fall concentrated on what it 
meant for Britain and how to move forward to victory;126 just one article accorded 
with the NP and AEU that ‘The ruling classes of Belgium and France, in their 
anxiety to preserve their status and the right to exploit their peoples … sold their 
common peoples into slavery.’127 The NP went further, linking pro-fascism to anti-
Sovietism and antipathy to the working classes.  They described Paris’s fall as a 
triumph for ‘Fascist Vichyites and anti-Stalinites … France and her people were 
betrayed by her Ministers, 5th columnists and big businessmen’, facilitated by 
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those ‘who had encouraged Hitler to build his armaments to fight Bolshevism … and 
to crush the social aspirations of the French workers and peasants’.128   
The NP’s coverage of the war was insubstantial, other than reminding readers of 
the pro-fascist attitudes of the inter-war Tory (and National) Governments and their 
incapability of making public policy choices that benefited those outside their own 
class, with disastrous consequences for ordinary British people and the world. 129   
The NP unvaryingly propagated positive interpretations of Soviet policy.  Articles 
detailed visits of union and other delegations to the USSR, describing the Soviet 
industrial set-up, trade unions, collective bargaining, and the Soviet worker’s 
experiences.130 They depicted Russia’s industrial unions as the ‘ideal form of 
organisation’131 and reported on Soviet Production Conferences,132 Soviet factory 
inspectors, efficiency and care for the welfare of workers,133 and the care provided 
for Soviet Servicemen and their dependents.134 Throughout such coverage they 
sought to ensure their typically socialist readers, were exposed to, and perceived 
issues through, a communist understanding. 
Incidents in the course of the war that resonated with the contributors’ socialist 
aspirations, were seized upon.  The French resistance / insurgent movements, ‘the 
Council of Resistance’, and its non- cooperation with German policy, were 
praised.135  The AEU Journal contributors celebrated with much rhetoric the ousting 
of the Yugoslav Government ‘by the idealism of the common people …They have 
told the Nazi Goliath that they prefer to die as free men than slaves’.136  Reports of 
strikes by Italian workers at Germany’s Siemens, and various Italian aircraft works, 
were publicised.137 The need for workers solidarity to defend themselves against 
class enemies – the natural sympathisers of Hitler, was made clear. This was 
reinforced by the AEU and NP regarding the allies’ relationship with Admiral Darlan, 
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(under whom Dakar had allied itself with Hitler).138 The NP described this 
relationship as ‘akin to Sir Oswald Mosley being made Prime Minister’ concluding 
‘Anti- Fascist wars cannot be won with the help of Fascists’.139 
 
Attitudes to the Second Front 
Russia’s new status as an ally bolstered the positive attitudes most journal 
contributors afforded her (except when attempting to malign domestic communists).  
Soviet war-time successes were publicised, and were employed to illustrate the 
disingenuous nature of the pre-war capitalist press’s reports denigrating Soviet 
engineering.  To reinforce their point, they continued to report on Russia’s 
transformation from a backwards agricultural state in Tsarist times,140  and noted 
that these advances occurred despite world economic boycotts and continuous 
threats from capitalist states in both the east and west. 141  Thus, journal 
contributors could point to a concrete example of socialism as a lived reality and 
also note its remarkable achievements, which illustrated the potentialities of a 
people, once the profit motive is removed and effective planning implemented.  All 
such articles carried the implicit message that such potentialities were applicable to 
Britain if socialism was introduced.  
Throughout the duration of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the majority of AEU contributors 
continued to be disinclined to believe that Russia betrayed its Socialist ideals to 
befriend Nazism,142 and until Operation Barbarossa, they reported the communists’ 
belief that Russia would remain neutral in the ‘imperialist war’.   J. T. Murphy’s AEU 
articles included the history of Soviet foreign policy, focusing on the post 1917 
foreign intervention which provided the background for her subsequent policy 
choices.  Russia’s desire to normalise diplomatic and trade relations, her entry into 
the League of Nations, and her fear of a Nazis led capitalist attack, were deemed to 
have motivated her calls for a United Front against Nazi aggression.  Murphy, like 
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most AEU contributors (and all NP), considered her Pact with Germany was an 
expedient pursued only after collective security through the League became 
unrealisable.  Thus, Murphy asserted that Russia’s principal peaceful aims 
remained constant.143 Although writing from pro-Stalinist perspective, and thus 
striving to elicit positive perceptions and judgements of the USSR, Murphy’s 
interpretations accorded with the majority AEU Journals voice at this time.  The 
NP’s analyses corresponded with Murphy’s; their recommended reading included 
Soviet Peace Policy. Four speeches, by V. Molotov.144 
The AEU Journal backed the Second Front.  Jack Tanner stated that, ‘No other 
issue has the same importance.’145  He highlighted the Trafalgar Square rally which 
sixty thousand people gathered to support.  This illustrated to readers the policy’s 
widespread following (contrary to Bevin’s advice, and the NUGMW’s position). 
The NP cited Churchill’s 1942 declaration that ‘the Russian danger is our danger’ 
and bemoaned the unfulfilled promises to open a Second Front that year, which 
they blamed on the ‘Munichite and Isolationist circles’ who had supported Hitler, and 
followers of the ‘Moore Brabazon line of the ‘desirable’ mutual exhaustion of the 
Soviet and Nazi Germany’.146  The NP further warned readers to: 
… guard against being misled … by certain critics in Parliament, ... pro-
Fascist elements, the Empire-first Johnnies, and demagogues who are 
attempting to use the serious [North African] situation as a cloak whereby 
they can weaken the new pact.147  
The NP asserted that the Second Front, in addition to striking Nazism, would impact 
the British ‘Old Gangs’ policies.148 The NP profiled anti-Second Front protagonists, 
like Conservative MP Commander Robert Bower, a pre-war fascist sympathiser, 
leading figure in the ‘Friends of National Spain’ and the ‘Anglo- German 
Fellowship’.149 By linking anti-Second Front views with fascist sympathies (in other 
words, everything any ‘right thinking’ person would revile), the NP contributors 
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sought to discredit the anti-Second Front message by discrediting the messenger 
through association. 
However, it was not only Tories and industrialists who opposed the Second Front.  
NUGMW contributors never supported it, rather they defended its non-
implementation on grounds of expedience, postulating that had forces been diverted 
from North Africa, the Nile would have been lost.150 At the 1942 TUC, the platform 
also opposed the Second Front, backed by the TGWU and NUGMW.  Conversely, 
the AEU, ETU, Mineworkers, and others, supported it (the AEU amendment 
succeeded).151 Such policy discrepancies highlighted the multi-stranded nature of 
trade unionism, socialism, and labourism, and the journals function in disseminating 
the different perspectives and efforts to elicit adherence to their distinct visions. 
Based on his past record, the AEU concluded that Churchill’s public proclamations, 
that he desired friendly relations with Russia, were disingenuous. His supporters’ 
dissemination of anti-Soviet propaganda about a ‘Bolshevisation of the Balkans’, 
and his Foreign Minister’s encouragement of anti-Soviet Polish reactionaries in 
London, was considered to amount to a ‘frenzied Tory antipathy to any and every 
progressive regime anywhere.’152   
 
Internationalism 
The journals revealed the deterioration of the already dire conditions experienced 
by many, especially Jews, socialists, communists, and trade unionists, under 
fascism.  In 1942, the NUGMW described the deportation of Poles and Dutch 
workers for slave labour, the use of concentration camps,153 and starvation as a 
punishment.154  
Although generally preoccupied with Europe, India remained a concern for journal 
contributors. The war’s increasingly global nature and the British Commonwealth’s 
shared sacrifices, were voiced.155   The AEU and the NP journals drew attention to 
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the devastating famine 156 (now known as the Bengal famine).  They also continued 
to advocate Indian independence,157 as both a moral imperative, and an expedience 
as independence would give her people ‘something really worth fighting for against 
the Japanese’.158   
The King in his Christmas broadcast portrayed the Empire as ‘one great family’; 
Suthers (AEU) cuttingly remarked ‘We are all in the same boat, but first class and 
steerage are not merged.’159  Thus, he highlighted the British Government’s 
disregard of any real sense of equality, fraternity or human flourishing in relation to 
her colonial citizens, unlike the CP and much of the Labour Party.  The NP 
recommended reading Modern India, by R. Palme Dutt,160 and British Soldier in 
India, by Clive Branson.161 
Conversely, some NUGMW contributors considered that the Indian Nationalist 
Movement created vulnerable points in Britain’s defence: ‘Deplorable as it may 
appear …, Gandhi has had to be put away in a safe place, safe from his own 
dangerous pacifism, safe from his collaboration with Japan’.162 For such 
contributors, socialist core values were subordinated to British war-effectiveness, 
and NUGMW articles sought to persuade their readers of the expedience of such 
policies. 
 
The End of the War in Sight 
The dissolution of Allied Unity was noted from early 1943, along with discussions of 
how the Powers expected, or sought to be, positioned post-war. This, the journals 
juxtaposed with the ideals of the Atlantic Charter and the UN.163   
The Cairo Conference ordered Japan to return all territories obtained by aggression 
in the previous sixty years (including Korea).  The AEU Journal noted that if similar 
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conditions were applied to all nations, and backdated another generation, Britain 
would have had to relinquish Hong Kong to China, and many other Asian and 
African nations liberated.164  The hypocrisy was made explicit. 
The AEU contributors expressed concern about the Allies’ apparent disregard of 
vanquished states right of self-determination. Mussolini fell, and Sicily was liberated.  
However, the Italian King and army head Badoglio, Fascist officials, police and 
administrators remained influential.  The AEU attributed this to the Allies seeking to 
ensure a capitalist regime was maintained (this also applied to Darlan in North 
Africa).165  The subsequent UN appointed administrators, proscribed Sicilian locals 
from engaging in political activities.  The AEU postulated that ‘The Italian people 
may desire freedom from the thraldom of Big Business and Landlordism as well as 
fascism’.166  The Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories (AMGOT) had 
no trade union representation, but appointed as Chief of Civil Affairs, Lord Rennell 
(of Morgan Grenfell Bankers, formerly Bank of England Board, and Bank of 
International Settlements), despite the fact that ‘No one can plead ignorance of the 
evil results of banking on unrepresentative forces in other liberated areas’.167  Thus, 
the journals, especially the AEU and NP, implicitly and explicitly, disseminated the 
message that the ‘old gang’ of capitalists and the ‘ruling classes’, intended business 
as usual post-war.   
The British (and American) policy ambitions to secure Royalist regimes with 
reactionary governments across Europe, to safeguard the forces of capitalism and 
suppress the people by effectively containing contrary ideas emerging from below, 
was considered by the journal contributors to be antithetical not only to socialist 
principles, but also everything the war was premised on, and the Allies position as 
liberators.  The message was again reinforced that the capitalist class was 
untrustworthy abroad as well as in Britain, and had deep undemocratic tendencies 
unless they could ensure such democracy did not challenge their interests. 
  
The Greek situation also caused the journal contributors concern.  In December 
1944 an army of 35,000 under General Scobie invaded Greece to prevent Ethnikos 
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Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (ELAS) (which had driven out the Germans) from 
coming to power, as ELAS contained Communists.168 There were multiple calls in 
the NP for the British Government to support ELAS / Ethnikon Apeleutherotikon 
Metopon (EAM), rather than championing the Greek Royalists and anti–democratic 
forces.169 The NP condemned the Political Warfare Executive for instructing BBC 
services (1st August 1944), that ‘the PM has ruled that in principle no credit of any 
kind is to be given to ELAS or EAM’.170  This fact also served to reinforce the NP’s 
claim (shared by the labour movement generally), that the capitalist and 
establishment press, including the BBC, were untrustworthy promotors of the 
capitalist cause. The NUGMW contributors noted that ‘Democracy must be 
vindicated, otherwise the last 5yrs struggle, will be lost’;171 a sentiment generalised 
throughout the journals. However, the NUGMW warned of potential political 
instabilities within ruined countries with collapsed economies, which would render 
the population vulnerable to propaganda (for the NUGMW, this meant communism).  
 
International Organisations- Bretton Woods/ Atlantic Charter / United Nations. 
The unions continued their support of the League of Nations and condemned the 
inter-war Governments for marginalising the League.172 Despite the League’s failure 
to maintain peace, the NUGMW Journal (1941) asserted: 
We cannot blame the machinery of the League for not averting war.  
Governments of the Great Powers refused to make proper use of it. …the 
League is the proper body, or something like it, which will be greatly needed 
after the War, and that experience must not be wasted.173  
The inception of the League’s successor international organisations was, according 
to the journals, attributable in part to socialism in Russia offering an ideological 
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alternative to capitalism.  The democratic states sought in these new institutions to 
demonstrate that security and full employment was achievable without the loss of 
personal liberty experienced by Russian citizens.  International planning and co-
operation were considered essential to prevent future wars; this generalised 
sentiment fed into the establishment in the Moscow Four-Power Declaration, the 
Atlantic Charter, and the UN. 
Some British capitalists, like Sir Patrick Hannon, professed unease over the Atlantic 
Charter.174  The AEU Journal interpreted such sentiments to be indicative of a 
planned return to international competition for markets and resources, which would 
inevitably result in more wars. By mid-1945, the AEU reported that nations, 
including the Great Powers were, ‘indulging in a game of imperialistic grab’,175 and 
warned that some in the US were campaigning to deploy the atomic bomb against 
Russia.  Given the Western Powers attempts to destroy her post-WWI (a history in 
which the contributors were steeped), it was considered inevitable that Russia’s old 
mistrust of the West was resurrected, and somewhat disturbing that Stalin had 
become concerned with ‘pacts and spheres of influence of the kind that have landed 
us in two world wars’. 176   
The UN was ostensibly based on ‘the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
peace-loving States and open to membership of all such States … for the 
maintenance of international peace and security’,177 and thus appealed to socialist 
ideals.  Its formation was universally welcomed, but with reservations.  For instance, 
Suthers (AEU) commented that: 
… if the UN were one-tenth as well prepared to wage peace as … to wage 
war, one might well rejoice’178 and that ‘If it succeeds international trade will 
be robbed of its terrors, and financial gangsters will be out of business.179  
However, these were presented as big ‘ifs’. 
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The journals were full of rhetoric about establishing a socialist inspired international 
system, but gave few specifics beyond international labour co-operation through the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), national and international trade union 
organisation, international minimum labour conditions, and international solidarity, 
with the British Labour Movement as principal mover. A minority voice expressed 
concern about ‘native labour’ and labour in ‘backward countries’ undermining 
Western workers’ wages and conditions unless minimum labour conditions 
legislation was in place.180  The TUC called a World trade union Conference in 
1945. Representatives from forty-two countries attended, but the AFL refused due 
to Russian involvement. The AEU Journal countered by stressing the need for 
uniting all trade union bodies ‘irrespective of race or creed, or of political, religious 
or of philosophical distinction’;181 ‘strength through unity’.  
 
Attitudes to Germany 
The NUGMW Journal, evidenced profound changes in attitudes towards Germans.  
Before the war, Chas Dukes’s blamed the Nazis for German attitudes and 
aggression, and blamed Versailles and its aftermath for creating the conditions that 
facilitated Hitler’s rise. By 1943 Dukes was condemning not merely Germany’s 
leaders, but also the German Labour and Socialist Movement leaders and people, 
whilst only reluctantly conceding that some minorities opposed Nazism.  He further 
posited that ‘a few evil-minded men’ could not seize power against the German 
people’s will, alleging that ‘Nations must at least be pre-disposed to a certain line of 
thought before the cleverest propagandist can hope to succeed in moulding the will 
of the people’.182  Moreover, he suggested, had such conditions occurred in Britain, 
British labour leaders (like him) would have organised effective opposition including 
general strikes.183 (Although doubtless the readership were cognisant of Dukes, the 
NUGMW’s, and the LP’s pre-war vehement opposition to a United Front against 
fascism, akin to the German Social Democrats and communists mutual 
antagonism).  
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The war-time vehement anti-German sentiment of the NUGMW Journal included all 
aspects of international trade unionism: ‘It is not that the ideal is wrong, but … it 
ignored the influences of race, which are deeper than association between peoples 
of different nationalities.’184 The NUGMW Journal supported the ‘Fight for Freedom 
Group’,185 warning that the alternative was a rearmed Germany.  Dukes, expressing 
the NUGMW official line, moved a resolution at the 1943 TUC to this effect,186 and 
at the Labour Party Conference, he accused those with contrary views, of being 
‘ultra-pacifists’, who ‘have become so infected with the germ of ‘anti-Vansittartism’ 
as to blind themselves to the realities of the present situation.’187 He also claimed 
they were the same people who opposed sanctions against German and Italian 
aggression before the war.188  Similarly, the NUGMW Journal posited that:  
We must re-educate the Blonde Beast, the arrogant Nazi; … The middle-
aged German may be ready to accept the teaching willingly; they, at least for 
a short time knew the beauty of democracy, but the youth of Germany know 
nothing of the finer concepts of life, they may be completely unteachable.189 
The NUGMW Journal published no anti-Vansittartian articles.  Their position was 
logically inconsistent with their utter condemnation of the imposition of a victors' 
peace at Versailles which, whilst embodying reparations, was in many respects, 
less draconian than the Vansittartian vision now proposed.  Nonetheless, it was in 
keeping with the NUGMW’s hierarchy’s top down, somewhat paternalistic approach 
to their membership (in practice if not in theory). The abnormal context of two world 
wars, both attributed to the same nation within the authors’ lifetime, and a genuine 
fear of its repetition, precipitated the subordination of the core values of socialism, 
trade unionism, and international fraternity, to nationalist concerns that were 
expressed through the perimeter concepts of Vansittartian inspired foreign policy.  
Such recommendations were then disseminated, illustrating the malleability of 
political cultures and ideology generally, and the common-sense understandings 
they embodied.   
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The AEU took a contrary stance, desiring ‘a peace void of the seeds of future 
wars’,190 and consistently regarded Versailles itself as a gift to German 
reactionaries, ‘the work of generals and diplomats hostile to workers control.’191 The 
ideological differences between the AEU and NUGMW Journals were underlined by 
the AEU’s condemnation of the ‘Fight for Freedom’ group.  They branded Lord 
Vansittart and his followers ‘ruling-class imperialists’192  who favoured Versailles 
type policies, which privileged generals over workers.193 They suggested that British 
socialists should expose and censure ‘the Vansittarrtite character and associations 
of some of its own prominent executive members’ (like the NUGMW’s Chas Dukes), 
rather than obsessing about the CP194 (thus associating Vansittartism with anti-CP 
fanatics).  The AEU contributors underlined the common-sense nature of their 
argument, reminding readers that the 1943 Trades Union Congress attributed war 
blame to the Nazi Party, not the German people. Tanner asked, how then can the 
1944 Congress condemn them,195 and whether they intended to ‘include those 
being freed from concentration camps or those who fought fascism’ amongst those 
that must pay.  Furthermore, the AEU Journal asserted, ‘punishing German people 
just because they are German … is as undemocratic and unreasonable as 
Nazism’,196 which they reinforced by citing Edmund Burke’s comment on the 
American fight for independence: ‘one could not indict a nation’.197 
R. M. Fox (AEU) stressed universal brotherhood and shared humanity amongst 
ordinary people, citing the example of the popularity of the sentimental song ‘Lilli 
Marlene’ amongst both Allied and Axis armies.198  The AEU contributors declared 
that Nazi atrocities exposed in Belsen and Buchenwald’s liberation did not shock 
them, as the Nazis ‘perpetrated the same long before the war against Trade 
Unionists, Socialists and Communists, and our admirers of Hitler secretly 
approved.’199 Nonetheless, they deemed General Eisenhower’s decision to invite 
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ten British MPs to bear witness ‘a master stroke’, rendering the atrocities 
undeniable, thereby helping to insure against its repetition.200 
The NP took a similar stance to the AEU, and lamented that some, like Herbert 
Morrison, identified the whole German people with Hitler, and contrasted this with 
Stalin, who considered the German people allies.201  Thus they propagated the idea 
that international fraternity was a core value for Stalin, and that he empathised with 
the ordinary worker’s plight, unlike many Western politicians, and even some in the 
Labour Party and the TU movement.   
 
Hopes for the Post-War World 
 
From 1940 onwards the AEU Journal had called on the Government to publish its 
‘war aims’, and presented post-war planning as a priority to avert powerful 
influences ‘who refuse to see that the genesis of Nazidom and the prevailing world 
conflict emanated from the basic economic conditions which they are endeavouring 
to re-establish post-war’.202  When Randolph Churchill posited that it was sufficient 
at present to ‘fight for victory and the preservation of what is good in the present 
system’, Suthers retorted: ‘Unfortunately, what is good in the present system failed 
to prevent this war and could not prevent another’.203  
The journals portrayed a broadly shared vision of the hoped for post-war new order, 
with public ownership and policies premised on workers and society being the 
beneficiaries of labour, not just the capitalist classes. Such policies were seen as 
legitimate and morally desirable, the practical answers to the inefficiencies, 
inequalities, and conflicts of the pre-war capitalist system that led to depressions, 
hardships and wars. The wartime experience of planning, full employment, and co-
operation in a common cause, enabled journal contributors to offer tangible lived 
examples of how the pre-war system could be bettered.  Thus, contributors 
challenged received understandings regarding traditional social, political, and 
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economic arrangements; this now had far greater resonance than it would have 
done pre-war, and provided an opportunity to raise readers’ political and class 
consciousness, persuading them to become part of the social transformation (in line 
with the unions’ ideological agenda), rather than merely reflecting upon issues and 
events. 
The Beveridge Report (1942) fed into this discourse.  It was generally welcomed in 
the union journals, despite its goal of ameliorating need, not establishing a new 
socialist order.  The ‘freedom from want’ it embodied, was universally supported, 
although it was not considered an end in itself; it was not socialism.204  The 
retention of voluntary hospitals and doctors’ freedom to attend private patients 
would, it was predicted, preserve the old class distinctions.205  An equal right to life 
and health, unavailable under prevailing health care arrangements, was considered 
fundamental, a necessary component of the post-war ‘new world’; the only fair 
system, it was asserted, was a unified system.206   
Moreover, the AEU stressed Beveridge’s underlying establishment attitude that: ‘It 
is dangerous to allow benefits during unemployment to equal or exceed earnings 
during work’,207 and the NUGMW highlighted the employers’ organisations’ attitude 
that: 
It is imperative that the expenditure on social services must be directly 
related to the industrial performance of the country …. And that benefits they 
provide … should not be such as to weaken the incentive of the 
population.208  
Publishing such statements served to reinforce the perceived ‘blame the victims’ 
attitudes of the capitalist class, and thus prick readers’ class consciousness; the 
journal contributors considered that the politico-economic systems, not individuals, 
were responsible for unemployment.  Besides which, the journals all considered a 
Government dominated by ‘reactionary Tories’ was unlikely to implement 
Beveridge, as their position depended on ‘class privilege’ being maintained 
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(although paradoxically their electoral success depended on the working class 
vote).  
Regardless of the safety net that Beveridge promised, the journals deemed it 
intolerable that full-employment was normal in wartime when directed at destruction, 
but not in peacetime, when production was directed to satisfy the population’s 
needs.  The generalised journal conclusion was that unemployment could not be 
obviated by tinkering with capitalism, but required socialist policies,209 including a 
minimum living wage as: ‘Freedom below the minimum requirements of life is a 
fallacy’.210  The AEU and NUGMW Journal contributors promoted their conception 
of a ‘better world’, through rhetoric, ideological, and ethical arguments reinforced by 
authoritative sources, like Archbishop Dr Temple’s plea for a fairer society, 211 or the 
five Churches of Britain and the Pope, who posited that earth’s resources belonged 
to all equally as a ‘gift from god’ (interpreted by the AEU as effectively a call for 
world Socialism).212  They also published articles on specific policy objectives, and 
on socialism, framed to appeal to a wide audience.213 Evolutionary not revolutionary 
changes were advocated, with a planned political and economic order to ensure full 
employment, not the unrestricted privatisation of profits, whilst the state assumed 
their business’s social liability. ‘lf … the State is to accept the responsibility, it must 
also claim the right of determining the limits within which industry shall function’.214  
Such changes were necessary, NUGMW postulated, to obviate the previously 
commonplace hunger and malnutrition,215 and a society structured so 7% of 
Britain’s population owned 80% of the wealth: effectively ‘stolen property’ (echoed in 
the other journals).216  
Quotations from fiction and film were included to give a greater tonal depth to their 
rhetoric, for instance, Charlie Chaplin (‘The Great Dictator’): 
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The way of life can be free and beautiful, but we have lost the way. Greed 
has poisoned men’s souls; has barricaded the world with hate; has goose-
stepped us into misery and bloodshed . . . Machinery that gives abundance 
has left us in want. Our knowledge has made us cynical; our cleverness hard 
and unkind.  The hate of men will pass and dictators die, and the power they 
took from the people will return to the people; and so long as men die liberty 
will never perish.217  
The message was clear; the very structure of society must change. Social planning 
and community welfare were considered the remit of the political side of the Labour 
Movement, which was continuously, implicitly and explicitly, promoted. 
Amid the majority narrative of making socialism a lived reality, a minority advocated 
a cautious trade union based approach: 
[T]o avoid losing the peace we must become a united whole. There is no 
time to experiment or to create new machinery. …The most suitable from 
every angle is the industrial movement.  …The acid test for any idea, any 
projected policy must be …., will it in any way injure our unity? If there is any 
danger, any doubt, the idea, however attractive or promising, must be 
rejected218 
 The journals dominant mantra had been ‘No going back’ since 1941, and as the 
war progressed they increasingly stressed that the essential role they and their 
members played in winning the war entitled them to be involved in planning the 
peace.219 However, the AEU Journal informed it readers that the capitalists and the 
Tories disparagingly disagreed: The Daily Telegraph (21st March 1945) was cited: 
‘Trade unionists have done no more than fight for their own skins in this war, and 
deserve no special recognition or testimonial for good behaviour’.220  Citing such 
comments would have enabled journal contributors to raise and reinforce class 
consciousness, and ideas and resentments about ‘them’ as opposed to ‘us’.  
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The Clerk journal challenged the idea that workers had merely ‘earned the right’ to 
be involved in peacetime planning through their involvement in the war, instead 
positing that:  
… the title of the workers to social and political justice rests now, as it always 
has rested, on the simple fact that it is they who create the wealth by which 
the community lives. This should be the foundation for Reconstruction from 
the Trade Union point of view.221  
Thus, the author sought to rally readers to demand what should be theirs by right, 
not ask to be rewarded for being good citizens.   
The journals published critiques of National Policy for Industry (1942), published on 
behalf of 120 industrialists (with over 600 directorships) which advocated a profit 
motivated corporatist approach to industry with state capitalist tendencies, which 
excluded any worker’s voice in the control of industry.  The AEU expressed concern 
over its motivation, its anti-nationalisation, and pro-private enterprise stance, 
although they appreciated their acknowledgment of the social obligations of 
industry.222 The NP interpreted A National Policy for Industry as a manifesto to 
ensure to ‘a tiny minority … the right to exploit the great majority’. Britain’s main 
monopolies were to be the beneficiaries: steel, alloys, chemicals, electrical 
engineering, sewing, cotton, flour, and patent medicines.  Their report conceded 
that unemployment was inevitable under capitalism, but sought to maintain and 
promote the system.  Thus, the NP contributors condemned it, highlighting to their 
readers the incompatibility between unemployment and the social necessity of 
decent living standards.223 They sought to show the widespread public support for a 
socialist inspired economic future, citing a 1944 Gallup Poll which found 68% of 
people wanted post-war State control of industry, with only 14 % favouring control 
by private business.224 The NP asserted that if key industries and services were 
publicly owned in the interests of the people, then full employment, a guaranteed 
40-hours week, and decent homes for fair rents, was achievable.225  In this respect, 
there was much commonality between the NP and the other journals regarding their 
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declared hopes for post-war economic structures; their underlying aspiration for a 
communist Britain was implicit within the policies for industry free from capitalism 
and the pursuit of the general good, rather than being overtly articulated. 
Nationalisation / socialisation of all key industries and the Bank of England was 
central to unions’ post-war aspirations and unanimously advocated across the 
journals, only the range and form differed.  The Electrical Trades Journal declared 
that the electricity industry illustrated the benefits of public ownership, as the two-
thirds of all electricity undertakings which were under local government control, 
consistently provided electricity cheaper than those under private ownership.226 The 
AEU supported Professor Hogben’s recommendation for the inclusion of science, 
with scientists employed by Government to benefit the whole community, not private 
enterprise where innovation is employed competitively for profit maximisation.227  
For the vast majority of contributors, nationalisation / socialisation was an 
ideological goal bound up with their core values, although for a small minority it was 
merely the pragmatic means to optimise production in societal and the national 
interests.  There was a general consensus that it would improve productivity, 
expedite effective planning, end unemployment and boom and bust, and facilitate 
equality and fairness in society. 
The AEU Journal ran a series of articles by other unions that articulated their post-
war objectives.  Amongst the unions involved were: The National Union of Boot and 
Shoe Operatives’;228 The Electricity Supply Industry;229 The Furnishing Trades;230 
Post Office Workers;231 The Building Trades;232 Printing and Kindred Trades’ 
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Federation;233 The Footplate Men;234 and Iron and Steel.235  Their visions although 
different, had much commonality: full employment; industrial security with decent 
regular wages and conditions; worker participation in management; profits allocation 
/restriction; extended JPCs; waste reduction; and decent pensions and social 
security.   Co-operation between the unions, Government, and employers, along 
with the importance of planning (including National Industrial Planning Boards), and 
education and training (including training for management) were covered. However, 
there were different visions, emphases, and levels of detail.  For instance, the Iron 
and Steel Workers prioritised nationalisation/ socialisation in the shape of a public 
corporation run for the state’s benefit (details to be worked out in the transition 
period). 236  The Union of Post Office Workers’ plans were heavily influenced by 
Guild Socialism, and involved the transformation of the Post Office’s 
bureaucratically administered State monopoly under Ministerial control, into a public 
corporation with workers’ control.  Moreover, speaking from experience, they 
cautioned other unions that nationalisation was insufficient, as it did not necessarily 
incorporate workers’ control. 237  Such articles, whether heavy on rhetoric and light 
on details, or the converse, reinforced the message of socialist restructuring to a 
readership accustomed to Government direction of production, and JPCs being 
employed to increase output. The various plans presented positive visions of how 
the world could be constructed differently, with an implicit appeal that readers lend 
support to their unions (and the LP’s) plans for a better world.   
For the NP, nationalisation was a long-term goal which they had continually 
advocated.  They recommended reading Labours case for public ownership and 
control, by Alex Massey.238 The NUGMW did not cover such issues at this time.  
The Clerk advocated worker control, but only engaged with the topic 
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occasionally.239 (Nationalisation, versus socialisation, versus workers control, was 
fully debated post-war, Chapter 4). 
It was envisaged that the transition from war to peace would be problematic, with 
demobilised forces predicted to create labour market influxes, and commodity 
market uncertainties.240  The capitalist class reportedly believed the war was 
effectively won by early 1943, and both the AEU and NP contributors stated that 
industry, particularly the aircraft industry, had become primarily concerned with 
positioning itself for post-war trading, rather than war production and victory.241 
Although it was unknown to the contributors, the December 1942 formation of the 
Brabazon Committee,242 at least partially substantiated their allegations.   
In this context, readers were reminded that WWI saw increased trade union 
membership, successful wage claims, and trade union and Labour Party 
protagonists being invited into the Councils of Government.  However, peace and 
subsequent depressions led to unemployment and poverty. Consequently, the 
retention of some war time controls was considered a necessary expedient.243  The 
NUGMW condemned as irresponsible anyone disregarding trade union officials’ 
policy against stoppages, typically denouncing them as politically motivated.  
Moreover, they warned that although they suffered less unofficial actions than other 
unions, they were still liable to be ‘tarred with the same brush’.  Thus, in-line with 
their incorporative, Mondist understandings, they utilised their journal to attempt to 
persuade members not to take action that might alienate public opinion,244 or 
undermine the responsibility, prestige, and position with Government, garnered in 
the war.245 
Late 1944 saw multiple lay-offs, redundancies, pleas to keep plants open, and calls 
for a planned transition from war to peace-time production. The AEU Journal 
maintained: ‘Our value is proved, and we claim the right to work and to administer 
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upon equal terms with anyone’,246 and drew an analogy between planning for 
society, and blueprints in engineering, to achieve a desired outcome.247 Questions 
were raised over the Shadow Factories no longer required for war work. The idea 
that private firms should be gifted State financed infrastructure (estimated at 
£675,000,000) caused resentments.248  Despite deputations to the Board of Trade 
reporting shortages of factory space, shadow factories were run down.   NP 
contributors attributed this to capitalists pursuing policies to enable their cheap 
acquisition of the assets (at the taxpayers’ expense). 249   
The optimisation of land use in the national interest was advocated, and the 
NUGMW supported the Uthwatt’s Committee recommendations of State acquisition 
of Development rights outside built up areas, as a step towards the ideal of land 
nationalisation.250  The capitalist classes lobbied hard against it. The AEU lamented 
that: 
… a couple of years ago even die-hard Tories were advocating far-reaching 
social and political changes. Unemployment and poverty, gross inequalities, 
ill-health, privilege, monopoly, profiteering, slums were all to go.251 
 For instance, in 1940 the AEU cited The Times which was advocating a post-war 
co-operative society, where ‘there is no room for mutual attempts at exploitation or 
for sharply differing levels of social and economic opportunity’.252  Now peace was 
in sight, such ideas were rejected.  The journal contributors took this as further 
evidence of the landed and capitalist classes’ untrustworthiness, and their disregard 
for workers’ efforts, sacrifices, and futures. Other contributors echoed the sentiment:  
… it is only in the atmosphere of sacrifice and co-operation created by a war 
… that social justice becomes a topic of burning interest; in times of peace 
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the wells of good nature in industrial and commercial leaders seem to wilt 
and dry up.253  
Thus, the need for action, not wishful thinking, was repeatedly stressed:  
The trade union movement is our strongest lever inside the industrial fabric, 
as the ballot box is our heaviest hammer outside. Let us make the fullest use 
of both and we shall not need to ‘wish’ ourselves better circumstances; we 
shall be able to insist upon them.254   
The journal contributors collectively deemed it insufficient to seek public support for 
their ideas; people needed to be educated, and inspired to political action to ensure 





The journal contributors’ ideological position on education remained unchanged; 
that the ruling class, through the state education system, moulded peoples’ 
frameworks of reference, common-sense understandings, perceptions, and 
paradigms, whilst obfuscating the realities of the social, political, and economic 
realms.   Education and union organisation, they believed, offered the potential to 
break ‘the unholy trinity of ignorance, indifference and traditional prejudice fostered 
and perpetuated by those in power’,255  by enlightening them to the conditions of 
their own exploitation, and the underlying organisation of society that perpetuated 
the system where they worked and the capitalists profited.   
Education in moral, social, political and economic spheres was also considered 
necessary to expose workers to the underlying causes of war and its purposes, 
including the concept of imperialism.  ‘Real’ education, it was argued, promoted 
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human progress, countered nationalist ideas and racial prejudice, and fostered 
world unity.256   
The war-time influx of new workers into industry created both a need and an 
opportunity for educating those without backgrounds in organised labour, to learn of 
the work and history of the trade union movement.257  The capitalist class 
understood the potential of education, and consequently opposed working class 
enlightenment, as informed workers would challenge the capitalist system. Instead, 
the journals posited, the ruling classes promoted commercialised entertainment to 
dull minds and engender apathy.258  The autodidactic tradition was promoted and 
encouraged, and recommended readings provided.  People had the power to 
change things for the better through political engagement and the democratic 
process, if only they had knowledge and understanding.259  Moreover, it was 
proposed that: 
… it is no longer necessary to challenge the validity of the old school tie 
philosophy; a year of war has revealed its emptiness.  …. if this war should 
mean anything to the working class it should mean the death of a pernicious 
educational theory which claimed for the public schools the top rung on the 
ladder of social achievement.260 
US Vice-President Wallace’s ideas around the ‘Century for the Common Man’ which 
encompassed worldwide education, were employed by the AEU.  However, they 
argued that this must include adults as well as children, as an understanding of the 
social, economic, industrial, and political spheres was necessary for one ‘to 
exercise … choice and veto, otherwise he is the slave to prejudice, blind unreason, 
persuasion and manipulation’.261 Indeed, by 1944, with peace in sight, the need for 
education to inform societal change, was perceived as increasingly urgent, as 
peace would see Britain as a debtor, not a creditor nation, and thus less able to: 
… carry, as in the past, a load of very expensive ornaments in our Society, 
i.e., an idle class at each end of the Social Scale.  …. One lesson of the last 
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five years must be learnt, the Nation that can create, equip and maintain 
itself in the face of a common danger in wartime can equally run its own 
business in peacetime.262 
This involved an imperative to: 
… rid the world of the evils that cling to the present economic system - 
monopolies, cartels and huge trusts which control supply and demand, to suit 
the whim and desire of a minority, and hold governments in bondage.263 
Otherwise, it was asserted, whilst ‘we may win the war, we shall lose the peace’. 
The NUGMW recommended reading Education for a New Society by Ernest Green 
(WEA General Secretary).264 
Scholarships continued throughout the war, sponsored principally by the unions, 
with some from the TUC and other organisations. The unions continued their 
backing for the WEA and the NCLC, and free courses were available to members, 
although wartime considerations meant more was done through correspondence 
courses.265  There were specific courses for those wanting to work within the union, 
as well as for the membership generally.  In addition to the established courses, 
new courses were developed with temporal relevance.266    
The education of children and youths was also a live issue.  This covered the range 
from academic to industrial and technical training.  All contributors shared a 
vehement opposition to any class basis for education.267 Nonetheless, whilst the 
1943 Education Bill’s class based foundations was criticised for not tackling vested 
interests, nor providing a date for the school leaving age to be raised to sixteen 
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years, its structural class biases were generally ignored, despite some protests.268  
The majority voice in the journals accorded with H. L. Bullock, who, writing in the 
NUGMW, welcomed it as ambitious, promising and progressive, ‘with the initial 
common school for all, and an equal opportunity for each child to develop all its 
latent faculties to the topmost capacity’,269 despite it falling short of the objective of 
the Council for Educational Advance.  Will Thorne employed an autobiographical 
account to highlight how the Act constituted, ‘a degree of advancement, undreamt 
of in my youth. I never went to school and consequently never learned to read and 
write’.270 
The expectation for the post-war age to be one were brains dominated brawn, 
resonated within the engineering industry. The Education Bill was welcome by the 
AEU, and was expected to promote scientific research. There was, however, some 
concern that it would lead to an oversupply of the technically trained who would look 
down on the engineering trades, although this could be overcome through co-




The journals all stressed the importance of the political, as it affected all spheres of 
life.  They disseminated the socialist message (of various strands) and sought to 
develop readers’ political consciences’ and working-class unity.  The imperative to 
translate political thinking into action was promoted, and readers were encouraged 
to join their local Labour Party.  Both the AEU and NUGMW sought to strengthen 
their relationships with their MPs, and their non-sponsored MP members,272 and 
they carried journal articles written by them.  All the journals stressed the preference 
for their MPs to have working-class and trade union roots, and thus experiences 
and understandings only indirectly available to those from other classes.273  
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The engineers lamented their limited Parliamentary voice (two MPs), whereas the 
miners had forty-two.274  AEU rules stipulated a ratio of 1: 15,000 sponsored 
candidates to members paying the Political Levy, and therefore periodically 
campaigned to increase the numbers paying (as did the other unions) to augment 
their potential voice in Parliament and on the various Government nominated 
boards.  Additionally, increased funding would enhance the competitiveness of the 
Labour Party.275  In 1941 only 80,000 of AEU’s 500,000 members were 
contributing.276  However, this increased throughout the war.277    
The NUGMW, AEU, NP, and Electrical Trades Journal, all campaigned stridently for 
a 1945 Labour Party election victory (in contrast to their sparse coverage of 
previous General Elections).  The Electrical Trades Journal stated that in order to 
ensure that the ‘Old Gang’ and their self-serving policies did not return, it was 
necessary to engage in an ideological war. 278 Tory policy failures were highlighted, 
from the ‘Geddes Axe’, the Trades Disputes Act 1927, to the return to the Gold 
Standard, mass unemployment, the Means Test, and the depression.  Tory 
empathy for fascists, and their inter-war foreign policy, their circumventing and 
disempowering the League of Nations and rejection of collective security, were all 
condemned. 279 Thus, all that was wrong in the inter-war period and all that caused 
WWII was laid at the Tories door, with the explicit message that the election of 
another Tory Government would mean a repetition of the policies that had brought 
hardship and disaster.  
A Labour Party electoral victory, on the other hand, was presented as ushering in a 
new post war world, where society was restructured to ensure workers, not merely 
capitalists, profited from their labour, and that the basic needs of the many were 
safeguarded.  Thus, it was considered that if a Labour Government was elected, the 
socialist vision they had long hoped for would be brought into being.  Nonetheless, 
the NUGMW and AEU journals were keen to point out that it was the ‘right sort of 
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socialism’ that was expected. Suthers (AEU) made clear voting for the Labour Party 
would help disempower the CPGB whilst facilitating the establishment of a Labour 
Socialist Government.  The prospect of socialist electoral victories in Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada, resulted in it being argued that, ‘combined with a socialist 
British Empire, would give Stalin the shake-up of his life.  If two of the Big Four had 
Socialist Governments … the world would be saved’,280 as socialism provided the 
means to achieve peace, and democratic socialism provided a real alternative to 
Bolshevism, as well as capitalism.  Moreover, the journals (including the NP) 
predicted that a Labour Government would ensure British influence was employed 
to further a peace agenda.281   
                                                          
280 R. B., Suthers, ‘The War to go on Indefinitely? p. 12.  
281 R. B., Suthers, ‘A Vote for Labour is a Vote for a Fine Future’, p. 172. 
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Chapter 4.  Optimism and Socialisms: Labour in Office 1945-1951 
 
The 1945-51 period encompassed successive domestic and international crises, 
some of which also impacted the ideas environment.  As ever, the domestic and 
international spheres intertwined, and the various themes within these spheres 
remained interpenetrative, as each informed the others. The economic legacy of the 
war would inevitably have caused Britain difficulties, but the decision of the US to 
end Lend-Lease three days after the defeat of Japan vastly exacerbated the 
problem.  Much of the loan agreement negotiated by Keynes involved trying to 
make sterling convertibility work (enforced 1947). Shortages of labour, raw 
materials and food held back production and consumption. Circumstances dictated 
that exports were prioritised, and austerity ruled in Britain.  In the international 
sphere, Soviet actions in Europe created tensions, and challenged the 
preconceptions of some; a situation subsequently exacerbated by events in Korea. 
Nonetheless, the 1945 general election results were greeted with jubilation and 
marked a watershed in the evolution of the labour movement.  The journal 
contributors considered that it represented the culmination of everything that had 
gone before in the political, economic, and industrial spheres, rather than merely a 
reaction to the war; the public had rejected capitalism, preferring ‘communal 
services; coal and power, land, banks, transport, etc. … run by the community for 
the people, and not for private profit’.1  Optimism abounded, strengthened by a ‘no 
going back’ determination, no repeat of the post WWI betrayal.  It was presented as 
a new beginning, a new order was to be constructed, a socialist state, with the 
unions as an estate of the realm and partners in government, forming part of a 
European move to the left.  Idealism and optimism usurped reality.  The AEU 
declared:  
Everywhere the progressive forces are surging forward. The mighty Socialist 
State has emerged as a great world power commanding universal respect 
and admiration. Along with our other great allies, the USA and the USSR, 
Britain is pledged to co-operate in planning and building world prosperity.2 
                                                          
1 H. L. Bullock, ‘Six Years After’, NUGMW Journal, (October, 1945), p. 298.  
2 ‘District Circular: Labour Party Victory’, AEU Journal, (August, 1945), pp. 228-9. 
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The unions considered that their continued progress would be inevitable.  They had 
progressed from uniting workers to defend and promote their interests in a hostile 
environment, to their critical role in the war-effort and acceptance into the state at 
multiple levels. Now, with their political wing in Government (including 120 MPs with 
trade union backgrounds), it was presumed that their structural power and voice 
would be augmented through participation on boards, commissions, and through 
consultations. Moreover, it was thought that the relative proximity of the labour 
movement’s protagonists to ordinary workers endowed them with an understanding 
of the workers’ plight, and consequently an enhanced ability to formulate policies to 
satisfy their needs.  
From the Government’s inception, the unions utilised their deontic power to remind 
readers of their responsibility to ensure the administration’s success. A new 
reciprocal relationship was deemed necessary,3  including a more positive and 
constructive approach to industry and changes to mind-sets within the unions.  As 
the trade union movement coalesced with the Government as a ‘loyal State partner’ 
in the country’s economic organisation, union leaders stressed the ‘universal good’, 
not just pursuit of the best pay deals for their members.4  Walter Citrine, George 
Isaacs, and Emanuel Shinwell, amongst others, promoted this message in the 
journals, warning that, ‘Socialist principles are literally on trial’.’5 Jack Tanner (AEU), 
posited that the new situation meant ‘unions have got to cultivate organisers instead 
of orators, and encourage administrators rather than agitators.’6 The alternative, the 
journals repeatedly stressed, was a return to the inter-war situation.   
Nonetheless, the economic conditions that the Labour Government inherited 
curtailed and pressurised policy choices and ambitions, bringing into tension the 
unions desire to support ‘their’ Labour Government, the unions’ socialist ideals 
(especially the AEU and NP), and their primary function to further their members’ 
interests.  The differing political cultures within the unions steered their differing 
responses to this situation.  Changes in the NUGMW hierarchy also affected the 
political culture the journal portrayed, as Tom Williamson’s succession as General 
                                                          
3 C. F. Slade, ‘Labour’s Task’, NUGMW Journal, (September, 1945), p. 374. 
4 F. G. Moxley, ‘Where do we Stand?’ AEU Journal, (February, 1950), p. 42. 
5 ‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (November, 1946), p. 321. 
6 D. F. Bellairs, ‘The New Unionism' AEU Journal, (May, 1951), p. 142. 
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Secretary (November 1946) precipitated a change in the journal’s tone, from 
general support for the Government, to uncritical support, with all debate quashed.   
 
  
Health and Social Policy 
 
The establishment of the welfare state and NHS were iconic features of the 1945 
Government.  The provision of health, social, and welfare services in pursuit of the 
ideal of human flourishing were fundamental to socialism and the labour movement 
and was welcomed by the unions, albeit with caveats regarding the details.  The 
Labour Party social security schemes including National Insurance, Family 
Allowances, National Health Service, National Assistance, and Industrial Injuries 
Acts, although directly relevant to union members and their families, were poorly 
covered by the AEU and NUGMW Journals, especially compared to topics like the 
Anglo-America loan and the Marshall Plan.  Similarly, the post-war housing crisis 
received little coverage.7 Notably, there was an absence of debate on the 
contributory nature of the social security schemes, which the AEU in particular, had 
challenged in the past.  
However, the structure of the NHS and the influence of various vested interest 
groups were discussed. The replacement of ‘the old vicious system’ of charity 
funded local hospitals was welcomed.8  The NUGMW Journal considered that 
opposition to the establishment of the NHS was based on objections to ‘the 
privileges so long in history cherished by the few’ being shared by all.9  In contrast, 
the AEU contributors blamed such objections on doctors’ interests clashing with the 
working classes’ needs. 10  They countered Tory accusations of mismanagement by 
the Labour Party Government, by highlighting the fact that Capitalist or voluntary 
hospitals administrative staff (who had opposed change) dominated the hospitals 
                                                          
7 Except for example: Anon., ‘Beneath Big Ben’, AEU Journal, (December, 1945), p. 362; Anon., 
‘New Spirit on 100%’, MW, (October, 1946), p. 4; Anon., ‘Take Over Luxury Flats say Shop 
Stewards’, MW, (October, 1946), p. 1. 
8 W. Brotherton, ‘Buy a Flag, Please!’ NUGMW Journal, (September, 1945), p. 235. 
9 Reg G. Cook, ‘Britain -The Welfare State’, NUGMW Journal, (September, 1949), p.274.  
10 A. W. Edney, ‘Doctors or State Medical Officers’, AEU Journal, (June, 1945), p. 173.  
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executive councils.11  Moreover, the Committees’ dislocation from local government 
and democratic procedures was also considered problematic.  The ‘Metal Worker’ 
(MW, the rebranded NP) and The Clerk concurred, and, whilst welcoming the NHS, 
they criticised Nye Bevan for continuing to facilitate inequality by permitting 
specialists to keep private nursing homes.  They instead recommended direct State 
employment of doctors.  They (and occasionally the AEU) praised the local authority 
public health department organisation, and regularly advocated the health services’ 
extension to include an Industrial Health Service (in-line with the Socialist Medical 




As war-work unwound, a hardening of patriarchal norms was evidenced in the 
journals.  Female job losses in industry and the Forces (July to December 1945), 
amounted to one million.13 Aggregate union membership fell, but the drop was 
highly gendered; by the end of 1945 male membership had fallen to some 
7,803,000 (down 223,000 on 1944), whilst female membership fell to some 
1,597,000 (down 214,000) in the same period.14   
The previous sentiment (amongst both genders), that female labour was a 
temporary, reversible war-time expedient, was challenged by women who 
considered that their war work warranted their place in industry as equals.  
Incidents, such as the Metal Mechanics’ Union’s resolution (defeated) advocating 
married women’s exclusion from their industry, 15  were indicative of male fears and 
discontent. The NUGMW’ regular women’s column continued, but gender 
antagonisms provoked Miss D.M. Elliot (NUGMW’s Chief Women’s Officer) to 
appeal to trade unionists not to exacerbate the situation through ‘fear or by 
prejudice’ and reminded readers that some 6 million women were employed pre-
                                                          
11 J. McHale, ‘Opponents in Your Health Service’, AEU Journal, (July, 1949), p. 204; J. McHale, ‘The 
Dead-Hand in Health Services’, AEU Journal, (May, 1950), p. 143. 
12 For instance: Anon., ‘Build Industrial Health Service on a Democratic Basis, says Industrial 
Doctor’, MW, (December, 1947), p. 6; Anon., ‘Industrial Medicine in the Future’, MW, (July, 1947), p. 
7; J. McHale, ‘A National Health Service or Industry’, AEU Journal, (November, 1951), p. 326.  
13 Dorothy Coulthard, ‘I Lose £4 a Week on Women’s Rate’, NP, (February, 1946), p. 6. 
14 Anon., ‘7,803,000 in Unions’, NUGMW Journal, (June, 1947), p. 176. 




war, only rising to some 7.75 million at peak mobilisation.16  Nonetheless, some 
NUGMW male officials complained that the new light industries employed mainly 
women; they felt male employment was required, and cited a local radio journalist: 
‘There is no tradition here of women working while men are idle. It causes domestic 
unhappiness … which must be taken into serious account by planners.’17  Such 
views reflected those common in wider society at the time.  For instance, at the 
Labour Women’s Annual Conference (1948), it was stressed that the Government 
believed mothers belonged at home when their children were young.18   
The journals all presented gendered wage differentials as a problem for all, not just 
women.  The unions, through the TUC, presented evidence to the Royal 
Commission on Equal Pay.19  A Majority Report (signed by 5 men and one woman) 
expressed major reservations, but conceded that equal-pay for equal work was 
feasible in the Civil Service, the Post Office, Teaching, and Local Government. The 
Minority Report (signed by 3 women) favoured equal-pay.20  The MW considered 
the Majority Report’s conclusions to be class based:  
… reactionary and unscientific … Whose … concern is not to meddle with 
the employers’ sacred rights to draw the greatest volume of profits from the 
exploitation of women as cheap labour.21   
The fact that men had reoccupied women’s wartime activities only reinforced the 
‘rate for the job’ argument.22  The MW supported women in industrial disputes,23 
and recommended reader action to attain equal pay for equal work through lobbying 
MPs and submitting multiple resolutions.  The MW reported that women on men’s 
wage rates were being sacked, and then attempts were made to re-recruit them on 
the women’s rate (58s/wk.).24 The AEU National Committee (1945) adopted a 
                                                          
16 Anon., ‘Women in Industry’, NUGMW Journal, (June, 1945), pp. 206-208.  
17 J. Yarwood, ‘Northern District Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (November, 1946), pp. 382-3; Also see: J. 
Yarwood, ‘Northern Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (October, 1946), p. 351. 
18 A. J. Caddick, ‘Labour Women’s Annual Conference’, AEU Journal, (November, 1948), p. 328. 
19 D. M. Elliot,’ Women’s Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (September, 1945), pp. 284-5. 
20 ‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (December, 1946), pp. 353-4. 
21 D. Coulthard, ‘Equal pay – the Government Must Act’, MW, (December, 1946), p. 6. 
22 W. J. Smith, ‘The Nemesis of Confusion’, AEU Journal, (July, 1947), p. 208; A. J. Caddick, 
‘Conference of Unions Catering for Women Workers’, AEU Journal, (July, 1946), p. 197; M. 
Macdonald et al, ‘The [17th] Annual Conference of Representatives of Unions Catering for Women 
Workers’, AEU Journal, (August, 1947), p. 233. 
23  For instance, The High Profile, 1946 Pay Dispute at Cossors.  Anon., ‘Cossors Put Women on the 
Front Page’, MW, (April, 1946), p. 1.   
24 D. Coulthard, ‘I Lose £4 a Week on Women’s Rate’, MW, (February 1946), p. 6.  Also see Anon., 
‘If They Want us to Stay in Industry They Have to Pay us a Living Wage’, MW, (May, 1946), p. 6. 
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resolution (40:11) that skilled trade-apprenticeships should be open to women.25 
Nonetheless, the tone of their journal content remained androcentric, despite 
superficial calls for equal pay on grounds of fairness. 
Later, at the time of the Korean war rearmament drive, the NUGMW effectively 
acted as a Government agent in promoting female recruitment. They introduced 
additional articles written by and aimed at women; these varied from breaking 
monotony, to incentivising women, to utilising fiction to reassure women nervous of 
entering industry,26 and even criticizing women for quitting their jobs ‘on … flimsiest 
provocations’ in a time of national crisis.  27Greater women’s involvement in the 
unions was the suggested solution.28   
The NUGMW Journal blamed unorganised women for poor female pay and 
conditions. Union attitudes to all non-unionists continued unchanged post-war, but 
considering that most workers were ‘nons’ (thereby reducing the unions’ potential 
effectiveness), sophisticated analysis of the problem was conspicuously absent. 
Only the NUGMW gave the issue a high profile (although the other journals raised 
the topic).  The NUGMW principally tackled the issue through cartoons in the inter-
war period, then ad-hoc articles including fiction, and from (January 1948 onwards), 
a new column, ‘A Question? by ‘A Candid Observer’,29 was published, which 
consisted of opinion pieces about the ‘nons’ from multiple angles.  However, the 
message was constant: ‘nons’ were morally or intellectually defective.  Thus, the 
journal not only propagated the advantages of union membership, but attempted to 
employ workplace social pressures to shame ‘nons’ into joining. 
 
Industrial Production and Planning 
 
The transition from the war-time capitalist economy, to the (anticipated) socialist 
economy, was expected to take time.  The journals sought to manage expectations 
with multiple calls not to expect too much too soon.30  The NUGMW Journal 
                                                          
25 Anon., ‘AEU Women Apprentices’, NP, (August, 1945), p. 4. 
26 Helen Sloane, ‘She Works in a Factory’, NUGMW Journal, (May, 1950), pp. 138-40. 
27 H. Sloane, ‘She Wants a Change’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1950), p. 70.  
28 H. Sloane, ‘Women in Factories Dislike Monotony’, NUGMW Journal, (April, 1950), p. 104; H. 
Sloane, ‘She Wants a Change’, p. 70.  
29 A Candid Observer’, ‘A Question?’ NUGMW Journal, (January, 1948), pp. 10-11.   
30 For instance: F. Pallister, ‘Loyalty is Required’, NUGMW Journal, (September, 1945), p. 277. 
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continued their long-standing refrain against left-wingers, stressing that the labour 
movement had to prove that they were ‘realists as well as idealists’’31 and co-
operate with the Government to create the economic foundations for a better life. 
Pragmatism replaced wartime conjecture about a socialist post-war order and the 
euphoria of the General Election victory.   
Economic security for all was considered foundational for the ‘new post-war order’.  
This necessitated full employment and increased production, which, the journals 
judged, necessitated planning.  The essential industries could then be prioritised,32 
rather than production decisions being left to the inefficiencies and caprice of 
orthodox economics and market solutions.  Encouraged by the Labour 
Government’s pledge to support voluntarism and free collective bargaining, the 
unions advocated tripartite working33 and promised to endeavour to increase 
production. Planning, the journals agreed, would increase efficiency, and provide a 
moral basis for the economy, replacing individualism with social solidarity and 
production for need, and thus was presented as the common-sense solution for 
peace-time.  It would enable the expedient use of scarce resources, the 
identification of future training needs, and capital to be directed to socially useful 
outcomes, whilst ensuring income levels were both adequate and maintained; it was 
also a necessary condition for facilitating the financing of an expansion of social 
services.34  Planning, it was asserted, would also facilitate the formulation of foreign 
trade agreements that would optimise the security of domestic industry.  For some, 
especially within the AEU, planning was also requisite for industrial democracy and 
worker control, which itself remained a goal, and formed part of their understanding 
that democracy remained only partial if confined to the political sphere and denied 
in the sphere of work.  Nonetheless, authors sought to draw a distinction between 
socialist and fascist planning by stressing that planning is only advantageous if its 
social purpose is beneficial, and its operation benign (and thus distinct from fascist 
dictatorial planning).   
                                                          
31 C. Dukes, ‘The Central Hall and What it Portends’, NUGMW Journal, (April, 1946), pp. 120-121. 
32 J. Yarwood, ‘Northern Note’s, NUGMW Journal, (January, 1946), pp. 27-28; H. N. Harrison and J. 
Matthews, ‘Engineering Industry’, NUGMW Journal, (May, 1947), p. 144.  
33 E.g. Editor’s Notes ‘Facing Up to Industry’s Problems’, AEU Journal, (March, 1946), p. 65; ‘Editor’s 
Notes’, AEU Journal, (April, 1946), p. 97. 
34 R. Bamber, ‘Functions of the Trade Union Movement in the Post-War World’, AEU Journal, 
(September, 1945), p. 272. 
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The war-time consultative machinery, from factory level JPCs, through Advisory 
Committees associated with Ministry of Production District Committees, Regional 
Boards, and Government officers, was considered by the journal contributors as a 
suitable basis for peace-time consultative working.35 The AEU Journal contributors 
advocated making JPCs obligatory in all factories (over a certain size), and along 
with the NP/MW recommended the official recognition of shop stewards.  
Additionally, the AEU and NP/MW advocated Government control over direct 
investment to ensure that planning was implemented and production optimised.36 
The initial switch from war-time to peace-time production caused multiple lay-offs as 
factories closed or switched to non-war production.  Nonetheless, outside the 
Development Areas, labour shortages soon emerged, prompting the AEU and MW 
to question keeping nearly 5 million in non-productive sectors, such as the armed 
forces and auxiliary service, Government employment, service trades, and 
entertainment industries.  The military’s financial cost was highlighted and 
condemned by the AEU and MW (in line with left-wing labour and communist 
opinion).37 Importantly for the MW, reductions to the military would also help free 
Britain from the US: ‘[C]utting the swollen armed forces … in the Middle East 
guarding oil pipelines for Wall Street’, 38 would contribute to a more socialist (pro-
Soviet) foreign policy.  The NUGMW, occasionally complained about the size of the 
forces policing occupied countries’,39 but once Tom Williamson became General 
Secretary, all such criticism was omitted from their journal. 
Britain’s economic situation meant Government policy aspirations were subjected to 
context driven expediencies; export production was given precedence over home 
consumption, and the expected rise in living standards was deferred. Improved 
technology and modern capital equipment were deemed essential to close the 
productivity gap with the US.40  Inquiries were initiated into organisation, production, 
and distribution methods and processes, and the utilisation of scientists, engineers, 
                                                          
35 For Instance, L. Stubbs, ‘Experiment or Expedient’, AEU Journal, (March, 1946), p. 81. 
36 Sidney Hall, ‘Why we Lose our Export Trade', AEU Journal, (March, 1946), p. 82.  
37 Anon., ‘1,510,000 in forces, Whilst Industry Needs 750,000’, MW, (February, 1947), p. 1. Also see: 
Anon., ‘Tory Pressure’, MW, (November, 1949), p. 4; ‘Abstract Report of Council’s Proceedings’, 
AEU Journal, (August, 1946), p. 229. 
38 Anon., ‘Output Problems’, MW, (February, 1947), p. 4. 
39 H. L. Bullock, ‘An Urgent Problem’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1946), p. 83; T. Williamson, ‘Can 
Industry Afford Compulsory Military Service?’, NUGMW Journal, (May, 1947), pp. 152-3. 
40 A. E. Scarr, ‘Slog Harder or Work More Effectively?’, AEU Journal, (May, 1947), p. 143. 
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and economists, was recommended and encouraged.41  This approach resonated 
with those who considered that expert knowledge (especially scientific knowledge) 
was apolitical and untainted by interests. The unions arranged information gathering 
delegations abroad.42  The Government established the Anglo-American Advisory 
Council to enable the interchange of ideas on such issues,43  which provoked mixed 
feelings.  The NUGMW Journal contributors were enthusiasts; the AEU’s had no 
objections in principle, but expressed concerns about the insidious influence of US 
ideological dogma.44 The MW was overtly hostile, considering the Councils to be 
conduits for US Big Business influence in British industry as a cost condition of 
Marshall Plan Aid.45 Improved technology was not objected to per-se, but as R. A. 
Etheridge (Austin convener) stated that, ‘what we do object to is the workers … 
operating new machinery at … less wages than previously despite increased 
production’.46  Moreover, they exposed the criminal conviction of P. D. Reed 
(Chairman, US Section of the Productivity Council, and General Electric Co., 
America) for conspiracy with Nazi arms-supplier Krupp over monopoly price fixing.47  
The combination of Nazi connections and the exploitation of the war situation, 
clearly signalled to readers the politics and character of the Committees American 
members.48   
The third session of the Anglo-American Council concluded that: ‘basic to all else is 
the attitude of mind ... ‘productivity consciousness’ is … a long step towards high 
productivity.’49 This accorded with the views expressed through the NUGMW 
Journal, and G. D. H. Cole’s belief that: 
                                                          
41 ‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (November, 1945), p. 231.  
42 For instance, an AEU delegation visited the US as guests of the United Automobile Workers of 
America to examine their Engineering Industry; Anon., ‘The AEU Delegation to the USA’, AEU 
Journal, (March, 1949), p. 74.  
43 ‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (September, 1949), pp. 257-8; ‘Editor’s Notes’ AEU Journal, 
(February, 1949), p. 33. 
44 Editor’s Notes: Hitting the Targets’, AEU Journal, (August, 1948), pp. 255-6.  
45 Anon., ‘Bedeaux System in British Factories’, MW, (August, 1948), p. 1. 
46 Anon., ‘Shop Stewards Refute Attacks by Austins’, MW, (June, 1949), p. 1. 
47 Anon., ‘General Electric and Krupps’, MW, (December, 1948), p. 6.  
48 See, for instance: Anon., ‘Foundry Workers Attacked in Anglo-US. Report’, MW, (October, 1950), 
p. 2.  Also see, for instance: Editor, ‘Engineers case. Pt.2’, MW, (June, 1948), p. 4. 
49 T. Williamson, ‘The Problem of Production’, NUGMW Journal, (December, 1950), p. 368. 
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… key individuals set the tone of the workshops …with an attitude of hostility 
to capitalism or … belief that efficiency of production was the employer’s 
affair … they had better avoid taking any share in the responsibility for it.50   
The new era of Labour Government, NUGMW argued, necessitated joint working, 
JPCs, and a tolerant atmosphere; they even promoted the hated ‘time and motion 
studies’ (as did the TUC)51.  In justifying their changed stance they stressed that 
their traditional objection to scientific management was that, previously it was 
designed to exploit workers, whereas now it offered ‘direct benefit to the workers … 
facilitating … minimum expenditure of time, labour and energy’.52 The NUGMW 
even questioned union and the shop steward functions under a Labour 
administration, and whether this should include discipline (hitherto management’s 
responsibility), as indolent workers negatively impacted community interests, the 
Labour movement, and Government.53 The NUGMW utilised various devices, like 
outside authoritative sources, to reinforce their message54 (subsuming their 
socialism and trade unionism to promote Labour Government prescriptions).  For 
instance, the NUGMW quoted the report of ‘An American visitor’ that the British see:  
… all work … as hardship, all pressure for higher output as ‘slave-driving’, 
and insistence on good quality work as intolerable exploitation’, adding that ‘if 
you need more dollars from American workers, get busy proving … you can 
afford your five-day week, your easy attitude towards shirkers, your solicitude 
for the thriftless, and your out-of-date industrial ideas.55   
Whilst the NUGMW used such reports to control worker dissent; had such articles 
appeared in the AEU or MW they would have been employed to illustrate the 
pernicious US’s attempts to enforce its capitalists’ will and their ideology on British 
workers.  The NUGMW presented these reports as a warning, and also cited the 
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America who 
posited that US big business, through its capitalist press, was attacking American 
social welfare by linking Britain’s dollar crisis with the Labour Government’s 
                                                          
50 H. E. Matthews, ‘Industrial Relations: The Purpose of Joint Production Committees’, NUGMW 
Journal, (October, 1950), p. 292. 
51 D. A. Hopkin, ‘Time-and-Motion Study’, NUGMW Journal, (March, 1949), pp. 72-3. 
52 William E. Hopkin, ‘Chairman’s Address, Scarborough Congress’, NUGMW Journal, (July, 1949), 
pp. 194-9.  
53 W. N. Mosley, ‘It all Depends on You’, NUGMW Journal, (April, 1946), p. 112. 
54 J. Yarwood, ‘Northern Notes’, NUGMW Journal, (July, 1951), pp. 212-3. 
55 J. Yarwood, ‘Through American Eyes’, NUGMW Journal, (September, 1949), p. 268. 
191 
 
‘reckless Socialist experimentation’ which ‘squandered the heritage of centuries of 
capital accumulation in four extravagant years of ‘Welfare Statism’.  Thus, the 
NUGMW, through its journal sought to pressure workers into modifying their 
demands and behaviour by linking their success in rectifying the British economic 
situation to both British and international working class socialist ambitions.56 This 
illustrates the profound impact of context on political culture as articulated through 
journal content and union policy prescriptions. 
The AEU disseminated the idea that structural impediments undermined 
Government pressure and propaganda in stimulating production, as stockholders, 
not workers, remained the primary beneficiaries of the workers’ labour.  The MW 
concurred: ‘We cannot be expected to increase production merely to increase 
employers’ profits’, and they asked the Government to legislate for a five-day, 40-
hour week, and protection for Shop Stewards from victimisation by reactionary 
employers.57  They advocated Advisory Councils to facilitate Ministerial consultation 
with employers and workers on engineering matters.58  The MW supported David 
Kirkwood and his fellow MPs’ call for a National Planning Commission59, and 
advocated the ‘genuine participation by the workers in planning from the top, e.g., 
through the Engineering Advisory Board-right down to factory floor’.60 
Similarly, the AEU blamed the failure of profit-sharing and similar schemes to raise 
productivity on the structures of capitalism and instead they advocated limiting 
returns on capital and the distribution of surpluses as dividends on wages.61  The 
journals all cited foreign worker participation and consultation schemes as workable 
systems, each journal selecting examples that accorded with their ideological 
position.  The MW detailed operations in Russia and Eastern Europe, and the 
French legislation (February, 1945) which augmented Joint Works Committees 
powers,62  and their 1946 extension which included consultation on organisation 
and management, and access to all information available to shareholders including 
                                                          
56 Anon., ‘We Stand with British Labour’, NUGMW Journal, (January, 1950), p. 18. 
57 Anon., ‘Jimmie Hamilton Tells Attlee How to get Increased Production’, MW, (November, 1946), p. 
5. 
58 Anon., ‘Wilmot to set up Advisory Councils for Engineering’, MW, (January, 1947), p. 1. 
59 Anon., ‘MPs Want Plan’, MW, (February, 1947), p. 1.  
60 Anon., ‘Output Problems’, MW, (February, 1947), p. 4.  
61  Such as Vauxhall Motors, where 6% is paid to capital, plus 90% of additional profits; workers 
received the small residue; Paul Derrick, ‘Incentives in Industry’, AEU Journal, (November, 1946), p. 
327; also, see: P. Derrick, ‘Why not Mutualise Engineering?’, AEU Journal, (April, 1950), p. 114. 
62 Anon., ‘French Stewards’ Wide Powers’, MW, (October, 1946), p. 4. 
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auditors’ reports and accounts.63 The AEU also advocated such regulation64  and 
highlighted Swedish Joint Consultation,65 and Mitbestimmunsrecht in Germany, 
which provided equal representation on large mining, and iron and steel company 
Boards.66  The NUGMW described the Norwegian JPCs arrangements.67 
Despite the unions and Government talk of tripartite working in the national interest, 
the AEU highlighted how the employer /management class pursued its own agenda.  
An editorial from the trade journal, The Engineer (7th May 1948), was cited to 
illustrate their point: ‘managements must continue to manage, and workers must 
continue to produce’. 68  The same article derogatorily located the problem with the 
workers’ loyalty, describing workers as often ‘inarticulate’ and ‘some … hostile.’69  In 
the same vein the AEU reported on the Institution of Production Engineers’ 
Conference where R. W. Mann, (President N. E. Section) concluded ‘that fear must 
form part of the incentive’.70  Thus readers were reminded of the employer-class’s 
continuing disparaging attitudes, antagonism, and enmity, thereby implicitly 
reinforcing their members’ class consciousness. 
 
Profits, Wages and Prices 
The wages question of the late 1940s illustrates the inter-union ideological 
differences. The journals published multiple Government appeals for pay restraint. 
The Regulation 1305 conditions meant many strikes were re-labelled by the 
participants ‘holidays’, and often such unofficial actions, as occurred in engineering, 
received local (unofficial) union support. However, when the leadership truly 
objected, strikes were condemned for violating the trade unionist core values of 
loyalty to the leadership and unity.  The TU official journals, exercised their deontic 
power in this pursuit, reminding readers that they had duties not just rights.  Taking 
industrial action before exhausting the conciliation machinery was deemed 
                                                          
63 Anon., ‘French JPCs See Firms’ Books, MW, (August, 1947), p. 7. 
64 Don Ellis, ‘What Should Labour’s Programme Be?’ AEU Journal, (May, 1949), p. 141. 
65 Anon., ‘Joint Consultation in Sweden’, AEU Journal, (May, 1949), p. 142.  
66 Mitbestimmunsrecht is the direct workers’ participation in industrial control in Germany, which 
provided equal representation on large mining, and iron and steel company Boards (although the 
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68 J. D. Lawrence, ‘Freedom at Work’, AEU Journal, (October, 1948), p. 299. 
69 Ibid. 
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unjustifiable as it alienated the previously indifferent, created animosities, provided 
class enemies’ ammunition, and left union leaders open to accusations of being 
unable to maintain their members’ compliance.71  The MW dissented. 
The NUGMW continually advocated the Government and TUC’s line on wage 
limitation and the subsequent wage freeze (1948).72 They typically vilified strike 
action and printed multiple expressions of regret about ‘certain elements’ and 
‘sectional interests’ (communists), who they accused of negating trade union 
democracy by defying official union policy.73  They saw strike avoidance as 
especially important in nationalised industries, and pledged an ‘energetic 
persecution of anyone who contributes to the breaking-up of ‘mutual 
relationships’.74  Moreover, they warned readers that: ‘wage inflation … will bring 
this Government down. The industrialists and the Tories cannot bring this 
Government down, but our Movement can’.75   In 1950 the NUGMW Journal 
suggested they even workers on automatic sliding scale agreements who ‘May feel 
… entitled to get what is due to them …. will be wrong’, as higher wages would 
undermine the Government.76  Thus, the NUGMW again prioritised the Labour 
Government’s welfare over their members’ short-term interests, premised on the 
idea that Labour’s success in Government and continuation in office were 
necessary conditions to secure their members’ longer term interests.  However, a 
lone dissenting voice was published in the NUGMW, stating that workers do not 
‘deliberately and lightly throw themselves out of employment, unless … something 
very, very serious … caused them so to do’,77 and, this contributor, attributed half 
the unofficial strikes to employers’ conscious provocation (the AEU’s and MW’s 
position).   
                                                          
71 C. Dukes, ‘Must History Repeat Itself?’, NUGMW Journal, (November, 1945), p. 344. 
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The AEU reported that the situation was complex.  They were torn between loyalty 
and common cause with the Government and TUC on the one hand, and on the 
other, their basic TU principles, National Committee’s pay demands, and those of 
the Confederation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Unions (to which they affiliated 
1946). 78   In an environment of cost of living and productivity increases, profits at 
double pre-war level, but limited wage increases, the AEU decided to pursue a £1 
per week pay claim,79 but chose by ballot to submit the claim to the National 
Arbitration Tribunal rather than strike (51,280 for strike: 143,579 against).80  The 
NUGMW’s leadership (unsuccessfully) took the political decision to attempt halt the 
AEU’s ballot under Arbitration Order 1305.  The AEU condemned this as an attempt 
to undermine their democracy. The M.W accorded.81  Thus, notwithstanding their 
shared self-identification as socialists and their shared support for the Labour Party 
administration, the two unions differing political cultures were evidenced in their 
conflictual policies. 
The MW, like the AEU Journal, campaigned for the £1 a week engineering pay rise 
and advocated strike action.82  Authoritative sources, like the ‘Interim Index of 
Industrial Production’ were cited, as was Dr. Barna’s (Oxford Institute of Statistics), 
statement that profits per worker (1948) were 85% higher than 1938, and return on 
capital up 174%.83  Implicit within this was the message that the capitalist continued 
profiteering at the workers’ expense, and those labour movement advocates of the 
Government’s wage restraint policy were in fact backing this continued 
institutionalised capitalist exploitation, and therefore their judgement and leadership 
should be questioned.  For the MW, this illustrated the validity of their (communist) 
ideas and understandings, including the need to fundamentally restructure society 
in order to usurp capitalist exploitation.   
                                                          
78 ‘Editor’s Notes’, AEU Journal, (January, 1950), pp. 1-2. 
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The eventual reversal of the TUC policy was regarded as inevitable by the AEU and 
MW, but not the NUGMW Journal which argued for its retention until spring 1951.84  
This included rhetorical outbursts, for instance, accusing anyone campaigning for its 
repeal (like the AEU and MW)85 of being ‘blind servants of the Cominform States,’86 
and being ‘political, sponsored and supported mainly by those who desire to see a 
wave of industrial strife for the sole purpose of undermining the national effort for 
recovery’.87  Thus the evolution of the Cold War context (which by this time had 
become institutionalised) can be seen as intensifying the NUGMW’s long-standing 
anti-communist position, and its contrast with some of their wartime utterances. 
 
Economic and Fiscal Measures 
A nation’s economic and fiscal policy is reflective of the power and influence of 
various groups within society.  The unions had expected far-reaching and structural 
changes; they voiced their disappointment (to varying degrees) at what they 
perceived was the maintenance of class privilage.  In autumn 1945, the Chancellor 
appealed to ‘industry to plough back increased profits rather than to distribute them 
to shareholders. The response to this invitation has been patchy’.88  The journals 
advocated curbs on profits and higher level salaries to match those proposed for 
wages. 89 The Government declined, claiming profit limitation would hamper 
production and expansion incentives, whilst dismissing the idea that wage limitation 
reduced workers’ incentives.90  The AEU Journal lobbied for an Excess Profits Tax 
(EPT) of 80- 100 % throughout the Labour administration, to be ‘held in trust by the 
Treasury for industry to use when better times return’.91    
The MW (1947) highlighted the EPT refunds to employers (Vickers received 
(Vickers receive over one million pounds), while worker’s (apart from Old Age 
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Pensioners (OAPs)) post-war credits remained unpaid.92  The journal contributors 
saw this as indicative of the capitalists’ unwillingness to act in the national interests 
(as workers were urged to).  Thus, fiscal issues were politicised, and 
notwithstanding the unions support for the Labour Government, they sought 
changes in their policy direction by repeatedly highlighting the (unexpected) 
continued disparity of treatment between classes.  
As the 1940s drew to a close the divergence between the left and right of the labour 
movement became more pronounced in the journals.  For instance, the TUC and 
the Government (and, with caveats, the NUGMW Journal) advocated the ongoing 
voluntary dividend limitation scheme, which it believed steered profits towards 
capital development. However, the AEU and MW condemned it because 90% of 
firms fell outside its parameters.  Moreover, for those that came under its remit, it 
was voluntary, and it was regularly circumvented through bonus shares schemes.93  
The AEU Journal instead promoted statutory profits, dividend limitation, and 
company law changes, premised on the fact that dividend limitation alone simply 
reassigned surpluses, which stockholders continued to accumulate.94 They also 
advocated the co-operative principle (including surpluses distributed as dividends 
on wages), which would decrease wage pressures and thus inflationary risks 
(protecting export competitiveness). Simultaneously it would incentivise production 
as the workers, not shareholders, would profit from their increased efforts, and 
thereby facilitate full employment through increased effective demand.95 Indirect tax 
increases were condemned;96 a graduated tax on property incomes was 
advocated.97  
In pursuit of their ongoing critique of capitalism and promotion of the need for 
structural change, the MW’s longstanding column ‘The Money we earn for Others’ 
was resurrected (June 1947).  It continued to highlight companies’ profit increases, 
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and their shadowy accountancy devices.98  Other articles continue this theme, for 
instance, R. Chamberlain MP writing in the MW, blamed commodity speculation, 
combined with company reconstructions, which provided ‘huge personal tax-free 
fortunes for existing shareholders, and bloated financial super-structures forcing up 
the price of every manufactured product’, 99 causing inflation (which indirectly 
combatted the ‘wage push’ inflation hypothesis).  The MW (and AEU) sought to 
reinforce their argument by highlighting how the wages component of domestic 
national income had stagnated at around 40% since 1880.  The MW recommended 
Dr. T. Barna’s pamphlet Profits During and After the War,100 and Margot 
Heinemann’s Wages Front.101  
The interaction of international affairs and the domestic economic sphere was 
evidenced in the 1949 Sterling crisis, precipitated by the American loan agreement’s 
Sterling convertibility clause.  Devaluation brought mixed responses from the 
journals.  The AEU Journal deemed it pragmatic, and advocated capitalising on the 
situation to push exports,102  and argued that inaction would have led to Britain’s 
reserves being drained, triggering deflationary policies, credit contraction, and 
export price reduction, and thus unemployment.  The MW disagreed.  Devaluation, 
they concluded, was a ‘Wall Street’ tool for acquiring British and Empire assets and 
raw materials cheaply, whilst increasing their Sterling Area competitiveness.  
Instead, they argued repeatedly that the dollar crisis could be resolved, and 
employment secured, through increased trade with the USSR, Eastern Europe, and 
China,103 and for lower US tariff barriers.104   
The Korean War provided a further example of the international impacting the 
domestic sphere.  Gaitskell’s 1951 budget omission of an EPT, the postponement of 
OAP relief, food subsidy limitation, and spectacles and dentures charges (as funds 
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were diverted to rearmaments) were all considered to disproportionately burden the 
working classes with rearmament expenses. 105  The AEU quoted The Express: 
‘Gaitskell would make a first-rate Tory Chancellor’,106 and noted that following day’s 
Financial Times (FT) Ordinary Shares Index reached a three year high. Thus, 
journals’ contributors interpreted and framed the consequences of the confluence of 
foreign, domestic, and economic policies, in terms of conflicting class interests and 
disparities. 
The perceived perversion of priorities precipitated the resignation of Bevan, Harold 
Wilson and John Freeman.  Gardner, (AEU General Secretary), condemned the 
resignations, but not their criticisms.  Much sympathy was expressed for the Bevan 
group’s assessments published in One Way Only, but with the caveat that ‘wishful 
thinking influenced by Soviet propaganda’ may have influence the group.107 Another 
contributor, J. Stewart, considered their resignations would improve debate, and 
‘give recognition to the fact … that a much more positive radical policy is required 
from our representatives in Parliament.’108  
 
Nationalisation v Socialisation 
 
The nationalisation of essential industries was pre-eminent amongst the 
longstanding ideologically driven changes expected from a Labour Majority 
Government.  The alternative was presented as a return to the interwar autocratic, 
capricious, industrial system, where unemployment was deemed inevitable.   
The Bank of England’s status as a private concern, responsible to its shareholders 
(whose 24 directors were board members of 152 leading companies), was 
universally considered an anathema by journal contributors, especially as its credit 
decisions impacted the nation’s employment, wages levels, and social service 
provision.  Public control was presented as fundamental to facilitating investment 
decisions and to fund allocation, guided and planned for the national benefit.109  
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Nonetheless, Lord Catto’s continuance as the Bank’s Governor post nationalisation, 
and its unchanged structure and staffing, were conspicuously omitted from the 
journals.  Moreover, the NUGWM, AEU, and NP were silent on the compensation 
paid; the Electrical Trades Journal commented on it, but without the usual 
condemnation.110  
The NP (1944) had published Lord Catto’s merchant banking connections (Andrew 
Yule and Co., the Royal Bank of Scotland, and Morgan Grenfell), and his record of 
promoting millionaire financiers’ interests.111  Thus he was ostensibly an unlikely 
choice to advance socialist economic policy.  Indeed, his continued employment 
underlines institutional continuity within apparently profound change, and how 
ideologically driven change (the Bank’s nationalisation) was limited by orthodox 
economic expedience, market considerations (market wariness of a socialist 
government), maintaining Britain’s position as a financial centre, and arguably, 
deference to interests and the establishment. 
The absence of debate or comment on the issue was consistent with the NUGMW 
Journal’s editorial practice of not publicly questioning Government’s decisions.  
However, its absence from the AEU Journal is more surprising, given its traditional 
focus on economic issues, and its criticism of the Coal Board’s structure and the 
lack of workers’ control under nationalisation.  Similarly, the MW would have 
normally attacked the granting of power positions to advocates of powerful financial 
and business interests.  All journal contributors would have been acutely aware of 
the situation, and its implications.  Support for the Labour Government, and an 
ideological belief in the importance of public control (which could subsequently be 
internally restructured), a sensitivity to the City of London’s pre-eminent position, 
powerful financial interests, and market fears, would have all been factors in its 
omission, but their relative importance would vary between journal editors.  Their 
silence on the matter underscores how the journals failed to hold the Labour 
Government to account to the extent to which they would have a Tory Government 
implementing the same policies. 
The AEU Journal continued to condemn private factional reserve banking, whereby 
credit creation was almost cost free, yet the bank income received the interest 
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charged, including from the financing of Government bonds; moreover, they paid no 
EPT.   They recommended that credit from banks and financial institutions should 
be replaced by non-interest bearing State Credit, and alleged that ‘the banks and 
high finance control the Government’.112   
Coal 
The mines had suffered from a dearth of capital investment as mine-owners 
prioritised short-term profit (especially since the Samuel Committee), which, 
combined with war pressures resulted in the mining industry’s dire state, as 
evidenced in productivity declines, down from 301.9 tons per worker annually 
(1938), to 242.2 tons in 1946.113  However, the journals never discussed whether 
coal (or railways) nationalisation was effectively a bail-out.   
The Clerk Journal noted that immediately pre- nationalisation, Coal owners, who 
had in the past attempted to thwart trade unionism, began exalting it, ‘Can it be that 
they wish, on nationalisation, to seek protection under the umbrella of strength of 
the staff worker?’ 114  The journals reported on the political significance and 
industrial expedience of nationalisation.  However, the form it took caused disquiet, 
especially amongst the AEU contributors (spring 1946 onwards).  They had 
expected a democratic structure ‘from the coal face upwards’. Instead a capitalists 
dominated Board was appointed and ‘superimposed’ on the industry.115  Moreover, 
the AEU Journal noted that disparity was further institutionalised as appointees from 
union backgrounds had to sever their ties; private sector appointees had no such 
restraints on outside interests.116  Discontent over the former owners’ re-
employment, excessive executive pay, top-heavy administration, and the paucity of 
workers’ representation, resulted in the AEU submitting numerous resolutions at 
various union, TUC and Labour Party Conferences.117  
The AEU Journal majority voice believed nationalisation did not equate to 
socialisation; they had expected socialisation. They lamented that ‘It is clear to us 
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to-day that Socialisation does not mean … in its present phase, the disappearance 
of the employer-employee relationship’,118 and that ‘The miners could scarcely have 
had less representation …. The industry is still controlled by the same class that has 
always controlled it’.119 Indeed, it was stressed that ‘within this State capitalist model 
the worker remained industrial serf’ 120 and exposed to the caprice of future Tory 
Governments.  The AEU Journal instead advocated the establishment of Pit 
Councils comprised of representatives from production, official and management 
realms, selected on ability and expertise; these Pit Councils would send 
representatives to Regional Pit Councils, whose representatives would form a 
National Coal Board, which would liaise with the Minister and Government.  Similar 
models, it was considered, should be applied to all industries being nationalised.121  
This stood in stark contrast to Arthur Horner’s Miners Charter and vision of a 
collaborative relationship the managers in the common good as part of a national 
plan.122 There was no mention in the journals of Shinwell’s discussion with the 
Miner’s Unions about them running the industry.  
The nationalisation programme was deemed to be ‘permeated by inevitable 
compromise with capitalist experience and competency’,123  founded on ideas 
concerning competence propagated by the capitalist classes.  This resulted in the 
employment of managers and technicians of questionable political reliability.124  The 
AEU proposed that those best qualified to direct nationalised industries were highly 
technically qualified ‘men’ [sic] who were nationalisation advocates, with the 
leadership skills to motivate the workforce and a desire to thwart socialism’s 
enemies.  
Stafford Cripps suggestion, that workers were unsuitable as nationalised industry 
executives, was utterly condemned by the AEU and MW as showing the ‘same 
contempt for the working-class which was voiced by Churchill in his notorious 
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phrase, ‘Labour is not fit to govern’ and merely repeated capitalist classes’ 
prejudices.125 AEU contributors highlighted how Union officials already acted as 
solicitors, advocates, negotiators, technical experts, and interpreters of 
Governments Acts and Orders, and many rank and filers had potential.126  Cripps 
elitist attitude was contrasted with the Webbs’ statement in Industrial Democracy, 
‘such representatives (of manual workers and technicians) will be found to compare, 
in competence, quite favourably with the average member of a Board of Directors’. 
127  
Morrison’s suggestion that as ‘joint stock company’s go out into the market and buy 
brains. The State can do the same.’ was linked with the 1931 Macdonald 
Government and Snowden’s 1928 statement, that: ‘We are going to get Socialism 
largely … through a public corporation controlled, in the interests of the public, by 
the best experts and business men’.128  Thus the AEU Journal contributor, sought to 
discredit such assertions through association. R. Rallison, a regular AEU economics 
contributor (whose M.A. qualification was always printed), was alone in positing that 
workers lacked the ‘perseverance and will-power to study and master the technique 
of control’, implicitly meaning, unlike him.129  
The AEU Journals hosted a long debate (1946-8) on the nationalisation / 
socialisation question.  This debate illustrated the multiple (left-wing) ideological 
strands pursued by their contributors; each presented their case as ‘obvious’ and 
‘common sense’ and selectively quoted Marx, Engels, and Lenin, for corroboration.  
Everyone agreed that socialism embodied: 
A system of society based upon the common ownership and democratic 
control of the means and instruments for producing and distributing wealth by 
and in the interest of the whole community.130   
However, some argued that the Labour Party Government’s nationalisations were 
merely the State acquisition of ‘the right to administer’, whilst ‘the issue of bonds 
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has guaranteed capitalist rake-off.’131  Some questioned if this form of 
nationalisation was socialist, especially as various defenders of capitalism had 
historically advocated nationalisation as ‘an expedient of property ownership … not 
even remotely connected with working-class interest’.132  Counterfactuals were 
offered and compared.  It was argued that the prevailing form of nationalisation had 
not altered the fundamental that workers were still compelled to sell their labour in 
exchange for wages to purchase necessities.  It was suggested that ‘so long as the 
wages system exists together with rent, interest and profit, we shall continue to 
suffer the Capitalist system’,133  as illustrated by the postal workers’ status.  Such 
contributors considered that a necessary condition of socialism was the abolition of:  
… property ownership in the means of production and distribution, and … the 
social superstructure peculiar to property ownership, the end of capital and 
wage labour, and the whole paraphernalia of barter and monetary 
exchange.134   
This position also precluded those with capital loaning it to the Government instead 
of private undertakings. ‘Both are capitalist’.135 In a ‘truly socialist’ system, 
production and distribution would function for use not profit, and for universal 
benefit; ‘all … will live according to the maxim: ‘From each according to ability to 
each according to need’.136  All such articles sought to influence the debate and 
ultimately the form in which nationalisation was operationalised.  However, often 
such articles were rhetorical, merely cataloguing the Government’s programmes’ 
faults without providing worked alternatives.   
Another strand in the AEU Journal debate condemned continued Capitalist type 
imposition of workforce discipline in nationalised industries.  In capitalist industry, 
factory rules were dictated ‘without reference to the ruled’, which was deemed 
expensive and inefficient and where promotion meant joining ‘the management 
against the Union’. 137  Instead it was suggested there should be: 
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technical leaders, elected by ballot upon their qualifications … no managers, 
no foremen, no rate-fixers, no charge-hands, no promotion-seekers, no 
secret police, no clocking-on … will reduce the cost of production 
enormously.138  
Moreover, ‘totalitarian dictatorship … perpetrated by arrogant managements’ was 
alleged to be a major cause of strikes.139  However, a minority AEU voice argued 
the need for a transformation in attitudes, if workers or their elected officials were to 
be involved in management of nationalised concerns. 140    
Share-prices increased when nationalisation was anticipated, and fell when it was 
contested, illustrating for the contributors share-holders’ profit expectations from the 
nationalisation process, which most deemed reprehensible.  However, one 
contributor proposed, that granting former shareholders interest bearing bonds was 
merely equivalent to funding municipal work through similar bonds.141  The AEU 
Journal editor formally halted the debate (October 1947), concluding that 
nationalisation was a step towards socialisation.142 Nonetheless the debate and 
analysis continued.  The specific nationalisations of gas, electricity and transport, 
received little coverage, but were welcomed as necessary to optimise productivity, 
and for industrial and scientific progress.   
The nationalisation – socialisation debate was largely absent from the NUGMW 
Journal. They did however argue that unions within nationalised industries must 
remain free, and able to dispute any oppressive or unfair administrative practices 
(thereby precluding themselves from running industry).143  R. E. Scouller (The 
Clerk) similarly concluded that, despite his previous support for workers’ control, 
trade unionisms’ sectional nature was incompatible with running nationalised 
industries due to conflicts of interests with the community through parliament.144 
The NUGMW remained largely silent on the domination of the National Coal Board 
(NCB) by ex-private mine owners and managers.  Indeed, issues around the nature 
and efficacy of nationalisation, or increased worker participation in management 
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(except in the broadest generalised terms) were omitted.  However, a single 
complaint was printed stating that they ‘could never accept that the architects of the 
capitalist system … could also be the architects of the New World’.145 In 1948 the 
NUGMW concluded that: 
Until the problem [nationalisation] has been satisfactorily solved, from the TU 
standpoint one feels that it would be both unwise and untimely to widen the 
scope of nationalized industry.146  
The journal’s lack of debate, despite many members being directly employed or 
indirectly impacted by nationalisations, can only be interpreted as a deliberate 
editorial decision to pursue a policy of unity behind the Labour Government.   
The absence of scrutiny or denunciation of the NCB by the MW is more complex, 
but doubtless partly driven by their enthusiasm for nationalisation, and partly 
support for the Labour Government (although post-mid 1947 they became 
increasingly critical).  However, the widespread discussion of the topic’s on the left 
may have meant the editors considered their limited space had other exigencies.  
 
Steel 
Steel nationalisation was acrimonious, largely, because unlike coal, the industry 
was profitable for the capitalists.  The AEU and MW covered the issue, including 
histories, industry concentrations, cartels, and collusions.147 The MW described the 
industry’s record as ‘restriction, unemployment and the murder of towns like 
Jarrow’.148  The AEU and MW were highly critical of the compensation paid, of 
structure, and personnel, ‘top ranking jobs filled with people who had a social 
background but no experience in the Iron and Steel Industry’. 149 They retained 
managements, their company names, and subsidies (some £22 million in the 
financial year 1948-9), which limited steel prices for the largely private sector 
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buyers.150  The MW cited Ellis Hunter’s (Iron and Steel Federation Chairman), 
comment on the nationalisation agreement, ‘I think it is alright. I have no 
complaints’; itself a damming indictment for the communist MW.  The NUGMW 
Journal merely described the iron and steel nationalisation without analysis, 
comment or criticism.151  
The Schuman Plan further complicated the iron and steel question.152   It received 
little AEU Journal coverage, none in the NUGMW, but was condemned in Electron 
(the rebranded Electrical Trades Journal)153 and the MW,154 who portrayed it as an 
anti-socialist, anti-Soviet, monopolistic umbrella for capitalist coal, steel, and the 
iron Barons (including Hitler’s backers), to maximise their profits at workers and 
consumers expense, the CP line. 
Opinion polls in 1951 found that 39% of nationalized industries’ employees were 
disillusioned.  The NUGMW (whilst reminding readers that the alternative was 
capricious private ownership) suggested that the ‘pioneers’ ‘believed State control 
meant new men with new ideas.  …however… too many ‘old order’ minds’ 
remained in control’155 and they complained that the National Boards were overly 
concerned with ‘approved channels of procedure’.156 The perception of continuity in 
the workers’ role and relationship with the ‘boss’, rather than the change envisaged, 
caused disappointment.  This was further exacerbated by problems, such as getting 
shop stewards official recognition in the gas industry in 1950.157  Nonetheless, those 
on the left, as articulated by the MW and much of the AEU, continued to advocate 
further nationalisations. The unpopularity of nationalisation was deemed to be 
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consequent upon the degree of continuity in these industries; they were largely 
managed by the same people; the relationship between workers and management 
remained largely unchanged, and the worker control / participation in management 
originally envisaged had not materialised.  Thus, they surmised, disillusionment was 
not a product of nationalisation per-se, but was a consequence of the form 
nationalisation took, and thus could be rectified in those industries already 




During the immediate post-war period, communism remained a negative 
background issue in the NUGMW Journal, coming to prominence viscerally when 
pertinent.  On the other hand, the AEU Journal’s majority voice supported 
communist rights, usually even when their politics diverged.  For instance, the 
AEU’s 1945 National Committee advocated that all members paying political levy 
should be eligible for election as representatives for all Labour Party bodies and 
Labour Party Conferences.158  Jack Tanner pressed this issue at the 1946 Labour 
Party Conference, and (again) advocated CP affiliation to the LP.159   The NUGMW 
Journal reported that his speech was disrupted when he credited communists for 
JPCs successes. 160 (This was omitted in the AEU Journal).  The MW cited the 
same speech and appealed against the ‘outburst of antagonism between the 
different sections.’161 The position of The Clerk on communism at this time was 
nearer that of the AEU than the NUGMW. 
The extent of the impact of the international context on the unions political cultures, 
was evidenced in diminution of pro-communist statements in the AEU Journal from 
1948 onwards (and also in The Clerk) as the Cold War intensified, and anti-
communist rhetoric increased.  One AEU contributor equated an attempt to obtain a 
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strike decision at the re-called National Committee (1948), to a ‘complete 
domination of the Union by the Communist minority’,162 adding, that if they 
succeeded, it would be comparable to the revolutionary forces ‘Burning and 
murdering’ in Kharkov in 1919.  Responses were published, one entitled ‘Let Us be 
Fair--Even to Russia’,163 and another highlighted how such anti-communist 
hyperbole was ‘reminiscent of Tory fear-mongering’.164  Nonetheless, the prevailing 
mood was illustrated by four out of six readers’ letters published in (May 1948) 
which denounced communists within the movement, or complained that the journals 
published ‘extreme socialist’ views.165 Notably however, two pro-communist letters 
were included, illustrating the continued editorial policy of publishing multiple left 
wing ideological positions.  Thus, what the AEU Journal contributors deemed to be 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of socialism shifted over time in response to the 
changing international context and the wider ideas environment.  
The following year (1949), Jack Tanner alleged that communists were endeavouring 
to undermine the economy and weaken the Labour Government and movement, 
hoping that with ‘the consequential scarcity, unemployment and dissatisfaction … 
the workers will turn to them’ resulting in ‘planned insurrection-possibly Civil War -
certainly the forcible overthrow of the Government … and … dictatorship of the 
CP’166  Amid such allegations one published respondent declared that he was 
elected as: 
Minute Secretary, Branch Secretary, District Committee Representative, 
Shop Steward, Trades Council Secretary, Food Control Committee 
Representative … as a known Communist …If a meeting supports some 
policy put forward by a Communist in preference to another, is not that 
democracy?167   
The NUGMW Journal maintained its long-standing anti-communist position,168  it 
merely intensified as the Cold War intensified.  Warnings were published that ‘We 
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must be alert that they [communists] have no opportunity to plant the seeds of their 
insidious propaganda within our ranks’,169 as, through ‘infiltration in politics and 
trade unions we find that a mere handful of Communists can wield tremendous 
power over the community as a whole’, alleging that they were ‘just like Hitler’170  
(and thus indubitably evil).  The NUGMW justified their position (and that of the TUC 
and Labour Party hierarchy) by suggesting that they were ‘compelled to forestall 
any coup d’état by those who hold key positions in our constitution.’171  The 
NUGMW Journal provided its own interpretation of international communist history, 
which it linked to the contemporaneous World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) 
disunity over the Marshall Plan,172 unrest against the production drive, an ambition 
to capitulate the Labour Government,173 and Cominform policies. Indeed, everything 
concerning communism and the Soviets was framed to leave no doubt as to 
communists’ malevolence, and the necessity for members to counter their influence. 
Despite the escalating anti-communist environment, the MW articles were 
increasingly published with attribution (spring 1946 onwards) whereas previously 
they were almost exclusively anonymous. The MW presented the 1948 onwards 
communist ‘witch hunt’ as a replay of the 1924 situation, where attacks on the left 
preceded assaults on workers’ terms and conditions.174 The MW condemned the 
presentation by the capitalist press of shop stewards as a ‘red bogy,’ which they 
suggested was an employer expedient:  
They want to drive a wedge between members and union leaders; if the 
Stewards can be isolated from the membership … workers’ claims can be 
resisted. Profits can be safeguarded.175   
Thus, MW contributors sought to undermine ‘Reds’ fear-mongering by firmly 
situating shop stewards as the workers’ ally against their exploiters. 
The MW expressed alarm at ‘Attlee’s statement giving the secret police wide 
powers to conduct a witch hunt in the Civil Service.’176 (The NUGMW reported the 
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policy but without censure).  The MW condemned the TUC circular banning 
Communist appointments or speakers, as being antithetical to the union 
movement’s ethos.177  Similarly, the MW (and AEU), appealed against individual 
dismissals, for instance, Ernest Athorn (due to his Second World Peace Congress 
involvement).178  They publicised the CPGB’s The British Road to Socialism policy 
statement which declared that ‘Britain will reach Socialism by her own road,’ and 
that ‘the British people can transform Parliament into an instrument of the will of the 
vast majority of her people’ rather than ‘introduce Soviet Power into Britain’.179 This 
supported the MW published narrative, that they merely sought a socialist state 
where the majority, not the few mattered (which ran parallel to their agitational 
content that sought to motivate their readers into action). 
 
Britain’s Financial Position, the American Loan, and Marshall Plan 
 
The intertwining domestic economic sphere, international finance, and foreign 
affairs, came together with Lend-Lease’s cancellation.  It was universally 
condemned by the journals’ contributors.  The AEU and MW judged it to be 
indicative of US capitalist desire for economic dominance, which would enable them 
to steer British domestic and foreign policy, and export opportunities.  The MW 
considered it reinforced the need for international trade unionism to fight imperialist 
and ‘dangerous reactionaries whose poisonous doctrine “back to cut-throat 
competition” is spread ‘from City Offices as well as from Wall Street.’180  The AEU 
urged the Government to refuse ‘any financial arrangement with the US which will 
make this country dependent upon and subservient to the economic royalists and 
Big Business interests.’ They endorsed Attlee’s message to the American 
Congress, ‘we are going on with our programme of socialisation whether America 
likes it or not’.181  The AEU majority voice considered the subsequent US loan to be 
a necessary expedient that ‘bore few marks of generosity’.182   
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Roosevelt's death precipitated AEU contributors’ warning of the ‘disintegration of all 
progressive forces in America, and that the Democrats had become a collection of 
vested interests’.183  These vested interests were deemed to hold power nationally 
and internationally, and were behind the US’s insistence on dollar denominated 
trade settlements184 (although the Cold War was already an evolving and 
intensifying reality). The MW concurred.  In order to illustrate the fact that many 
shared their concerns, the AEU reported on the disaffection of some Labour Party 
MPs over the extent to which a perceived need to please the US was shaping 
British foreign policy (1946), publishing Crossman’s (defeated) amendment calling 
for the Government to:  
… review and recast its conduct of international affairs as to afford the 
utmost encouragement to, and collaboration with, all nations striving to 
secure full Socialist planning and control of world resources, and … a 
democratic and constructive Socialist alternative to an otherwise unenviable 
conflict between American Capitalism and Russian Communism.185 
The prevailing AEU Journal majority opinion (and that of The Clerk186) promoted this 
‘third way’ at this time, distinct from American Capitalism and Russian Communism 
(promoted by G. D. H. Cole and the Keep Left advocates). 
The Marshall Plan provoked diverse reactions.187 On the state level, sixteen 
countries accepted it and worked to fulfil the US’s requirements, but the Soviet 
Union rejected its conditions and barred Eastern European states from engagement 
(in order that they remained a buffer zone for Soviet security).   
The AEU Journal provided detailed analysis reflecting the importance they attached 
to the subject, and their belief that the membership should be informed and be 
interested.  Disquiet over American actions, intentions, and ideology, occasionally 
spilt over into anti-American polemics:   
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 [America] that land of freemen: free to use machine guns against the 
workers in labour disputes and to lynch Negroes to satisfy the whims of her 
southern gentlemen … A country that has enriched itself out of the miseries, 
suffering and destruction of two world wars. … it breeds fear and suspicion 
even among the rulers and forces them to spend countless millions of dollars 
on defence measures.188 
The AEU reluctantly approved the Marshall Plan as an expedient agreed to under 
severe duress. Refusal, it was thought, would have equally consigned Britain to 
American mercy.189 They reported on the concern of the European Committee on 
Economic Co-operation over the Marshall Plan conditionalities,190 and reminded 
readers that the American Government represented capitalist financial interests 
domestically and internationally.  The AEU also highlighted the divisions within the 
WFTU (discussed below), the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the US unions.191  
For instance, a  US Committee of Industrial Organisations (CIO) visitor’s report of 
opposition to the policy due to its ‘political implications’192 was published, along with 
assertions that the AFL and CIO officially supported the Plan, on ‘fraternal 
humanitarian grounds’ and ‘to preserve our own form of democracy and our living 
standards and security’.193  Moreover, the AEU Journal reported the unanimously 
adopted CIO Convention resolution:  
… under no circumstances should food or any other aid … be used as a 
means of coercing free but needy people in the exercise of their rights or 
independence and self-government, or to fan the flames of civil warfare.194 
 Such reporting, in addition to merely disseminating information, was doubtlessly 
motivated by a desire to mitigate reader hostility to accepting American money with 
strings attached, particularly in light of their previous anti-US propaganda.   
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A minority strand within the AEU, was represented by Walter Ayles MP (who, like 
most contributing MPs was politically right of other contributors).  He stated, in a 
tribute to Bevin, that:  
Marshall Aid with the assistance of Cripps saved England. The Atlantic Pact 
which with the great assistance of a futile Russian policy … killed 
isolationism in America and linked the US with Europe for all time.195  
However, as the Cold War intensified, AEU Journal opinion tended further towards 
this position (and that of the NUGMW). 
The MW, steadfastly condemned the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact, which 
they considered contravened the UN Charter.  They cited Senator Vandenberg’s 
statement (US Senate Marshall Aid debate) that in: 
… signing the Atlantic Pact Britain would also agree to a specific 
memorandum certifying that her trade agreements did not and would not 
come into conflict with the purposes of the Atlantic Alliance.196 
This, the MW stated, explained the British Government’s non-engagement in trade 
with Eastern Europe, to the detriment of Britain’s economic position and job 
security. 197  The Ford steel plant’s exclusion from the Steel Bill was similarly 
blamed on US pressure and concerns that ‘the Marshall dole might suffer’.198  The 
20% cut in steel allocated to the shipbuilding industry in 1947 ‘so that our friends in 
the USA can dump their Liberty ships on us’,199 and the US’s proposed deferment of 
British shipbuilding until after 1952, rendering some 13,000 unemployed, were 
considered Marshall Plan corollaries that harmed British workers.200   
In contrast to the MW and AEU Journals, the NUGMW presented the US as 
benevolent, and the Marshall Plan as ‘generous and far-sighted,’201 an aid to 
reconstructing a healthy Western Europe, both industrially, and, as an example of 
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‘liberty and human rights.’   They quoted J. B. Carey (CIO), that the Plan was ‘partial 
repayment to the European countries for the contribution they had made in human 
resources to America’, and George Meany’s statement that the AFL, was ‘whole-
heartedly in favour’.202  No anti- American opinions were printed. The only downside 
they foresaw was that intimate ties with America left Britain vulnerable to her 
economic fluctuations and export surpluses (British competition in foreign 
markets).203  The NUGMW rejected suggestions that Marshall Aid (and the US loan) 
was a US tool to steer British domestic and foreign policy, or to allow US financial 
interests to penetrate Europe.  Instead, they regularly expressed gratitude for US 
finance, and the necessity to convince America ‘that we do not regard it as a 
subsidy or a right’,204  and (following the US and Bevinite line) interpreted Russian 
Marshall Plan opposition as indicative of their desire to sabotage it, and the West’s 





Peace precipitated the revival of the pre-war approach of internationalist and 
collective security of many contributors, and the 1945 Labour Party victory was 
seen as holding the promise of a ‘socialist foreign policy’.  The NUGMW Journal 
stressed the need to ‘re-align the sympathies of those who had learned British 
diplomat’s word was not always his bond’.205  In India this was evidenced in 
procrastination, unfulfilled promises of economic and political freedom, and even 
‘that our slick diplomats have actually fermented … fratricidal struggles for 
power’.206  The Moslem and Hindu conflict, and the dire conditions were considered 
a damning indictment on British colonial rule.   
Despite subscribing to the core socialist and labourist concept of equality, this was 
usurped by ‘traditional’ ideas around colonialism by NUGMW Journal contributors.  
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British exceptionalism and the ‘white man’s burden’ pervaded their content: ‘the 
cool, reasoning, tolerant Briton’ was contrasted with ‘these simple, innocent, 
illiterate, emotional souls, [who] can be whipped into a fury of insensate killing’.207  
Such ideas, although unacceptable and deeply offensive in contemporary society, 
were widely subscribed to when they were written.  The passage of time and 
changing mores have rendered such issues visible.  
The NUGMW also suggested that India’s terrible labour conditions could be cured 
by building a TU movement ‘like ours’, and that their own Labour Party would 
transform Indian employers into ‘decent citizens’.208  This was incongruous and 
logically inconsistent with their belief that employer/ employee relations were 
structural (shaped by capitalism), and their portrayal of British employers’ as 
malevolent despite the British Labour Party and trade union movement’s presence.  
Moreover, in parallel with British exceptionalism, the NUGMW’s deferential attitude 
to Royalty continued, for instance, describing Lord Mountbatten’s appointment as 
Governor General, as ‘a happy and fortunate choice ... exemplifying all that is best 
in the Britisher’. 209   
Conversely, the AEU Journal, continued promoting its longstanding ethically based 
support of Indian independence (the financial aspects of empire were considered 
extraneous to the argument).  It backed the India League, and expressed ‘grave 
dissatisfaction at the chaos and famine in India, which has resulted in the death of 
over four million Indian people’,210 which it considered was a consequence of Tory 
Imperialist and Colonial policies.  They advocated policies inspired by the Atlantic 
Charter’s ethos: the release of political prisoners, granting India Dominion status 
under a National Government,211 universal suffrage, and rescinding restrictions on 
freedom of movement, speech, and association.212  When in 1946 famine 
reoccurred,213 the AEU predicted six million deaths ‘A cool calculation - a race of 
                                                          
207 H. L. Bullock, ‘Impressions of Ceylon and India’, NUGMW Journal, (May, 1950), pp. 130-1. 
208 H. L.  Bullock, ‘Impressions’ NUGMW Journal, (June, 1950), p. 163. 
209 H. L. Bullock, ‘The Indian Scene’, NUGMW Journal, (January, 1948), pp. 3-5. 
210 Now known as the Bengal Famine; ‘National Committee’, 1945,’ AEU Journal, (October, 1945), 
pp. 303-7. 
211 ‘National Committee 1945: India League’, AEU Journal, (October, 1945), pp. 303-7. 
212 ‘The National Committee 1946’, AEU Journal, (August, 1946), pp. 234-238.   
213 Also precipitating bread and flour rationing in Britain. 
216 
 
people must die’,214 which although the figure was erroneous, illustrated the AEU’s 
contributors’ desire to propagate ideas around international fraternal sentiment. 
Outside the Indian question, there was little Colonial coverage, which contrasted 
with the Labour Government’s often-expressed enthusiasm for the Commonwealth 
as a resource for British economic reconstruction.  Walter Ayles, MP wrote in the 
AEU from the Labour Party establishment view (to which the NUGMW accorded), 
describing British colonial policy (1946), as illustrating:  
… our real love for freedom. We are … spending millions of pounds in 
building up their economic and social life and their educational systems’ and 
have sent out trade union leaders to train the natives in trade union 
organisation and the establishment of co-operative societies. We want them 
gradually to develop so that they too will be self-governing. 215   
Nonetheless, in reality, declarations about colonial development translated in 
practice into increased exploitation.216 In keeping with the Government policies 
since the 1930s, the Colonial Office co-opted trade unionists to assist in the 
development of ‘responsible’ trade unions (that is non-nationalist and non-
communist).  The TUC organised special training courses, and Ruskin College 
sponsored correspondence courses for colonial trade union leaders. However, by 
1950, J. Hale MP acknowledged that the Empire’s natural resources, including 
labour, had been exploited, with derisory levels of services provided in return, and 
education and health provision left to religious missions.217     
 
The Wider International Scene 
 
The need for international trust and economic co-operation were highlighted, and 
consensus formed that the UN was the mechanism to achieve it.  However, the 
AEU expressed concern over a perceived democratic deficit in the San Francisco 
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Agreement itself, especially the ‘Big Powers’ ability to defy decisions, whilst the 
smaller nations had no such option.218   
The hoped for ‘new world order’ was deemed to be partially dependent on 
international trade unionisms’ input.  The AEU accorded with the TUC policy (1945), 
including the establishment of the WFTU, premised on the understanding that ‘only 
amongst the workers could be found the base for the formation of free democratic 
governments,’ and they possessed the ‘experience and the equipment to help forge 
such governments’.219 The WFTU optimistically believed that ‘no Government will 
dare refuse admission to colonial territories to so representative a body… nor ignore 
its recommendations’. Moreover, they claimed a right to a seat and vote in the UN 
Economic and Social Council, and a consultative voice in the UN General 
Assembly.220 These claims were ignored and the AEU denounced the Labour 
Government’s opposition to them.221   
The subsequent difficulties within the WFTU over the trade secretariats function 
were noted in the journals.222  The NUGMW Journal fully endorsed the TUC 
walkout.223 AEU Journal contributors challenged the dominant narrative around the 
WFTU impasse, and focused on the need for international co-operation, unity, and 
talks.224  The MW contributors unanimously condemned the TUC’s walk-out, and 
reported on the WFTU EC’s Scandinavian representative’s condemnation of the 
TUC proposal to suspend activities, and M. Benoit Frachon’s (CGT General 
Secretary) accusation about the Anglo-American union leaders’ ‘collaboration with 
the American Secretary of State’.225 
AEU contributors considered the USA’s intention to secure military bases in 
numerous Pacific Islands to be incompatible with the World Charter.  Britain’s re-
occupation of Hong Kong, and France’s deployment of forces into Indo-China to 
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thwart the population’s self-determination, were similarly denounced. 226  AEU 
contributors lamented the speed with which the optimism surrounding the UNO and 
Bretton Woods agreements dissipated, and ‘business as usual’ re-established, 
concluding that national representatives in the UN Councils and Committees were 
pursuing profiteering strategies and organising for the next war.227  To highlight 
‘right thinking peoples’ antipathy towards this, the AEU Journal published Leon 
Jouhaux’s (World Trade Union Conference chairman) statement: 
We … do not want economic war which creates the germs of future 
conflagrations … the question for to-morrow is not one of a new division of 
power, but of a community of forces of production.228  
The NUGMW concurred (1945) stating that there was: 
… no possibility of peace if nations insist on their sovereignty …  We have 
not spent ten years out of the last thirty getting rid of militarism… only to 
enthrone it here and elsewhere amongst the Allied Nations.229   
They were highly cognisant that ‘years pass, memories are dimmed and sedulously 
there creeps in again the old spirits of fear, distrust and suspicion; the old diplomacy 
… and the sickening game of competitive armament’230 and they illustrated the 
longstanding nature of their ‘common-sense’ position by citing William Penn, who 
250 years earlier recommended a United States of Europe, ‘where every nation 
should agree to submit its disputes to a world court of arbitration and all nations 
would promptly unite to crush an aggressor’.231  The NUGMW called for 
international aggression to be categorised as an international crime, and for an 
International Defence Pact, with a dispute settlement force (also utilisable in civil 
conflicts, such as Palestine).232   
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The official union journals promoted the United Nations Association (UNA) as they 
had the LNU; its ideals were stressed, and its objectives and educational remit233 
and its non-defence works were praised.  
Despite the initial optimism engendered by the UN’s establishment, schisms 
between the Allies deepened, and two conflicting ‘colony conscious’ power blocks 
emerged, resulting in conflicts fermented by fear and mistrust, and competitive 
weapons development (including nuclear).234  The deployment of nuclear weapons 
received sparse coverage other than the recommendation that all atomic bombs 
and infrastructure should be subsumed under a UN body.235  The NUGMW 
commented on the ‘miracle of scientific achievement, which saved tens of 
thousands of lives’.236  The AEU Journal postulated that atomic fission was a 
potential saviour from the oil cartels who were lined-up behind governments and a 
threat to world peace. The Russians reportedly believed that these cartels aspired 
to halt Soviet nationalisations and sought to control all oil: 
… from the tip of Arabia, through Iran and Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon, the 
Caspian, the source of the Volga to the mouth of the Petchora… Palestine 
…with its pipelines and its Haifa, and Syria with its Tripoli.237   
Oil was a longstanding issue in the AEU Journals, and considered a factor in 
multiple conflicts past, and potentially in the future (especially in North Africa), due 
to structural dependencies, and especially the US’s ‘rapacious’ appetite for the 
commodity.238  
In the intensifying Cold War context, AEU opinion shifted towards that expressed in 
the National Council of Labour’s May Day Manifesto (1949), that the UN and 
Atlantic Treaty, were ‘new instruments for the establishment of permanent peace 
based upon the principles of collective security and mutual trust’.239  However, as 
time progressed they changed tack again, countering the mainstream media’s 
presentation of developments in Europe and Asia (1951) as being in accordance 
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with UN decisions. The AEU maintained that ‘America can command sufficient 
votes in the Assembly to ensure a majority for any resolution’ noting that ‘When any 
government still in receipt of Marshall Aid votes against the USA on any major 
issue, then we shall be justified in believing that there are no strings attached.’240  
Moreover, US economic strength and control of raw materials ensured that ‘she can 





AEU Journal contributors’ concern over the Greek situation continued.  Their 1945 
National Committee resolution stated: ‘the British Army landed in Europe to free the 
suppressed peoples…. The past events in Greece have undermined our faith in the 
Government’s intention’.242  (In reality the British army’s (December 1944) 
occupation of Greece aimed to prevent the communist inspired ELAS, from gaining 
power after they ousted the German army).243  They denounced the Labour 
Government’s support for the ‘reactionary monarchists beating down the working 
people-… of the heroic Resistance Movement,’244 and expressed concerns that 
Greek Unions and Trade Councils’ elected representatives were being replaced by 
Monarchists.245 Such criticism continued (including supporting resolutions at the 
Labour Party Conference246 and TUC Congress247).  Their 1947 National 
Committee (NC) appealed for clemency for Pandelis Goussides Salonika (EAM 
Secretary)248, and sought Makronnisos Concentration Camps’ closure, and an 
amnesty.249 Thus despite the AEU’s rightward shift as the Cold War developed, they 
continued to promote the democratic rights of supposedly ‘freed’ peoples in their 
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struggle against what they considered to be reactionary occupation, including by 
British and US Governments’ forces. 
The MW concurred.250  They linked British foreign policy and the Government 
production drive.251  They called for a socialist foreign policy, emphasising the 
morality and widespread support for their position, including from within the TUC, 
and the sixty MPs that signed a resolution to end the Greece situation.252  The MW 
highlighted the credit and equipment given by the US to the Greek Royalists.253 
President Truman’s (March 1947) statement announcing the containment policy 
was deemed to be ‘an open declaration of American Imperialism and a threat, not 
only to the Soviet Union, but to …. Greece and Britain’ and ‘all progressive 
democracies’ carrying the world towards WWIII.254 The MW’s propagation of such 
‘common sense’ understandings sought to counter the interpretations of the British 
establishment and capitalist press, and draw adherents to their cause, whilst also 
garnering support for policies that assisted Russian foreign policy objectives.  The 
Greek coverage also illustrates that whereas the left-wing AEU Journal contributors 
and the communist MP contributors usually concluded that the cause of society’s 
problems were structural (capitalism), their response to Truman illustrates that they 
still considered agency important (even when fundamentally shaped by structures). 
The conspicuous absence in the NUGMW Journal of comment on any Greece is 
indicative of their shutting down dissent and debate on issues that questioned 
Government policies and gave ammunition to the capitalist press and Tory 
opposition.   
 
Attitudes to Germany 
 
Any international fraternity expressed in the NUGMW did not extend to Germans in 
the immediate post-war period.  However, in 1947 there was a temporary volte-face, 
when they suggested that: ‘If you have weak stomachs, find sweet the taste of 
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vengeance, or feel that it would be disloyal to slain sons to sympathize with the 
Germans, don’t visit Germany’.255 Then, by May 1948, they reverted, reporting 
Germans to be unchanged, and that ex-Nazis were not only free but being 
appointed to positions of authority (after the de-Nazification programmes were 
effectively abandoned).  The NUGMW alleged (without citing any evidence) that the 
Germans ‘ache to be together in the sense that they are of one mind, obeying one 
will, … working and planning towards their ideal of complete unanimity - which 
would be just hell to us.’256  By 1951, in the Cold War context, the NUGMW 
suggested that many Germans considered that:  
Hitler was not wrong in most of his ideas, but only in some of his methods. … 
they are laughing … at our failure to get the Russians to see right and reason 
… and become daily surer that the West cannot adjust the balance without 
their help.257  
Thus, reinforcing their status as a dangerous and untrustworthy ‘other’.  
Conversely, the AEU’s contributors’ attitudes towards the German people was 
fraternal.  Atrocities were blamed on the German High Command, and they 
suggested that condemning the German people because they failed to overthrow 
Hitler ‘is as undemocratic and unreasonable as Nazism’.258 The idea that German’s 
were all militaristic was countered, for instance, R. M. Fox’s article on the peace and 
nature loving post- WWI ‘Wandervogels’ youth movement. 259   Fox’s interpretations 
of international affairs were heavily influenced by the consequences of Versailles, 
his socialism, and his internationalism (even during the war he never attacked the 
German people).  This led him to suggest that Germany could achieve peace and 
democracy:  
If the people are helped and encouraged as the Russians are doing … But if 
every democratic aspiration is met by repression … despair will rise again 
and the old militarist ghosts … will triumph.260  
                                                          
255 J. Yarwood, ‘Antidote to Hate’, NUGMW Journal, (December, 1947), pp. 362-3. 
256 J. Yarwood ‘Now, ‘What about the Germans?’, NUGMW Journal, (May, 1948), p. 135. 
257 J. Yarwood, ‘Up and Coming Again’, NUGMW Journal, (January, 1951), p. 6. 
258 J. W. Smith, ‘Do we Believe in a Soft or a Hard Peace for the Germans?’ AEU Journal, (June, 
1945), p. 180.  




 Like many on the left he understood fascism was capitalism’s counter-offensive 
against socialism and workers control; consequently, a necessary condition for 
extinguishing fascism was to eradicate capitalism and international finance’s power. 
German reconstruction on Socialist lines was advocated, as the ‘new world order’ 
necessitated the prevention of US attempts to reconstruct the ‘old trusts … with 
American capital, so that some of the profits can go to American magnates and, in 
due course…, they can begin re-arming the German state.’261 They saw this 
exemplified in the post-war treatment of the Nazi funder Baron Kurt von Schroeder 
(who had strong US banking and oil links) who was given a ‘decisive role in the bi-
zonal Western Zones of Germany’.262 Publishing such material underscored the 
continued danger of fascism and its link with capitalism; it was doubtless hoped that 
giving readers this information would motivate their support for those groups and 
resolutions that sought to counter pro-US and pro-capitalist policies. 
The MW sought to engender a sense of disgust about Western Governments’ 
policies enacted in Germany, and an admiration for Russian actions.  They 
recommended reading Gordon Schaffer’s Russian Zone, which reported that the ex-
Nazi gentry continued their affluent lifestyle in the Western Zones, whilst in the East, 
they were assigned productive work or signed-on at Labour Exchanges; a 
turnaround that ‘horrifies many middle-class Germans more than all the crimes of 
the Nazis.’263 Thus, readers were reminded of the class equality that a Soviet type 
system involved.  Their anti-US polemics employed the example of German (and 
Japanese) low wages, which were blamed on US capital, interests, and cost cutting 
methods, which meant German competition was endangering British jobs, wages 
and conditions.264  The MW recommended solutions through the WFTU. 265  
The MW and AEU contributors condemned the subsequent suggestion of rearming 
Germany due to the perceived Soviet threat.266   The 1951 freeing of Hitler’s arms 
manufacturer Alfred Krupp, and restoration of his property, US talks with ex Nazi 
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generals, and Germany’s changed status to ‘future allies’ in the fight for ‘Democracy 
and Freedom’,267 were similarly denounced.268    
Despite the journals extensive European coverage, the advancing Red Army’s 
crimes against German civilians, the Nuremburg Trials, and issues around a 
European Customs Union, were all omitted.      
Relations with Russia 
 
The Soviet Union’s pivotal role in defeat of fascism challenged preconceptions and 
impacted the political consciousness of many in the immediate post war period, 
resulting in a flourishing of fraternal sentiment towards Russia. However, this was 
patchy, inconsistent and at times contradictory, and did not last (except in the MW).  
Initially after the war, AEU commentators noted with satisfaction political 
declarations favourable to consolidating Anglo-Soviet TU unity.269  The AEU sent a 
delegate goodwill mission.270  George Meany’s (AFL) negative attitude towards the 
Soviets was criticised, and contrasted with Attlee’s statement: ‘Unless we mean 
what we say when we declare all men to be brothers, we shall fail to create the 
world we desire.’271  However, geo-political changes had consequences in the 
domestic ideas environment and by 1947, the AEU Journal decided to challenge 
this and published a condemnation of Tories and ‘crypto-Tories on the Labour 
benches’ (such as Bevin) who judged that ‘all evils’ emanated from Eastern Europe, 
whilst considering that: 
Neither the British Foreign Office, packed by Tory gentlemen, nor the 
American State Department, packed with vicious enemies of the American 
working class, had ever said or done anything incorrect.272 
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The American House of Representatives’ decision that Soviet dominated countries 
should not receive Marshall Aid, was also evidenced, which further reinforced an 
anti-American sentiment, especially as ‘Spain with its murder and thuggery’ 
received no such disapprobation.273  
The NUGMW contributors’ general mistrust of communists soon became 
intertwined with their assessment of Russia. Outside the trade sphere (considered 
mutually beneficial in all the journals), the NUGMW were sceptical and suspicious of 
the Soviet Union.  The Czechoslovakian situation, the Soviet response to the 
Marshall Plan, and the Yugoslavian break with Cominform, were catalysts in 
creating an anti-Soviet hysteria by 1948.  In this ideas environment the NUGMW 
Journal complained: 
Everyone who elects to dissect Russian words and Russian acts 
dispassionately is accused of betraying mankind by sowing distrust … Isn’t 
that precisely what the Fascists said when we dared to criticize Hitler.274  
However, Russia’s dire post-war state was acknowledged,275 including her inability 
‘to wage war against any first-class Power’ due to severe internal stresses, no atom 
bomb, or ‘anything which the Anglo-Americans haven’t got in a superior form’.276    
Nonetheless, the NUGMW’s H. L. Bullock (1949) praised: 
… the realistic views of AFL towards Communism in general, Russian aims 
in particular … there can be no real peace or progress … as long as the 
USSR press on with their ideological totalitarianism in an attempt to dominate 
our world.277   
Russian domestic policy was similarly portrayed as ominous; her TUs ‘dragoon the 
worker into … ever-increased output and acquiescence … Any person who protests 
against this … is dubbed a fascist’.278  This, however, did not inhibit the NUGMW’s 
own relentless appeals for increased production, or labelling as ‘Communist’ 
anyone agitating for industrial action.   
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Jack Tanner stated (1947) that ‘Russian policy has not been altogether 
understandable, but no justification to suppose aggressive purpose’.279  In 1950 he 
repeated (without endorsing) the Stalinist view, that ‘there are forces amongst the 
capitalist powers who do not wish for a permanent settlement with the Soviet Union 
and the countries under its control.’  But, he added that ‘these would count for little’ 
if they proved they would not interfere in other countries.280 Even in the Cold War 
environment of 1950 - 1951, occasional AEU voices questioned the supposed 
Russian threat, when it was the US that had troops in Britain and ‘hundreds of other 
places … and … American Generals … publicly speculated on how they should use 
the Atom Bomb’.  Moreover, it was the US was that was the protagonist in crushing 
Soviet proposals to the UN for banning the atom bomb and disarmament.’281  The 
MW concurred. 282  
For the MW contributor’s, the USSR could do no wrong.  They challenged the 
dominant narrative and published glowing reports of different aspects of Soviet 
planning, industry, workers’ conditions, education, health care, and full 
employment,283  and reported on union delegation visits to the USSR in flattering 
terms.284  They also cited the  UN Economic Commission for Europe’s Economic 
Survey for 1948, which showed European industrial production increased 16% in 
1948, whilst in the USSR it increased some 28% (without Marshall Plan Aid),285 and 
in doing so contested the necessity of US money and its accompanying influence. 
Notably, although export embargoes with Russia were significant issues in the MW 
and the AEU Journals, the Berlin blockade and airlift received no direct mentions.  
Korea 
North Korea’s invasion of the South kept international communism a live issue.  The 
conflict wrenched open the schism between the two power blocks as the Western 
Nations feared its repeat elsewhere (especially in light of Czechoslovakia and 
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Yugoslavia).286 Positions became further entrenched, and language more 
inflammatory, especially within the NUGMW:  
We are too near the grim results engineered by Hitler … to be taken in by … 
those troglodytes behind the Iron Curtain and their stooges, catspaws and 
deluded supporters on this side of the Iron Curtain.287 
Thus, the NUGMW underlined its position on what they considered the 
unacceptable nature of socialism when expressed as communism; contextual 
changes merely shifted the focus from domestic communists as the source of evil to 
the USSR (akin to the time of the Nazi-Soviet Pact).  The NUGMW fully endorsed 
the UN, British, and American Government (and TUC), position.288  No dissent was 
published. 
The AEU Journal did not directly question the establishment’s version of events, 
however, it published a member’s letter expressing shock at its acceptance of the 
‘version of events in Korea as presented by our US overloads’,289 and sought to 
situate it in a longer-term perspective:  
The struggle did not begin … with North Korea`s attack on South Korea. … 
Japan`s attack on the US at Pearl Harbour. …. Japan`s invasion of 
Manchuria….  All the great Powers had, or have, or aspire to have, colonial 
interests in and around the Pacific. And the Asiatic peoples are in revolt 
against that kind of exploitation and political tutelage.   
But, the AEU warned readers not to ‘expect deliverance … by substituting for the 
colonial policy of western capitalist imperialism the Communist imperialism of Soviet 
Russia,’290 whilst also reminding them that: 
History is strewn with … crimes committed in the name of Liberation, … the 
excuse for wholesale murder of decent freedom-loving peoples who dared to 
resist the so-called Liberators.291   
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Socialist propaganda raised awareness of capitalist states’ motives; Cominform’s 
declared aim to liberate nations ‘from Imperialist despotism’ was deemed equivalent 
to the Capitalists, as it included ‘overthrowing democratically elected governments 
… the liquidation of free trades unions and co-operative organisations’ as illustrated 
in ‘Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Poland.’292 Both sides were judged to 
bear equal guilt.  The AEU warned that further military expenditure would harm 
Britain’s economic position, and consequently impair British international influence, 
thereby indirectly strengthening Cominform.293 
The MW advised caution over ‘lurid tales in the millionaire press’ regarding Korea, 
and advised that any solution must involve the Soviet Union and the new Chinese 
Government.294  They noted that the personnel the Americans selected to replace 
Japanese officials were ‘from the privileged classes … of the Korean extreme 
right’.295  The Information Bulletin for the WFTU (Number 17, 1950) was cited, 
describing South Koreas’ dire conditions, the lack of TU rights, the brutal repression 
of democracy, and how, since liberation, ‘over 150,000 of its active members have 
been killed’ and ‘89,000 arrests in seven months under the law on subversive 
activities’.296  Stanley Earl, (a Labour Consultant to the Marshall Plan Mission, and 
CIO official), was reported as stating in a radio interview (July 19th, 1950) that 
Korea was: 
… a complete full police state …  The government … was systematically 
looting the Republic of Korea; while many Koreans were starving the 
Americans were living handsomely.297   
Conditions in the North, by contrast, the MW reported, were steadily rising, with land 
reform and nationalisation.  Thus, the MW’s portrayal of the conditions on the 
ground again challenged the dominant narrative propagated by the mainstream 
press and the establishment, and in doing so they attempted to rally support against 
such hegemonic understandings and the Government policies based upon them. 
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Education continued to be promoted throughout the period of the Labour 
Government.  The AEU restarted its ‘recommended reading’ column in December 
1945 (cut due war-time paper rationing).  Conversely, the NUGMW ceased their 
regular book recommendations after the war.  The NP/MW reading 
recommendations continued unchanged. The new post-war order meant new areas 
were considered to require exploration and study, such as ‘Understanding 
Government’ (including: Cabinet duties and Ministerial powers; Bill preparation and 
implementation; the Law, and government).298  A. J. Caddick, (AEU) reminded 
readers that whereas ‘slaves don’t need to know about politics and economics’, 
workers do, ‘as powerful vested interests are only too anxious to mislead him.’299    
As in previous periods, context driven courses were introduced, such as ‘A Working 
Class Plan for Britain,’ ‘Let us face the Future’, ‘The Termination of ‘Lease-Lend’, 
(American Loan, Marshall Aid conditionalities, Government White Papers, 
Economic Surveys for 1947 and 1948), ‘The Part of the Trades Unions in 
Reconstruction,’300 ‘The Western Union’,301 and ‘Running a Nationalized 
Industry’.302 Also new specific ‘training for management’ courses were established, 
encompassing economics, marketing, industrial relations, and psychology, both to 
fulfil the new roles they believed were opening up, but also to remove ‘the old curse, 
working class’s sense of inferiority’.303  However, the AEU highlighted the unfulfilled 
aspirations of the 1945 Ince Report, which had recommended a more extensive 
service, including a Central Juvenile Employment Executive.304  The TGWU 
decision to increase their annual education and training budget to £75,000 
(including courses on technical efficiency and scholarships to Ruskin) was 
considered by the AEU worthy of emulation.305 
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The NUGMW Journal contributors concentrated on workers who were, theoretically, 
becoming partners in tripartite working.306  New courses on Factory organisation, 
management and productivity, Industrial Relations and the law, were introduced, 
covering industrial organization, finance, costing, job evaluation, joint-consultation, 
time-and-motion study, and personnel issues,307 and included Ministry of Labour 
and National Service supported ‘Training within Industry’ schemes which focused 
on the spreading of industrial ‘know how’.308   The changes to the voluntary release 
of youths for part-time study, and the Juvenile Employment Service, were 
welcomed.309   
E. Fletcher, (TUC production dept. secretary) promoted the TUC’s production and 
management courses for shop stewards as teaching stewards to ‘talk the same 
language as managements’ to make them more ‘effective in negotiations’.  
However, the MW rebutted this position, insisting that the ‘the unions’ job was to 
teach a different language – socialism as opposed to the employers hunt for profits.’ 
310 
The idea that ‘orthodox’ education merely conditioned children to fulfil the role that 
the ruling classes assigned them, continued to permeate the journals, along with the 
idea that decent working class education was required to elicit freedom of 
thought.311  School education may not have included formal politics teaching, but it 
continuously imbued pupils with the ideology of the institution.312  Thus, the unions’ 
attitudes to public education continued unchanged, and the imperative of working 
class education through summer and weekend schools, postal-courses and 
scholarships continued, and new media, such as film, were offered free to branch 
meetings.313 
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The theme of inequality in children’s and youth’s access to education, continued 
post-war.  The Barlow Committee’s findings were reported, that just 20% of British 
youths with intelligence above the average of university students, gained places, 
thus depriving youth and the nation of their potential.  Additionally, both the AEU 
and NUGMW Journals pointed out, that whilst in America one in 150 youths 
attended university, in Britain it was only about one in 1,000.314  Thus, Britain lagged 
well behind the US investment into human, as well as physical capital, (with 
consequences for technological advances and productivity gains).  
The 1944 Education Act, was considered to be a significant improvement on the 
prior situation.  Nonetheless, the AEU condemned its continuation of class based 
selection and education.  They lobbied for the Government to reconsider its three-
pronged approach which was deemed to be imbued with disequilibrium of esteem, 
and the imposition of categorisations which would sustain social divisions.315 
Instead, ‘multilateral’ (comprehensive) schools were recommended which ‘would 
provide a’ common core ‘with facilities for bias according to ability and aptitude, all 
radiating from that core’ and thus ‘eliminate the inferiority stigma when a child in a 
poor family enters a grammar school’.316  
Both the AEU and the NUGWM journals output accorded with Mr Tomlinson’s 
(Minister of Education) statement that ‘Just as the individual who has ceased to 
learn has ceased to live, so it is with nations. The more complex the problems of 
modern life, the more we need to foster the intellectual abilities of our people.’317  
This included adult education, which the NUGMW posited ‘raises the level of 
popular discussion and private thinking’, necessary for democracy to function 
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Diminished and Lost Power: the 1950 and 1951 Elections  
 
From the summer of 1948 onwards, the journals attempted to minimise public 
dissent against the Government in anticipation of a forthcoming general election.  
The NUGMW reported the absence of the ‘usual voices’ of opposition to the 
National Executive Council (NEC) at the 1948 Labour Party Conference.319  At the 
1949 Conference Jack Tanner (despite his criticism of Labour Party foreign and 
domestic policies) endorsed the undertaking to prevent internal dissensions 
weakening the Labour Government’s chances.  He largely adopted the NUGMW, 
the TUC and Labour Party leadership’s position of ‘responsible unionists’, 
subscribing to Government policies, and speaking of the ‘logic realism, and firmness 
of the Chancellor’.320  Nonetheless, the AEU Journal also continued publishing 
multiple dissenting voices, including concerns that ‘the structure of Society remains 
unchanged’,321 and complaints that Labour Party attempts to garner middle-class 
support ‘is a process of bribery at the expense of the workers’.322 AEU contributors 
also warned that ‘present loyalty can be strained and could be broken if the political 
leaders moved over too far to the right.323  Instead they advocated socialist 
solutions, premised on a belief that if the public were informed about and 
understood such solutions, they would support them as obvious and common-
sense. 
As the 1950 election approached the NUGMW Journal offered their customary 
advocacy for Labour (and reminders of life under the Tories).  In contrast, the AEU 
Journal engaged heavily in overt electioneering, employing various tools and 
formats, from cartoons, to histories, ideological discussions, and polemics. An 
emphasis on the Labour Government’s achievements was generalised in the 
journals and they all sought to actively engage the readership in securing electoral 
victory.   
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The 1950 General Election results disappointed.  Despite garnering over a million 
more votes than 1945, their majority dropped to five. Very limited inquests into the 
results were published.  The fact that the Labour Party polled less votes than the 
combined membership of the three prongs of the Labour Movement (including those 
whose involvement only extended to their co-op ‘divi’) caused concern and 
bemusement, as it was considered that even those loosely linked with the labour 
movement should have still have come under its influence.  AEU contributors 
postulated that trade unions’ spirit needed resurrecting.324  However, they 
welcomed the paucity of the Communists vote. Increased Working class education 
and efficient ‘propaganda’ (marketing) was recommended.  The Daily Herald was 
considered the most effective conduit, but its two million circulation signified that 
nearly 6 million Trade Unionists affiliated to the TUC got their news elsewhere;325 a 
situation they deemed needed to be rectified. 
1951 Election 
The 1951 election loss was presented as a moral victory.  It was noted that the 
Labour Party had the highest ever vote (48.7%, compared with 46.1% in 1950, and 
48% in 1945).  This was taken as evidence that Labour Party policies had popular 
support.  The AEU considered that the defeat would facilitate a period of self-
criticism, including reflection on Bevan and his colleagues’ resignation and ‘Socialist 
doctrine and practice in the light of actual experience’.326 The NUGWM, despite an 
antipathy the Tories, declared that ‘the elected Government is the Government’ 
repeating the TUC undertaking ‘to work amicably with whatever Government is in 
power, and through consultation jointly with Ministers and with the other side of 
industry to find practical solutions to the social and economic problems facing this 
country.’327 The MW considered this stance to be inconsistent with rank and file 
opinion.328   
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This study was embarked upon with no preconceptions about the political cultures 
that close examination of the journals’ content might expose. Rather, it sought an 
understanding of the ideologies and political cultures and the thinking that drove 
activists, institutional choices, and recommendations, beyond formal resolutions 
proposed, seconded, or supported at various Conferences and Congresses.  The 
unions created the Labour Party as the movement’s political wing in order to 
achieve a parliamentary presence to further their cause, theoretically leaving them 
to pursue their interests in the industrial sphere. However, the journals expose this 
to be a misrepresentation and gross simplification of the role the unions and their 
publications actually played.  The unions remained political by their very nature.   
Trade unions were unquestionably political in their aspirations and deeds, but no 
single union was involved in all forms of political action simultaneously, and thus 
they felt justified in claiming that they were non-political.  Moreover, even when 
purely industrial issues were being pursued, like a fair-days’ pay for fair-days’ work, 
and improved terms and conditions, normative judgements around what is deemed 
‘fair’ are involved, and indeed extend into questions as to whether ‘fair’ was even 
possible under a system where asymmetries and unfairness were considered 
structural.   
 
The proportion of each union paying the political levy indicates that political 
commitment amongst members was far lower than the union journal content would 
suggest.  Moreover, members paying the levy did not necessarily mean that they 
actively supported the Labour Party; indeed, the effect of changes to the ‘opt in’ / 
‘opt out’ legislation on numbers paying, indicates that apathy, not commitment, 
influenced many. Thus, the extent to which the explicitly socialist ideology (of 
various strands) that continually imbued and shaped the journals’ content is 
significant and raises important questions, including why there was a paucity of 
correspondence printed complaining about this, or advocating alternative 
perspectives.1 
                                                          




The changes in the political cultures evidenced within the journals were not simple 
or linear, but were the manifestation of the consequences of complex contextual 
factors combined with prevailing ideas environments (themselves historically 
influenced) which acted upon the contributors’ and the trade unions’ matrices of 
ideas, concepts, and priorities.  There was also an overt promotion of the Labour 
Party and of Socialism, and notably, wherever alternatives to the Labour Party 
position were suggested by journal contributors, they were almost invariably to the 
left. Indeed, socialism pervaded interpretations of all other emergent themes within 
the journals.  The result is a continuous dialogue of leftist politics, where all is 
political.  Nonetheless, the success of trade unions depended on their ability to 
recruit eligible workers of all political persuasions, not merely Labour Party 
supporters or socialists.  
 
Temporal Contexts  
 
It is only by understanding the influences, insights, comprehensions, and historical 
conditions that shaped the authors’ and audiences’ ideological interpretations, that it 
is possible, following Skinner, to ‘see things their way’. The time period analysed 
here falls into three broad periods, the inter-war period, WWII, and that of the post-
war Labour Government (which have been further subdivided for the purposes of 
this study).  The wider environment of each of these periods exposes how the 
journals’ contributors interpreted and related to their changing context, and how this 
impacted the political cultures that the journals embodied.  However, none of these 
periods is discreet nor uniform, rather they need to be understood in a complex 
evolving whole, which could have developed quite differently.   
Trade unions shared many commonalities with the society in which they were 
embedded.  They were typically male dominated and patriarchal, hierarchical, and 
authoritarian, with officials often occupying their positions for long periods, and 
being guided in their trade unionism by reference to the rulebook.  The culture, 
norms, values and mental horizons in the society concerned had a profound impact 
on the unions as institutions, and in some cases subjugating their socialism, for 
instance, to patriotism, or to their attitudes to the British Empire and British 
exceptionalism, or in relation to gender issues.  The prevailing patriarchal norms 
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within civil and industrial life, meant gender inequality was an invisible, common-
sense part of social relations.  The AEU Journal traditionally ignored women; they 
were not treated as individuals, merely dependents insofar as tax and benefits were 
concerned.  Indeed, attitudes to women came across in the surplus meaning in non-
industrial articles.  For instance, when reviewing fiction like ‘Love on the Dole’, the 
contributors could only empathise with the father’s position, the plight of the 
women’s characters was treated as irrelevant.2  
Journal content was unrelated to the movement’s empirical strength.  The extreme 
weakness of the unions in the early 1930s and the LP’s position as an enfeebled 
parliamentary opposition, was not evidenced in the union journals, nor did it dent 
their confidence in socialism.  The contrary was the case.  The 1930s depression 
was interpreted as indisputable evidence of the failure of capitalism, especially 
when juxtaposed to the reported success of the Russian five year plans, which 
many interpreted as proof that socialism could succeed (especially the effectiveness 
of central planning), regardless of whether the specific way it had been 
implemented in Russia was approved of.  Implicit within the text was the 
presumption that the collapse of capitalism would drive the previously unconvinced 
towards socialism, and that they would embrace it.  The non-Marxist socialist 
contributors believed that this would occur when people were exposed to socialist 
ideas that resonated with their circumstances.  The CPGB (and non CPGB 
Marxists) contributors to the NP/MW and AEU, expected that they would come to 
the fore through the industrial sphere as the system imploded.  Such convictions 
were considered common sense by many, but history shows that both 
interpretations were mistaken.  The journal contributors chose to deal with the 
dichotomy between capitalism’s apparent implosion on the one hand, and the 
weakness of the Labour movement on the other, by ignoring the latter and focusing 
their members’ attention on the former.  They attempted through the journals to 
bolster faith in the Labour movement, and evidenced an unquestioning and largely 
un-reflexive faith in socialism.  This formed a constant strand in the unions’ political 
culture, within and between the journals, throughout the entire period.  
The 1931-1939 journal output was dominated by contributors who had direct 
experience of WWI (and its aftermath), as soldiers, conscientious objectors (who 
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were over represented amongst contributors), or workers, and, after WWI, the 
‘betrayed’ unemployed.3    Thus, journal articles reflected the contributors’ formative 
wartime experiences, and their subsequent embeddedness in a culture that relived 
and reinterpreted the war experience through poetry, literature, and theatre in the 
late 1920s.  Their pacifism reflected a dominant strand in British political culture of 
the time, and thus in the early 1930s the official union journals presented it as a 
non- controversial ‘common sense’ shared understanding.  They reinforced this 
stance through devices like the publication of arms and aircraft manufacturers 
profits, questioning the legitimacy of the private manufacture of arms, and made 
declamatory statements of how wars were instigated to further the interests of 
powerful groups at the expense of the working classes. The pacifism presented was 
not subject to critical analysis and was often contradictory.  For instance, many who 
presented themselves as pacifists supported the Soviet Union and its Government, 
despite the Bolsheviks having attained power through violence and engaging in a 
five-year Civil War in which some 10 million died. Only the rise of European fascism 
and the Spanish Civil war led to pacifist assumptions being challenged and 
reassessed, although the NUGMW retained a pacifist agenda longer than the other 
journals.4 
The WWII context led to the mutation of the matrices of political concepts that 
formed political cultures. The trade unions had reason to feel empowered as union 
membership surged and they were increasingly incorporated into government and 
accepted as an ‘estate of the realm’, an essential element in the pursuit of victory. In 
Freeden’s terms, the war led to political concepts being re-positioned in response to 
the changed environment, distancing themselves or moving towards previously 
adjacent or core concepts.  Such patterns, and their inter-relationships, continuities, 
and discontinuities, both shaped, and were shaped by, what was politically possible, 
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238 
 
which itself turned on what is contextually possible. For instance, the WWII geo-
political situation precipitated the shifting of the previously peripheral concept of 
nationalism into close proximity with the core concept of human welfare and 
flourishing.    For the NUGMW Journal contributors, the concept of international 
fraternity was marginalised, as the journal turned to patriotic and nationalistic 
fervour, and increasingly, anti-German sentiment (illustrating the mutability and 
permeability of ideologies).  Conversely, although vehemently anti-fascist, the 
internationalism (especially international fraternity amongst workers) of the AEU and 
NP/MW, remained part of the core concept cluster. 
During the war, the official union journals disseminated the previously reviled 
National Government’s propaganda, as national defence and the defeat of fascism 
constrained choices, subsuming previous political priorities and core concepts, 
including domestic socialist goals.  This is evidenced in the official unions 
acquiescence with the Government’s direction of labour.  In contrast, the NP/MW 
initially ignored the war, except when objecting to the direction of labour, and 
instead concentrated on bread and butter issues.  It was only when Russia entered 
the war that this stance changed.  The NP/MW never said a good word about the 
National Governments, but halted their cutting critiques, instead concentrating on 
production drive promotions, effectively suspending adherence to their core 
concepts to further the war effort. This continued for the duration of the war, 
including through the schisms that were developing between the Allies (first 
reported by the NP/MW in 1943). 
The reactions expressed within the AEU Journal were more nuanced. However, 
amid the changes and temporal rearrangements of core concepts, many 
fundamental understandings remained background constants, particularly regarding 
workers’ education, critiques of capitalism, and the desirability of socialism. This 
also applied to some underlying non-socialist cultural norms, for instance gender 
issues.  The AEU finally admitted women in 1943, but explicitly not on equal terms.  
Equal pay campaigns were undertaken, but the underlying ‘fairness’ argument often 
masked their priority of protecting the male wage.  The NP/MW, on the other hand 
(in-line with communist thinking) vigorously pursued gender equality and equal pay, 
including issues such as childcare, in war-time and post war (these were raised in 
the other journals but not with the same conviction).  The changing context from war 
to peace, and the subsequent production drive when women were urged to re-enter 
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the workforce, further stimulated journal discussion over women and equal pay.  
The AEU contributors were split between those who considered it a matter of 
fairness, and others for whom it was an expedient to protect their male membership.  
The NUGMW Journal, despite their long tradition of female membership, was no 
bastion of women’s rights, and as the war drew to an end, its patriarchy bordered on 
misogyny.    
The third overarching period covered by this study was defined by the 1945 Labour 
Government which attempted to actualise collectivist ideas. This new era 
engendered a sense of optimism, and a presumption that the unions would continue 
to grow and expand in influence, and that a Labour Government would be the new 
normal going forward both in Britain and all other European countries.  The trade 
union expectations were that they would be taken into partnership with Government 
and industry, where workers would be treated as equals, and their experience and 
knowledge would be employed for the common good.  
The trade union movement should have felt empowered during this period.  The 
unions exuded goodwill and support for the Labour Government (especially in 
nationalised industries). However, the situation presented its own challenges and 
tensions, particularly when Government policies diverged from union expectations.  
The Labour Government relied on the unions to ensure its economic and industrial 
policy success, which inhibited the unions from taking any actions that may have 
destabilised or undermined the situation or the government. It also restricted debate 
and socialist analysis as solidarity, loyalty, and a deep desire for the Labour 
administration to succeed came to the fore, inhibiting criticism.  This resulted in 
notable absences in the journals. For instance, no indication was given that the 
Government entered office without detailed plans for translating their aspirations 
into workable policies in many areas.   
The lack of policy analysis or any attempt to hold the 1945 Labour Government to 
account, resulted in increased commonality between journals on domestic issues 
early in the Attlee Government.5  However, this did not last. Divergent ideological 
stances resurfaced as the parliament progressed. The NUGMW offered uncritical 
support for the Labour administration and policies.  The AEU supported the 
Government, but became increasingly critical on issues such as the form 
                                                          
5 They differed greatly on foreign policy. 
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nationalisation took, fiscal policy, the U.S. loan, Marshall Plan Aid, and what they 
deemed the Churchillian foreign policy of the Attlee Government, especially in 
Greece.  Disappointment and a sense that opportunities had been missed began 
permeating AEU Journal coverage, and schisms grew between the left’s socialist 
aspirations and the LP’s policies.  For instance, insofar as nationalisation was 
concerned, there was a sense that whilst ownership had changed, and health and 
safety issues were foregrounded, much else remained untouched; those who 
believed that nationalisation would embody socialisation and worker control were 
disappointed. However, even where dissent was voiced it was not vigorously 
pursued for fear of providing Labour’s opponents with ammunition, and thwarting 
the chances of the Labour Party being returned to power.  The NP/MW dissent was 
also initially muted, but became more vigorously from 1947 onwards as the Cold 
War evolved.  
Thus, the structure of the British labour movement, as well as its ethos and the 
reciprocal deontic relationships between the industrial and political wings, greatly 
constrained the unions during this period. For some, it also led to a reassessment of 
fundamental questions concerning what their relationship should be with a Social 
Democratic Government.  This was especially so for some communists.  For 
instance, Arthur Horner thought that nationalisation would engender a corporatist 
collaborative relationship between the miners and their employers, characterised by 
reciprocity and the pursuit of common aims and the national good within a national 
plan, extending workers’ interests beyond narrow bread and butter issues.  Horner’s 
ideas and his ‘Miners’ Charter’ presented an ideal form of the type envisioned by 
the majority of journal contributors (with the notable exception of the post-war 
NUGMW under Williamson) and which contrasted with nationalisation as it was 
implemented.6    
Changes in office holders also elicited shifts in the journals’ political cultures.  For 
instance, the NUGMW Journal’s ideological position typically echoed that of their 
General Secretaries: Chas Dukes’ succession (1936) produced a move to the left 
(reversed during WWII); when Tom Williamson succeeded Dukes (1946), the 
                                                          
6 Attaining this ideal type was hindered by the LP’s hierarchy’s suspicion and scepticism about 
worker control, combined with disunity amongst the multiple unions which impeded their ability to 
speak for an entire industry, which was further hampered by continued shop stewards’ independence 
and militancy. See for instance, Fishman, The British Communist Party and Trade Unions; Fishman, 
Arthur Horner: A Political Biography.   
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journal shifted markedly rightwards, and their support for the Labour Government 
changed from general, to uncritical support, with a censure of all debate that 
questioned the Government’s line.  The retirement of J. R. Clynes as NUGMW 
President curtailed the NUGMW’s extensive coverage and promotion of the Co-op 
movement.  There were similar mutations in the political culture of the AEU Journal 
with changes in office holders, but these were more nuanced than in the NUGMW.  
For instance, Jack Tanner’s accession to the AEU’s Presidency in 1939, initially 
marked a leftward movement in journal content.  Then, in the context of the Labour 
Party Government and the Cold War, Tanner himself moved increasingly 




The influence of context on political thinking was exemplified in the journals 
changing attitudes to Russia.  Ideas concerning Russia and communism were multi-
layered, complex, intertwined, and contained inconsistencies and contradictions.  
Throughout the inter-war period Russia was the embodiment of lived socialism, with 
progress, no economic depressions, and the people, not shareholders, benefiting 
from their labours.   For many the subsequent Nazi-Soviet Pact and the invasions of 
Finland and Poland, challenged such received understandings.  The NUGMW and 
AEU Journals evidenced a considerable anti-Soviet and anti-communist backlash 
(although many AEU contributors disbelieved that Russia had shed its Socialist 
ideals and befriended Nazism).  The NP/MW judged the Soviet’s behaviour 
expedient and defensive.  Notably its circulation rose despite anti-communist 
sentiment in Britain supposedly being at its (pre-Cold War) height.7   
Russia’s entry into the war as an ally modified sentiment, and her subsequent 
successes falsified capitalist propaganda about her inability to supply national 
requirements, or that Russians would be disinclined to defend their state and 
system.  Russia’s success was recruited by the NP/MW and leftist AEU contributors 
and attributed to her Communism, and was used to rally readers to the cause.  The 
war-time growth in Russia’s popularity elicited a defensive response in the NUGMW 
(and reported TUC statements), which sought to disconnect admiration for Russia 
                                                          
7 The NP/MW’s circulation rose from 27,000 to 45,000 (May, 1939-May, 1940). 
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from British communists who, most NUGMW, and some AEU, contributors, believed 
had long been a malevolent disruptive force.   
Attacks on communists were directly related to Russia’s changing popularity, and 
they became ferocious whenever the CP sought Labour Party affiliation. The AEU 
and NP/MW supported affiliation, a position that continued post-WWII.  Comintern 
dissolution in 1943 did not alter perceptions as expressed in the journals (nor did 
the CPGB’s 1950 adoption of the British Road to Socialism).  The evolution of the 
Cold War, the post-war Bolshevisation / Sovietisation of Eastern Europe with one 
party states and soviet style state planning and ownership, shifted the focus for the 
anti-communists writing in the journals from domestic communists as the source of 
evil, to Russia (akin to the time of the Nazi-Soviet Pact), reinforcing the old 
dictatorship versus democracy dichotomy.  
 
The ‘Right Type of Socialism’  
 
Attitudes to communists were influenced by the presence of, and beliefs about, the 
‘actually existing socialism’ of Russia and its influence on contemporaneous 
debates and discussions within socialism.  This included the realisation for many 
(acknowledged and unacknowledged) that Soviet socialism did not take the form 
that many envisaged.  The anti-communists, particularly NUGMW contributors, cited 
this to underlined the schism between what they considered unacceptable socialism 
(communism), and what was (for them) the ‘right type’ of socialism, that is 
democratic socialism and social democracy.  The identification and condemnation 
of unacceptable ideas forms as much a part of ideology as the dissemination of 
sanctioned matrices of belief and values, and often those who were targeted were 
those who held related but distinct ideas. 
 
The unions support for, or acquiescence in, Labour policy regarding communists 
was complex, conflicted, and context dependent.  The different journals’ attitudes 
reflected their political cultures as they encountered changing environments.  
Nonetheless, all the official union journals contained anti-communist elements; in 
the NUGMW this was almost unanimous; in the AEU, ETU, and The Clerk journals, 
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it formed a significant strand.  Conversely, in the NP/MW, no anti-communist note 
was ever struck.   
Anti-communism was linked to Labour Party policy, but also propagated 
independently in the journals by contributors on ideological grounds (or for some, 
temporal expedience). Throughout the period analysed here communists worked 
through broader movements (similar to the earlier Fabian permeation of other 
organisations,8 although communists were not always open about such actions).  
Many communists legitimised their role in the union, standing openly as communists 
for election for shop steward or union office, often successfully (where they were 
known as dedicated, hardworking, trade unionists), which contrasted with their poor 
showing in general elections (where they were largely unknown to the electorate, 
and thus merely the representatives of an ideology, which the establishment and 
press portrayed as dangerous).  Moreover, from the Popular Front period until the 
Cold War, the CPGB advocated working within the trade unions, and leading 
communists like Arthur Horner believed that effectiveness within the trade union 
movement required trade union rules to be followed, rather than merely adherence 
to the CPGB line.9  
The anti-communists portrayed communists as dangerous fifth columnists who 
sought to destroy the labour movement.  They were concerned that communist 
agitators might build momentum behind movements that could become 
uncontrollable and pursue their goals through extra-parliamentary means, placing 
them outside the constitution, and thus a danger to the prevailing system.  Although 
they considered the system to be flawed and in need of reform, they did not want it 
to be overthrown.  
Nonetheless, others, especially within the AEU Journal, argued that the labour 
movement should be inclusive, and that anti-communists prevented unity of action, 
thereby hindering the socialist cause (such as prohibitions on CPGB backed 
organisations like the National Unemployed Workers Movement). Thus, the 
communist element amongst the AEU Journal contributors and those who 
considered communism a legitimate view was clearly visible in the journal.  Their 
socialist journalists exercised considerable freedom, which at times formed a 
                                                          
8 For instance, the LRD, which was communist in the1930s, had earlier been the Fabian Research 
Department. 
9 Fishman, The British Communist Party and Trade Unions; Fishman, Arthur Horner. 
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continuous dialogue between themselves, and was always written with the 
readership in mind. This stood in contrast to the NP/MW and NUGMW which, whilst 
occupying different socialist extremes (communist on the one hand, and views 
which accorded with the right-wing of the Labour Party on the other), both 
evidenced (almost exclusively) internally homogenous content synchronically, 
although it varied diachronically.    
The ideological gap between the communist NP/MW and the majority voice in the 
Labour Party supporting journals was profound and implicit, but not generally overt 
(with exceptions).  The socialist (communist) ideal was a constant, but the means of 
its attainment went unstated, with no indication given that a non-parliamentary path 
should be taken.  The NP/MW differed from the other journals in their focus on 
industrial discontent and the promotion of militancy in pursuit of wages and 
conditions as a means to politicise workers.  This mutated during the war-time 
production drive, in that grievances continued to be aired but focused on such 
issues as management, waste, the inefficiencies of capitalist production, and day to 
day issues like the presence and quality of canteens and other facilities. 
The NP/MW utilised point of production discontent to expose the exploitation that is 
usually obscured, and to challenge what they saw as the misinformation embodied 
within hegemonic explanations to a much greater extent than the official union 
journals.  They sought to expose workers to the true nature of power relationships, 
making them cognisant of the disparities that endured and their ubiquitous nature, 
which would remain unchanged until underlying structures were altered.  However, 
unlike most communist literature, the NP/MW content included little theoretical and 
ideological discussion.  For instance, whilst they emphasised the economics of 
capitalist firms, their profits and tax expediencies, they largely left it to readers to 
draw their own conclusions from the data presented.  Conversely, the AEU and 
NUGMW company profits and dividends data (often linked to wage disputes) were 
always published with accompanying explanatory narratives which promoted 
socialist ideas and understandings and elucidated capitalists’ exploitation.  
The NP /MW’s political culture remained constant: adherence to the CPGB line.  
From its 1935 inception until 1951, their work within the TUs was central.  However, 
within this their policy position fluctuated with changes in the CPGB policy positions 
(which depended on the Moscow line), from the Popular Front period, through 
245 
 
WWII’s initial categorisation as an imperialist war, to being fully behind the war effort 
and cheerleaders for the production drive which was often prioritised over their 
members’ short-term welfare (justified by the threat of a fascist victory and its 
consequences).  Post WWII the NP/MW supported the 1945 Labour administration, 
before turning against it as the Cold War evolved.  Each iteration of policy was 
presented not as a reappraisal or reassessment, but as non-controversial 
continuations, or responses to external events and conditions. 
 
The Prescribed Means of Attaining Socialism 
 
The unions’ officials and activists contributing to the journals examined in this study 
self-identified as socialists.10 They understood that workers were embedded in 
society, and thus their employment, pay and conditions, depended not merely on 
their industrial environment but on the wider economic, political, social, and judicial 
environments, which were all shaped by the structuring of society on capitalist lines.  
Moreover, workers were also consumers, who became sick and old, and who often 
had dependents.  Thus, the political was understood as all-encompassing, and that 
improving workers’ collective welfare would require societal transformation; 
socialism provided the ideological foundations and direction for the desired change.  
Economic actions were understood to impact the social realm, embodying an ethical 
component with culturally derived social meanings.  The socialisms which 
contributors propagated through the journals ranged from, an idealised distant 
‘nirvana’ that time, parliamentarianism, and paternalistic leaders, would eventually 
deliver, and which considered that members’ political activism should be restricted 
to voting, to the realisable imperative for fundamental structural change on Marxist 
lines.11  Thus, they encompassed all the views of all sections of the Labour Party as 
well as some to its left. 
Notwithstanding the journals’ distinct political cultures, their ideological 
commonalities, including socialist/ labourist core values routinely came to the fore.  
                                                          
10 With the single exception of I. Haig Mitchel who wrote in the AEU Journal and considered that 
socialism and its middle and upper class proponents hindered the cause of trade unionism. 
11 The histories and strands of socialisms and labourism are explored by, for instance, Geoffrey 
Foote, The Labour Party’s Political Thought: A History, (Kent, 1985); Callaghan, Socialism in Britain, 
(Oxford, 1990); or Tony Wright, Socialisms Old and New, (London, 1996). 
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The journals output evidenced a strong drive for fairness, equality and the 
promotion of human flourishing, along with co-operation, unity, and the belief that 
the future can be better than the present, all of which were embodied in the policy 
options they advocated.  In this pursuit, the journals contested the social, political 
and economic hegemonic understandings (propagated by the state, civil institutions, 
and the capitalist press), and elucidated class contradictions, worker exploitation, 
and structural inequities.  They condemned the Conservative and National 
Governments, the capitalists, and their advocates, for complicity in maintaining the 
system.  Nonetheless, often the socialism the journals advocated was of an 
unspecified nature, albeit with specific strands surfacing at different times and within 
different unions.   
The journal contributors assessed the interplays between structure and agency 
which resulted in their various policy recommendations and visions of structural 
changes (and subsequently their assessment of those changes implemented by the 
1945 Labour Government).  The journals all politicised distributional conflicts and 
interpreted them in terms of class, exploitation, and divergent interests.  These were 
expressed most starkly in the NP/MW, but were a constant within all the official 
union journals, although with diminished emphasis post WWII, especially within the 
NUGMW Journal.  The interrelationships between finance, industry, and 
Government were covered, and all pre-1945 Government budget decisions 
presented as expressions of class allegiances and power positions.  This was seen 
as being expressed in, for instance, the inter-war Government’s prioritisation of war-
debt and rearmament over social welfare; the perceived disproportional nature of 
the fiscal burden borne by the working classes; the war-time conscription of people 
but not business surpluses or private wealth, and accusations that war-time wage 
claims were unpatriotic, whilst increased armaments and aircraft industries profits 
were not. The journal contributors utilised such inequalities of treatment to arouse 
and reinforce class and trade union consciousness, interpellating readers into being 
‘one of us’, ‘othering’ the capitalist classes, who, contributors repeatedly made 
clear, lived off the product of the workers’ labours.  Nonetheless, the attitudes 
expressed in the journals also contained contradictions and inconsistencies, 
especially insofar as the NUGMW Journal was concerned, which whilst denigrating 
the privileged and capitalist classes, expressed almost sycophantic attitudes 
towards Royalty, and considered the ennoblement of its top official as the ultimate 
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honour. The contrasting political culture embodied within The Clerk Journal was 
expressed in their denunciation of: 
the action of certain officials of the Trade Union Movement in accepting so-
called honours at the hands of the capitalist class, being strongly of the 
opinion that such action is contrary to the interests of the working-class and 
the Trade Union Movement.12 
The pursuit of socialism through parliamentary means was explicitly promoted in the 
NUGMW Journal; it was usually articulated in the AEU, but left unstated in the 
NP/MW (although they did campaign for the Labour Party in the 1945, 1950 and 
1951 elections).  The majority voice in the official union journals deemed that 
parliamentarianism strengthened and unified the industrial and political wings of the 
movement, and was the only legitimate way forward.  Parliamentarianism was the 
driving force behind the unions’ efforts to motivate their readership into active 
campaigning for a Labour Government to ensure policies were actioned.  
Nonetheless, parliamentarianism was reliant on electoral success, and thus if 
accepted, it effectively shut down much extra-parliamentary political activity.   
The LP’s raison d’etre necessitated achieving power.  It found this challenging even 
in the dire economic conditions of the 1931 and 1935 elections. In the pursuit of 
office, the socialist message was diluted to attract wider support (against the will of 
the left-wing of the party).  This is evidenced in the journals through the Labour MPs 
articles, which were typically amongst the most right-wing in the journals (although 
there were exceptions).  Some theorists, like Ralph Miliband, interpreted the Labour 
movement’s adherence to parliamentarianism, as attempting to fight the class 
struggle whilst adhering to the rules and norms of the system that they were 
seeking to transform; the parliamentary path need not have been followed.   
Miliband’s ‘Parliamentary Socialism’ analysed speeches, resolutions and 
manifestoes, which, for him, evidenced the leaders’ doctrine bound ideology and 
their betrayals of the working classes revolutionary consciousness.  Analysis of the 
union and shop steward journals facilitates an insight into a level of the labour 
movement that the existing literature, which typically looked at the unions from 
either above or below, omitted.  The journals (especially the AEU) illustrate that 
                                                          
12 ‘The Annual Conference’, The Clerk (September, 1935), pp. 54-63. 
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contributors and interested members were not merely seeking to usurp an unfair 
system where they were structurally disadvantaged, but that the complexities of 
lives as lived, their auto-didacticism, and their exposure to socialist framings of 
issues and debate, provided nuanced understandings of intricacies, difficulties, and 
consequence. 
 
Character and Quality of the Journals Socialist Analysis  
 
Just as the types of socialism advocated in the journals varied, so did the character 
and quality of their socialist analysis. Indeed, some important issues were largely 
omitted, such as why a third of the working class vote Conservative, or why Labour 
lost the 1931 election.  Similarly, pertinent issues like the ‘non’ (at a time when most 
workers were not in trade unions) received little analysis, merely condemnation. 13 
The NUGMW Journal typically (but not exclusively) employed rhetoric rather than 
critique or analysis of policy options.  They concentrated on socialist and trade 
union values and beliefs, attempting to persuade people to the socialist view point, 
utilising contemporary examples that would resonate with readers to illustrate 
injustices.  They expounded the predatory nature of employers, and stressed the 
super-normal wartime profits made by the ‘pseudo patriots’ of the defence 
industries, with the National Governments supportive acquiescence.  Notably, when 
the NUGMW analysed and debated worker control, it was in a ‘Readers Forum’ 
rather than articles written by their usual contributors.  Within this ‘Forum’, 
technicalities and the extension of works and shop committees were debated, with 
the overwhelmingly majority of members’ input advocating full workers control 
(markedly to the left of the usual journal content).  Post 1945 the NUGMW changed 
tack and deemed worker control and trade union involvement in management to be 
incompatible with their priority of collective bargaining and protection of workers’ 
                                                          
13 Although the absence of such analysis is notable, market research and sampling based statistical 
analysis was in its infancy for most of the period studied here.  The assumption that imbued the 
journals was that rational voters would vote with their interests, and thus for the LP.  It was only in 
the 1950s that such issues became commonly analysed and the statistics widely trusted.  Such 
studies found 33% of the working class voted Conservative.  See for instance, Robert T. McKenzie, 




interests; thus prioritising defending themselves as an institution over socialist 
ideals. 
Conversely, the AEU rather than merely deploying rhetorical devices, routinely 
discussed and critiqued various different and sometimes conflicting socialist policy 
options both in the abstract sense, and as they related to topical and broader 
issues.14  For instance, as part of the nationalisation / socialisation debate they 
published a series of articles (1943-4) by other trade unions elucidating their post-
war objectives.  This included contributions from the Union of Post Office Workers 
who had first-hand experience of public control, and a public service ethos, and 
protection. This experience led them to recommend that forthcoming 
nationalisations should not follow the Post Office’s pattern, as nationalisation alone 
equated neither to socialisation nor worker control.  They desired the Post Office’s 
transformation from a bureaucratically administered State monopoly into a public 
corporation with worker control.  The AEU concluded their analysis of 
nationalisation and worker control by explicitly rejecting the Morrisonian model on 
the grounds that it perpetuated class interests and power asymmetries, as the 
previous owners were appointed managers and generously compensated, which 
effectively provided them with a profitable exit from distressed industries (which the 
state recapitalised), freeing their investment capital to seek more lucrative returns.  
Nationalisation in itself was deemed insufficient to be considered a socialist act, 
rather it was an expedient that enabled the planning necessary to facilitate a 
socialist agenda (although it was suggested that having been implemented it could 
be restructured on worker control lines).  In hosting such debates, the AEU, through 
the conduit of their journal, questioned dominant ideas, attempted to move debates 
on, and sought to influence the Labour Party (especially the PLP) to change their 
policy position.  In reporting these issues, they also presented counterfactuals and 
questioned whether Labour Party policy choices were in fact truly socialist and 
attempted to influence Labour Party policy indirectly through motivating their 
readership to advocate certain policy options in the public arena and through their 
CLP to effectively supplement the unions own lobbying and submission of 
resolutions.  The desirability of public ownership, however, was never debated; it 
                                                          
14 Such topics ranged from fiscal, economic, and trade policies, to Georgism, changes to ownership 
structures, and international affairs. 
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was self-evident and so went unarticulated, as part of the deeper cultural 
understanding that bound members. 
The NP/MW when commenting on the Conservative or National Government 
policies, or the behaviour of capitalists, were caustically critical (and to a lesser 
extent under the Labour Government, except post 1947, and for instance, 
concerning matters like the Schuman Plan).  However, they tended not to debate 
different socialist options. Instead they generally presented the ‘facts’ as self-
evident, or provided polemics, for instance in their regular articles extoling various 
aspects of the Soviet Union.  No regard was given to people being exposed to the 
same ‘facts’ reaching very different conclusions (as they digested the ‘facts’ through 
different ideological assumptions); it was taken as given that all right minded people 
would, or at least should, share the authors’ understandings.  
The journal contributors’ adherence to socialism was not at the expense of their 
trade unionism; the two ran in parallel; their malleable relative dominance was 
contextual, and varied between the agents and institutions. ‘Trade unionism’ forms 
a significant strand within all the journals, evidenced in their self-perceptions as 
institutions (including their defensive mind-set), their relationships with their 
members, the wider Labour movement, and the employers and Government.  The 
promotion of trade unions and trade unionism entailed issues being omitted (or 
underplayed) as well as being selectively included.15 The journals addressed the 
importance of recruitment and retention for trade unionism and the unions’ 
effectiveness, and also reminded readers of the unions structure and personnel.  
Moreover, the ideas, norms and values of trade unionism were institutionalised and 
became constitutive, contributing to their own reification.  The journals implicitly and 
explicitly communicated trade unionism’s sets of beliefs (unity, collectivism, loyalty, 
community, egalitarianism, selflessness, and co-operation), and its own underlying 
logic, philosophy, and purpose, which drove policy choices and aspirations.  Indeed, 
it was the promotion of such ideology and ethos in all its facets that was the primary 
                                                          
15 For instance, the expulsions of those who rebelled over the EC’s 1931 acceptance of a wage 
agreement without consulting the membership. Those expelled included Jack Tanner, the future 
General Secretary.  The significance of their action, their establishing the Members Rights 
Movement and the (short lived) journal, The Monkey Wrench, received sparse coverage in the AEU 
Journal.  See for instance, Frow and Frow, Engineering Struggles, pp. 92-94; Fishman, The British 
Communist Party and Trade Unions. For AEU Journal coverage, see, Abstract Report of Council 
Proceedings’, AEU Journal, (August, 1931), pp. 4-14; Abstract Report of Council's Proceedings, 
AEU Journal, (September, 1932), p. 6; ‘Letter to be Read Out in Branches: Members Rights 
Movement', AEU Journal, (May, 1932), p. 6. 
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function of their journals. In this pursuit, they also constructed their own historical 
narratives and utilised history to make substantive points, acting as a memory 
prompt for the non-committed.   
In fostering and elevating trade unionism, activists and officials attempted to create 
a sense of TU community, promoting the unions as cultural associations, as well as 
industrial and political institutions.  Social events, outings, sports events (especially 
in the AEU Journal), and children’s outings were all promoted and regularly 
reported.  In doing so they sought to bind their membership together within the 
union and the labour movement more generally, and seek to recruit adherents to 
the socialist political culture that was embodied within the movement, with the goal 
of obtaining a critical mass of followers that would facilitate the election of a Labour 
Party Government, who would implement the socialist policies they believe were 
imperative for the common good.  Thus, P. F. Clarke’s suggestion in his ‘Lancashire 
and the New Liberalism’ that the TU movement could never be to Labour what the 
Non-conformist church was to the Liberal Party, as a network of people, ideas, and 
values,16 somewhat underestimates the movement’s reach.   
The continuous flow of socialist/ labourist ideological interpretations of issues and 
events disseminated in the journals, was designed to raise readers’ political 
awareness and class consciousness; their ideology dictating that knowledge, 
framed by socialist understandings, would motivate readers to take a stance on 
issues and act on them, to be part of the social transformation.  Thus, the unions 
and their journals were unreservedly political, and socialist. 
 
Political Language and Decontested Meanings 
 
The journals all employed value loaded statements in both their overtly political and 
their seemingly politically innocuous content. Nonetheless, whilst the texts 
encompass authorial intentionality which can be easily understood (especially with 
the passage of time), it is much more difficult to ascertain how this content impacted 
the individual readers.  
                                                          
16 P. F. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (London, 1971). 
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The ideological imperative to control political language and decontest meanings is 
evidenced in all the journals.  This is most obvious when decontestations of 
meanings diverged, for instance, during the inter-war period, NUGMW officials 
decontested ‘incorporation’ by presenting it as a means for unions to gain influence 
in Government.  However, for the left-wing of the AEU and for the NP contributors, it 
was an insult aimed at those union leaders deemed to have allowed themselves to 
become incorporated into the capitalist system (and thus no longer representing 
their members who were in conflict with the system).   
Conversely, there was also much commonality in the language the journals 
employed, for instance, linking the word ‘parasite’ with capitalist, and the word ‘dole’ 
for the subsidies paid to capitalists and landowners.  Such content was often 
visceral and personal, constructed to interpellate readers as right thinking people 
into internalising their ideological interpretations.  Imagery was also employed, such 
as the capitalist ‘octopus’ with its invasive tentacles seeking out spaces to exploit, 
whist the co-operative movement was presented as its benevolent counterpart.  
Nonetheless, much of the journals ideological content was implicit, taking the form 
of shared common sense understandings, and evidenced within the surplus 
meanings contained in the texts.  For instance, the idea of ‘them’ (the capitalists and 
their advocates) and ‘us’ was constantly implicitly reinforced (as well as explicitly), 
and the ‘them’ ‘othered’.   The Conservative Government was presented as the 
‘other’ in political party form, and their policy failures were recruited by all the 
journals to emphasise the inefficiencies and failures of capitalism and its immorality, 
whilst in the international arena their inter-war policies were condemned as pro-
fascist (deemed by the journals to be their natural allies). 
Not all dissemination of ideology and ideas was linguistic. Cartoons were highly 
effective (most abundantly employed in the NP/MW), conveying Trade Unionism’s 
ethos, and collective relationships.  They were a simple but highly effective means 
of politicising distributional conflicts, conveying ideas around the workers’ place 
under capitalism, and views of the employer class (and castigation and denigration 
of the ‘non’ insofar as the NUGMW Journal was concerned).  They were rarely 
employed in anything but an explicitly political sense (the exception being Giles in 
the AEU in 1943).  The NUGMW Journal employed photographs as cultural prompts 
(typically unrelated to the adjoining texts); as WWII approached and during the war 
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an image of an idealised rural Britain was promoted, and images of young children 
were employed, implicit representations of what that the country was fighting for. 
 
The Journals and their Readers 
 
In contrast to the dominant narrative, that trade unions were rule bound workers’ 
associations concerned with wages and conditions and parochial matters, the 
unions’ and shop stewards’ journals covered a broad range of issues, and actively 
sought to further the objective to ‘educate, organise and control’.  The extent of the 
international coverage within the union journals, especially the AEU, challenges the 
assumption that foreign policy would be of marginal interest, and instead shows 
journal editors/ contributors belief that readers should understand issues outside the 
domestic and the industrial.  They stressed the importance of working class 
education as a means of countering the obfuscations of the capitalist hegemonic 
views which imbued state institutions, the press, and much of civil society.  The 
extent and persistence of adverts for books and educational courses in the AEU 
Journal (averaging a third of all advertisements, in addition to the journals own 
reading recommendations) attests to a thriving culture of educational self-
improvement. The NP/MW promoted various talks and rallies, it encouraged the 
auto-didactic tradition through book recommendations, and advertised the Left Book 
Club, the Labour Leader, and the Daily Worker. 
The union journals embodied both the doctrine and ethos of the movement as 
understood by the journal contributors, editors, and activists, but only shared by part 
of their membership, as many would have held different ideological positions or 
were politically unengaged.  Ideological disparities and divergences as well as 
commonalities between the journals were evidenced. Each union had its own 
specific political culture, ethos, and unconscious common-sense understandings 
(albeit with much overlap), which all varied over time in reaction to their external 
environment and  changes to journal staff - editors, senior union officers, or other 
contributors, who disseminated their understandings and interpretations, based on 
their common sense assumptions directly through their columns.17  Nonetheless, 
                                                          
17 For instance, the AEU’s employment of the communist, J. T. Murphy, and socialists, such as R. B. 
Suthers and R. M. Fox, ensured specific framings of events. 
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the politics of the left was ever present (which embodied shared socialist core 
values), and anti-socialist voices were absent (other than when prioritising trade 
unionism).   
The journals enabled contributors and editors to establish or reinforce the identity of 
the trade union and the wider labour movement, promoting and bolstering 
confidence and morale.  They sought to inform and engage their audiences, sharing 
their mediated understandings of events and issues, and how these situated 
themselves within the wider debates and with powerful voices of the time. Thus, 
journal content encompassed affirmatively apposite issues, and omitted 
inconvenient issues.  Texts embodied their assumptions of what the readership 
ought to know, and the subjects that ought to interest them, which extended beyond 
organisational rules, collective bargaining, workers’ protection, and pay and 
conditions. Even within the industrial sphere, the unions sought changes beyond 
pecuniary advantage, for instance, through worker control, encroachment on 
managerial prerogatives (as promoted by theorists like G. D. H. Cole), or changes 
to the ownership structure through various forms of socialisation or nationalisation.  
The journals present a one-sided narrative, albeit with audience awareness and 
sensitivities to feedback, as they sought to involve, or at least not alienate, their 
readers (necessitating some authorial self-censorship).  Contributors wrote not as 
sentimentalists, but addressed the larger issues, offering solutions to prevailing 
problems, whilst also disseminating their received understandings, including what 
they considered imaginable, desirable, and feasible. They exercised their power in 
various forms, seeking to influence discourse and set agendas, selectively granting 
voice, whilst also keeping some issues off the agenda (as well as through moral 
obligation and loyalty to the movement and leadership).  In doing so antagonisms 
between different strands of political thought within and between unions and the 
ASSNC were exposed.   The official union journals articles were typically attributed 
to named contributors (union officials, Labour journalists, and MPs) whose ideology 
was embedded in their texts.  The NP/MW articles however were normally 
anonymous due to victimisation fears (typically written by shop stewards and 
activists), but attribution increased during the war, and surprisingly continued as the 
Cold War developed, especially 1946 onwards.   
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As with all studies into the consumption of culture and the media, the motivation of 
consumers in accessing the materials is complex and often obscure. Thus, in the 
present study, the reasons why the readers purchased the journals in the first place, 
such as their particular areas of interest, their ideology, their interpretation and 
value of the content, or even their loyalty to the publishing institutions, is difficult to 
assess.  Journal readers were not necessarily interested in political affairs, 
geopolitics, economics, or history.  Their interests may have been in local or district 
matters or industrial disputes, just as people purchase newspapers for football 
coverage, racing tips, or financial analysis, often irrespective of whether the papers’ 
ideology is at variance with their own.  Thus, it should not be presumed that all 
readers read, let alone internalised, all the ideologically laden content.  
 
The Reach of the Various Trade Union Journals 
 
The journals exposed many thousands of people to a socialist framing of events 
and issues at a time when the mainstream media (the commercial press and the 
BBC) were hostile to such ideological understandings, and instead disseminated 
capitalist hegemonic interpretations.  The journals supplemented the relatively small 
and financially troubled socialist press by acting as a corrective to distortions of 
Labour Party policy disseminated by a media who had a vested interest in 
reproducing current system.  In an environment where Labour found difficulty in 
conveying its message and was constantly seeking ways to project itself (such as 
by investing in the Daily Herald) the unions’ journals effectively communicated 
Labour’s stance and policies (this was especially important during WWII when 
Labour Party machinery was not functioning). The journal texts often took the form 
of declamatory statements aimed at converting readers their own ideological 
position by persuasion.  The journal contributors mediated events and issues 
through their ideology, and employed reflexive reconstructions, reinforcing some 
existing ideas, denigrating others, and framing events to ensure that the resultant 
discursive constructions would lead to an acceptance of their interpretations as 
logical and obvious.  Thus, journal content was imbued with intentionality.   
Opinions differ as to the extent to which continual exposure to ideological framing 
elicits changes in received understandings, but most leftist thought attributes the 
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dissemination of capitalist hegemonic understanding through various institutions 
(including the press) as being powerful instruments in obfuscating reality and 
creating false consciousness.  The alternative framing of issues and events offered 
by the journals challenged such hegemonic interpretations.  The framing of issues 
alone is not a sufficient condition for altering peoples’ mind-sets, as ideas have to 
hold true to the readers lives as lived; however, the continuous exposure to socialist 
framing of issues would, at a minimum, leave some traces, and would have 
encouraged readers to question the establishment’s presentations of issues and 
events, and to think more politically. 
The long standing ideological, political and economic antagonism of the capitalist 
press to the Labour Movement and to socialism, precipitated the 1945 Labour 
Government into establishing a Royal Commission to inquire into the finance, 
control, management, and ownership of the press.  It was unanimously welcomed 
by the union journals’ contributors and reported.  The generalised view of the 
Labour Movement was articulated in the AEU Journal’s conclusion that the Press 
was ‘one of the most subtle and successful methods used by the dominant class to 
guide the thinking of the working class into the acceptance of the ruling class social 
outlook.’18  F. Allaun (NUJ member, author of The Tory Press) asserted in the AEU 
Journal that the newspaper proprietors’ expurgated evidence presented to the 
Royal Commission19 and misrepresented its findings by claiming that they were 
‘vindicated.’20.  The AEU also highlighted Lord Beaverbrook’s21 now infamous 
statement: ‘I ran the paper solely for the purpose of making propaganda and with no 
other object’, and Lord Rhondda’s  statement: ‘A newspaper in London will be a 
source of political power and I am prepared to spend money on it.’22 Newspaper 
ownership provided a platform to steer public opinion; propagate their ideas and 
interests, and oppose or denigrate the labour and Co-operative movements; a 
position which was reinforced by their desire to please capitalist advertisers (both in 
terms of content and audience delivery) who contributed some two thirds of major 
newspapers’ revenue. The AEU Journal situated newspaper owners’ vested and 
family interests within a web of self-reinforcing, self-serving, profit making firms, 
                                                          
18 W. Wilson, ‘Politics and an Unbiased Press’, AEU Journal, (September, 1946), p. 266. 
19 37 volumes of memoranda. 
20 F. Allaun, ‘The Tory Press and the Coming Election’. 
21 Lord Beaverbrook owned the Daily Express, Sunday Express, and the Evening Standard. 
22 F. Allaun, ‘Press Lords Versus Trade Unionists (1), Putting the Worker in Blinkers’, AEU Journal, 
(August, 1951), pp. 244-5. 
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which used their own press as propaganda instruments to steer public opinion and 
the political agenda.  For instance, Lord Kemsley (of the Berry family), owned the 
Sunday Times, Sunday Chronicle, Sunday Graphic, Daily Record, Daily Dispatch, 
Daily Graphic, Empire News, plus 200 additional papers; a brother, Lord Camrose, 
owned the Daily Telegraph.  Additionally, the family had significant cotton, steel, 
and armaments interests.  Thus, their newspaper articles were employed to 
implicitly and explicitly convince the readership of, for instance, the anti-steel 
nationalisation case, which they could then misrepresent as factual news.23 
Laura Beers postulated that the Labour Party by contributing articles and columns 
to the capitalist press (as well as their own), exposed many to a socialist / labourist 
framing of issues and brought their ideas into debates and discussions. 24 This 
strategy during the late-interwar period and the run up to the 1945 election served 
to: 
normalise Labour politics and bring them to the breakfast table or sitting 
room of homes that Labour had failed to penetrate through more traditional 
modes of political outreach.25 
Beers’ claimed that the press’s dissemination of Labour’s policies and positions was 
influential in shaping peoples’ conceptions.  Thus, by implication, the continual 
socialist framing of issues found throughout the union journals and shop steward 
papers represents an important asset for the Labour Party and the socialist project.   
The Labour movement’s concerns over their treatment in the mainstream press and 
their difficulties in conveying their message to the public was not confined to the 
period of history analysed here.  Sean Tunney in his Labour and the Press: from 
New Left to New Labour 26 examines the debates within the Party on such problems 
throughout the Wilson, Kinnock, Smith, and Blair eras, and the Party’s change in 
their tactics, from seeking to counter the capitalist press bias’s through structural 
changes relating to press ownership, to the pursuit of a ‘political marketing 
strategy’;27 a strategy that ‘renewed pressure to seek business approval – to avoid 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 Beers, Your Britain. 
25 Ibid, p.202. 
26 Sean Tunney, Labour and the Press:  from New Left to New Labour (Brighton, 2007), 
27 Ibid. p. vii; Although under John Smith, press plurality and accountability rather than press 
manipulation was advocated; see Tunney, Labour and the Press, pp. 104-5. 
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upsetting the apple cart by bringing forward proposals for structural change’28.  
Thus, the capitalist press not only chose what they printed, but kept legislative 
changes around press ownership off the agenda.29  
The power of the media to frame policies and personalities to suit their own agenda 
is ongoing; consequently, so are Labour’s efforts to manage their media presence 
and the dissemination of their own ideas, policies, and positions. This study’s 
finding that the trade union journals were an important but unacknowledged 
propaganda instrument for the Labour Party, not only in encouraging the Labour 
vote but in explaining why people should support Labour (and believe in socialism), 
has contemporary relevance. Labour’s ‘political marketing strategy’ and use of ‘spin’ 
within the existing capitalist press to garner Labour friendly coverage as part of the 
New Labour project, initially met with some success.  It has subsequently suffered a 
backlash along with those people with whom it is associated.   
In parallel with the policy of ‘spin’ there was an attempt by the Labour Party to deal 
with the ‘problem’ of the trade unions.  A policy of distancing themselves from the 
unions was undertaken, particularly in the Blair era.  However, such attempts were 
never very successful insofar as their media image was concerned; the media 
continued to link the two, and propagate that image (especially the idea that the 
Party’s structure and financial dependency on the unions empowers them within the 
Party).   
This strategy and its consequences are areas that warrant continued research. The 
loosening of the Party – union link need not have been the case and counterfactuals 
based on the potential role the unions could play (based on their past performance 
as conduits of the Labour message) could be useful in informing future policy. The 
media environment continues to be hostile, but the circulation of the press is 
shrinking, and current affairs programmes like Newsnight have a limited audience.  
However, even in their current weakened state the unions have the potential to 
disseminate the Labour message (political and industrial) to millions of people.  
Thus, if the LP were to present a coherent story and ideology that embraced their 
                                                          
28 Ibid. p. 139. For discussion of the three dimensions of power and their application see S. Lukes, 
Power: A Radical View.   
29 Tunney, Labour and the Press, p. 139 
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past to understand the present and imagine the future, the trade unions and their 
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